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Summary
In his seminal paper, Kyle [46] analyses a financial market under asymmetric information.
In the presence of noise traders, a monopolistic, risk neutral insider who receives private
information trades strategically with competitive, risk neutral market makers who try to
infer the insider’s signal. Subsequent extensions of this model stick to the assumption that
noise traders act completely irrational, i.e. they are insensitive with respect to both, the
price of the considered risky asset and its fundamental value. Their order flow is typically
modelled by a Brownian motion in the continuous time framework.
The model developed in the present thesis relaxes the assumptions on the order flow
of the noise traders in two different aspects. Firstly, it allows sensitivity with respect to
a possible mispricing of the risky asset, i.e. the difference between its fundamental value
and the market price, via a compensating drift term. Secondly, besides the well-known,
continuous, Gaussian noise, a further, discontinuous noise that is correlated to jumps in
the fundamental value process is introduced. Together, this model allows to describe a
market with decay and reinforcement of irrational behaviour where the latter is caused by
the arrival of new, unexpected information.
For both extensions the implications on a market equilibrium are studied by identifying
necessary and sufficient conditions for its existence. This involves the analysis of optimal
insider trading, on the one hand, and rationality of the market makers’ inference of the
noisy signal, on the other hand. Finally, the explicit form of a market equilibrium is
determined.
For a start, the first extension is analysed separately for both cases, a risk neutral and a
risk averse insider. It is shown that the existence of an equilibrium depends on the structure
of the drift term where the fundamental value and the market price have to enter in a
special form, weighted only by a deterministic intensity. This intensity in turn determines
the equilibrium price pressure, i.e. the rate according to which variations of the total order
affect the market price. As a result this leads to path dependent pricing rules. The case
when the drift intensity approaches infinity at the end of the trading period is of special
interest since the market gets infinitely deep and, in contrast to other insider equilibrium
models, the market is already efficient in the absence of an insider. In particular, this
places additional demands on optimal insider strategies, which are analysed. Furthermore,
it is proved that the presence of noise drift allows equilibria for a risk averse insider beyond
the framework of a linear pricing rule, which is typically a necessary condition for the
existence of an equilibrium in other models.
In a second part, shot noise is incorporated in the analysis. In order to solve the market
makers’ inference problem, non-standard techniques for stochastic filtering are developed.
The resulting equilibrium pricing rule exhibits a far more complex structure compared to
the standard case, including a non-deterministic price pressure.
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Introduction
In financial markets, new and unexpected information often leads to abrupt changes in asset
prices. Uncertainty, irrational behaviour, or wrong evaluation of this information may cause
inappropriate adjustments of prices. This arises over- or underpricing with respect to the fun-
damental value of the particular asset. After some time the effect may fade away while the
market comes back to more rational levels. Over the long run, this lets prices converge to their
fundamental level. A rationally acting market participant should be able to take profit out of
the resulting situation.
If all agents had full information and acted rationally, the market price should match the
fundamental value of the risky asset according to the efficient market hypothesis. If this is not
the case, one is facing a situation of optimal trading under asymmetric information, which is often
referred to as insider trading. Such models have been widely discussed in financial literature,
see e.g. [55], [6], [40] and [13]. But all these models have in common that prices are fixed
exogenously and are not affected by the insider or only affected in the framework of a special
structure of the price dynamics (cf. [29], [45]). In the latter case, the insider is often identified
as large investor, i.e. an agent whose influence on the market is big enough to manipulate the
price process dynamics by his decisions.
As Danilova [28, p. 2] points out, the assumptions of these models have two shortcomings from
the market microstructure point of view:
i) imposing strong efficiency of the markets even without an insider providing, through her
trading, information to the market – that is, assuming a priori that the price will converge
to the fundamental value
ii) the less informed agents are not fully rational, since they do not try to infer the insider’s
private signal from market data (since there is no feedback from insider trading to equilibrium
price).
However, price formation under asymmetric information considering the informational con-
tent of stock prices, and strategic insider trading, in an equilibrium framework, is discussed by
dynamic equilibrium models, which were introduced by the seminal work of Kyle [46] and elab-
orated by Back [7], see also [25], [28], [27], [19] and further references in Section 1.2. In these
models, the market price is a functional of the total order flow. More detailed, the original setup
of these models considers a market with two assets: one risky asset and one bank account with
interest rate zero. During a trading period [0, T ] the price P of the asset does not necessarily
match its fundamental value V . This changes in T by a public announcement of the fundamental
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value. Thus, in general we have Pt 6= V , for t < T and Pt = V , for t ≥ T .
There are three different types of market participants: an insider, market makers, and un-
informed traders (noise traders) who trade randomly. It is assumed that the informational
advantage of the insider consists in prior knowledge of the exogenous variable V that is pub-
lished to the market at time T . The order flow of the other market participants is independent
of this variable. The market makers set the price and clear the market according to a pricing
rule
Pt = H(t, Y[0,t])
that depends on the observed path of the total order flow
Yt = θt +Xt
where θ denotes the trading strategy of the insider and X the cumulated demand of the noise
traders. Indeed, the noise traders provide camouflage enabling the insider to hide his informed
trading and to earn profits. The insider now faces the problem to maximise the expected utility
of her profit, while the market makers try to infer the insider’s information from the total order
flow. Due to the dependence of the order strategy and the market price, the insider is revealing
her information by trading. The pivotal question is whether there exists an equilibrium, i.e. a
pair (θ,H), where θ is an optimal strategy given H, and H a rational pricing rule given θ. It
turns out that an equilibrium exists and that the fundamental value is fully revealed right before
the end of the trading period.
Holden and Subrahmanyam [39], Foster and Viswanathan [36] and Back et al. [9] introduce
multiple insiders into this kind of equilibrium model. In Holden and Subrahmanyam [39] all
insiders receive the same private signal. This competitive situation leads to agressive insider
trading. As a consequence, their information is revealed immediately if the interval between
auctions approaches zero (continuous trading). On the other hand, a waiting game effect caused
by imperfectly correlated signals (the insiders try to infer each other’s signals), considered in
Foster and Viswanathan [36] and Back et al. [9], slows down the revelation of information.
All equilibrium models introduced above assume that there exists a group of market partici-
pants, called noise traders, which act irrationally in the sense that they are completely insensitive
with respect to the price and the uncertainty over the fundamental value. Typically their order
flow X is modelled by a Brownian motion in the continuous time case. The existence of such
irrationally behaving noise traders can be explained by concepts of behavioural finance (cf. Bar-
beris and Thaler [11] for a review, see also Dow and Gorton [30] for further treatment of noise
trading). Nevertheless, the assumption of complete insensitivity with respect to the market price
of the asset and the uncertainty over its fundamental value seems arbitrarily, justifiable only by
analytic tractability (cf. [50], p. 360). In [59] and [50] a model with strategic noise traders who
receive random endowment shocks is analysed in a one and two trading periods framework.
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However, in the Kyle-Back model the presence of irrational agents is crucial since in a market
populated only with rational participants the no trade theorem (cf. Brunnermeier [17], Chapter
2) states that it is impossible to profit from superior information by trading. The attendance
of irrational traders leads to a semi-strong efficient market, i.e. a market that correctly reflects
public, but not necessarily private information and where the trading on the basis of private
information makes the latter public (cf. Fama [34]).
A second important assumption regards the public announcement of the fundamental value at
some future date. If this was not about to happen, the insider could not benefit from dissolving
her clandestinely aggregated portfolio since selling/buying again would lower/rise the market
price.
Coming back to our initial example, we have to acknowledge that the efficiency (the price was
assumed to return to its fundamental level at some time T ) is not compatible with the existence
of noise, on the one hand, and the absence of some announcement of the fundamental value, on
the other hand. If we discard the assumption of totally irrational traders in the sense of the
above discussed equilibria models, and replace these by traders who become rational and aware
of the fundamental value (in a collective sense) as time passes by, indeed, this should result in
a strong form efficient market because according to Fama [34], p. 388, “sufficient numbers of
investors” have access to the privileged information.
Becoming rational should by no means happen suddenly since this again could only be justified
by some exogenous event. Therefore, the order flow of the noise traders already should depend
on the fundamental value before time T . Partially informed noise traders who may be “more
rational than in the standard model” were already considered by Aase et al. [2] and modelled by
a demand that is correlated to the fundamental value. However, the model in [2] only considers
a one period trading framework.
In this thesis, we want to analyse the above situation in a continuous time setting. The order
flow of the noise trader is described by
dXt = µ(t, V, Pt) dt+ σ dBt, t < T,
where B is a Brownian motion and µ such that sgn(µ(t, V, Pt)) = sgn(V − Pt). We decompose
the trading into a noise part (uninformed trading), represented by the dBt term, and an informed
trading part, represented by the drift term. Since the informed part responds to the mispricing
in a positive way, but is not necessarily rational (in a utility maximising sense), we call this kind
of behaviour semi-rational. Hence, this model describes a situation that is located between the
classical Kyle-Back model (one insider and uninformed noise traders, cf. [46], [7]) and the model
of Holden and Subrahmanyam [39] (multiple insiders with homogeneous information). While the
first model provides an equilibrium, this fails to hold true in the latter case if trading happens
continuously. The pivotal question is, whether or not the insider accepts the competing noise
drift such that there exists an equilibrium.
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Indeed, we will point out a situation where an equilibrium is possible. The noise drift then is
represented by a fixed functional depending on the total order and the fundamental value, and
it is scaled by an arbitrary deterministic coefficient function called noise drift intensity. Letting
this function go to infinity while approaching the trading horizon results in a model where the
market is efficient even in absence of an insider. This provides the intuition of a market getting
more rational or, conversely, a market getting less irrational.
In our initial example, uncertainty or irrationality arises from the sudden arrival of unexpected
information. In a framework as described above, this raises the question if further incoming
information could stop the decay of irrational behaviour or even reinforce it. In the first instance,
new and relevant information should have an impact on the fundamental value of the traded asset.
Besides some influence on the informed trading part, a reinforcement of irrational behaviour could
become noticeable by the following two effects: Firstly, the period of time that is needed by the
market to cool down could be prolonged. Secondly, further over- or underreactions are brought
to the market by a sudden adjustment of the noise traders’ portfolios.
Mathematically more detailed, this situation can be described by a fundamental value that is
driven by a Poisson process N representing the arrival times of new information, i.e.
Vt =
Nt∑
i=0
V (i),
and a demand process of the noise traders with dynamics
dXt = µ(t, Vt, Pt)dt+ σdBt + dX
d
t
whereXd is some jump process that is correlated to V . The trading horizon T which is associated
to the time when the market has cooled down completely now is a stopping time that depends
on N , too.
Besides the usual, continuous noise, represented by a Brownian motion, the resulting model
incorporates a second noise component. Due to its instantaneous appearance it may be called
shot noise. On the other hand, we have a noise compensating drift term which can be identified
with the decay of irrational behaviour. In the world of exogenously fixed price dynamics such a
situation could be described by so-called shot noise models as in [58] or [5]. However, this thesis
studies the process of price formation and its underlying equilibrium in the above motivated
models. In order to do so we will proceed as follows:
In the first chapter, a definition of order based insider trading models in continuous time is
given and the central concepts and problems are explained. This is done in a general way so
that the above described extensions are covered by this framework. For an accurate classification
of the proposed setting, a short review of existing literature regarding this type of equilibrium
model is given. Significant extensions with respect to the standard model are described and the
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most important results are summarised.
As described above, the market makers have to infer the insider’s signal. Mathematically this
constitutes a problem of stochastic filtering. In general, such problems cannot be solved explicitly
since this leads to an infinite dimensional system of SDE according to the Kushner-Stratonovich
equation (cf. [10] Theorem 3.30, [48] Theorem 8.1). In the case of conditionally Gaussian sig-
nals, a closed system can be determined by taking advantage of a special relationship between
conditional moments of higher order (cf. [49]). Typically, equilibrium models rely on the feature
of a closed-form solution of the involved filter problem. In Chapter 2, we therefore reproduce
these crucial results. Since they only incorporate Gaussian noise, non-standard techniques have
to be developed for the case of additional shot noise. Presuming conditionally Gaussian shots,
a finite dimensional filter for this jump diffusion problem can be derived from the (continuous)
diffusion case.
In Chapter 3, we start the actual analysis of the model. As a first step, we only consider the
extension regarding the drift term, called noise drift, and study the model up to a fixed horizon
T , with a constant fundamental value. Both a risk neutral and a risk averse insider are allowed.
Initially, a rigorous definition of the model is given. This also includes the fixing of a class of
admissible pricing rules. We restrict the analysis to the case where the price is determined by
a function depending on time and the path of the total order flow which is weighted according
to a deterministic function, called price pressure. In the second section, we point out necessary
conditions for the existence of an equilibrium under the assumption of absolutely continuous
insider trading. This is done with the help of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation approach.
The derived conditions are related to the form of the noise drift. It turns out that dependences
on the fundamental value and the market price have to exhibit a special structure that is scaled
by some arbitrary, positive, deterministic coefficient function, also called drift intensity. We
show that the price pressure has to be inversely related to the integrated drift intensity and
thus decreasing, in particular. Primarily, this yields path dependent pricing rules. Furthermore,
this leads to the interpretation that informed trading of the noise traders is accepted by the
insider because the market gets deeper and hence future trades more profitable. Moreover, we
can identify the case of infinite drift intensity with an infinitely deep market. In this case, we
prove that the market is efficient by itself, i.e. the market price converges to the fundamental
value even without insider trading. The latter places additional demands on the optimality of an
insider strategy, which is studied in the third section. In the case of a bounded drift intensity, it
is proved that an insider strategy is optimal if it is absolutely continuous and drives the market
price to the asset’s fundamental value at the end of the trading period. This corresponds to
the results of the standard model and other extensions. If the drift intensity is unbounded, the
above criteria obviously are not sufficient since the market is efficient by itself. To solve the
resulting optimisation problem, new techniques have to be developed. It turns out that the
extended optimality criterion relates to the convergence speed of the market price measured by
the vanishing price pressure. Rationality of the pricing rule is analysed in the following section. In
Section 3.6, the results of the preceding sections are brought together to state sufficient conditions
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for an equilibrium. With the help of the elaborated criteria it is possible to specify the explicit
form of an equilibrium and prove its existence. The analysis is done for both a risk neutral
insider as well as a risk averse insider. We show that, in contrast to other insider equilibrium
models, the presence of noise drift also permits equilibria for non-linear price functions in the
risk averse case.
Additionally incorporating the second extension, i.e. the reinforcing part, is the main task of
Chapter 4. For the analysis of this model, we basically use methods analogous to those used in
Chapter 3. Due to the far more complex structure induced by the jump parts, we restrict the
setup to a bounded drift intensity and a risk neutral insider. We start with an heuristic transfer
of the results derived in Chapter 3. This naive approach justifies further assumptions made in
the rigorous definition of the model given thereafter, as for example a more complex structure
of the pricing function or the different weighting of continuous and discontinuous changes in the
total order flow. In the following analysis, it turns out that, in general, the price pressure (of
the continuous changes) has to allow stochastic dependence. Again, optimality and rationality
are studied and finally sufficient conditions for an equilibrium and its form are characterised.
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Notation
Filtered probability space and stochastic processes
All random variables are defined on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P) where F = (Ft)t≥0
satisfies the usual hypothesis (cf. [42], p. 5), i.e. F is right continuous and F0 contains all (P,F)-
negligible sets N. For any adapted stochastic càdlàg processes X we denote by
Xt− = lim
s↗t
Xs
the left limit of X in t. A jump at time t is written as
∆Xt = Xt −Xt−.
For a semimartingale X with
∑
s≤t |∆Xs| <∞, for all t ≥ 0, the process
Xct = Xt −
∑
s≤t
∆Xs, t ≥ 0,
is a continuous semimartingale. The discontinuous part of X, (
∑
s≤t ∆Xs = Xt −Xct , t ≥ 0), is
denoted by Xd. In particular, Xt = Xct +Xdt .
If not stated differently, for a given stochastic process X we will denote by FX := (FXt )t≥0
the completed filtration generated by the process X, i.e. for all t ≥ 0
FXt = σ({Xs : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}) ∪N.
General notations, functions and functional spaces
For any real numbers x and y: x ∧ y = min(x, y), x ∨ y = max(x, y).
For x ∈ R the signum function is defined by
sgn(x) =

1, if x > 0
0, if x = 0
−1, if x < 0
.
For an integrable function f : D → R, D ⊂ R and a, b ∈ D, a < b, we write∫ a
b
f(x) dx = −
∫ b
a
f(x) dx.
For k ∈ N, Ck(D) is the space of all real-valued continuous functions f on D ⊂ Rn with
continuous derivatives up to order k. C0(D) is the space of continuous functions f on D. For a
given f ∈ C2(D) the partial derivatives ∂f∂xi ,
∂2f
∂xi∂xj
, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, are also denoted by ∂xif , ∂xixjf .
An l-dimensional function f = (f (1), . . . , f (l)) ∈ C0l ([0, T ]) if f (i) ∈ C0([0, T ]), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
7

Chapter 1
Strategic order based insider trading models in
continuous time
This chapter is devoted to a basic description of the framework of strategic insider trading models
presented in the introduction. This includes the main definitions and central problems that are
discussed in such models. The second section gives a short overview of the existing literature
regarding this type of equilibrium models.
1.1 Strategic order based insider trading: an introduction
For a detailed description recall that all random variables are defined on a filtered probability
space (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P). We consider a market with two assets, one risky asset and one bank
account with interest rate equal to zero. During a trading period [0, T ) the market price P
of the risky asset does not necessarily match its fundamental value V . V itself is a stochastic
process, i.e. non-constant in general. The difference between market price on the one hand, and
fundamental value on the other is caused by an informational asymmetry that is cleared at a
(random) time T . This might be due to an announcement or some other event, as motivated in
the introduction, which ensures completely homogeneous expectation of all market participants
with respect to the value of the asset thereafter. It follows that from time T on, the market price
P matches the fundamental value V , i.e. Pt = Vt, for all t ≥ T .
Market participants
There are three different types of market participants: market makers, an insider, and noise
traders.
• Market makers: The market makers are not able to observe the value process V but the
total order process Y of the risky asset. In particular, they cannot distinguish between
informed and uninformed trades but are aware of the presence of informed trading (for a
model that incorporates uncertainty of informed trading we refer to [47]). Since they are
risk neutral and competitive, they set the price and clear the market according to a pricing
9
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rule
Pt = E
(
VT
∣∣FMt )
based on their observation FM = (FMt )t≥0 where FMt ⊃ FYt (typically it is assumed that
F
M = FY ).
• Insider: In contrast to the market makers, the insider possesses privileged information
that is the knowledge of the fundamental value process V . Additionally, she observes the
market price process P . Her information can therefore be identified with the filtration
F
I := (FIt )t≥0 where FIt contains the completion of σ({Ps, Vs, T ∧ s, 0 ≤ s ≤ t}). The
insider’s strategy is represented by an FI-adapted process θ.
• Noise traders: The noise traders do not act strategically. Their cumulated order flow,
denoted by X, contains a random part (also called noise). The total order process Y ,
which is observed by the market makers, can thus be represented by Y = X + θ.
The insider’s wealth
As pointed out by Back [7] for a model with constant trading horizon or by Corcuera et al. [27]
for the general case of a stopping time T , the insider’s terminal wealth W θT , corresponding to a
certain strategy θ, can be calculated as follows:
First consider a discrete model with trading times 0 ≤ t1 < t2 < · · · < tN = T , N ∈ N, where
N might be random. Purchasing θti − θti−1 units of the financial asset at time ti costs
Pti(θti − θti−1)
since the orders are executed at the new price. After all trading periods this yields the total cost
N∑
i=1
Pti(θti − θti−1).
Now, if the market price converges to the fundamental value right after tN , this leads to an extra
income θtNVtN . It follows
W θN+ = −
N∑
i=1
Pti(θti − θti−1) + θtNVtN
= −
N∑
i=1
Pti−1(θti − θti−1)−
N∑
i=1
(Pti − Pti−1)(θti − θti−1) + θtNVtN .
Analogously, in continuous time,
W θT+ = θTVT −
∫ T
0
Pt− dθt − [P, θ]T . (1.1)
10
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If we want to understand the above integral as Itô integral, we have to assume that θ as well as
P are FI-semimartingales. Observe that integration by parts (cf. [56], p. 68) would lead to
W θT+ = θT (VT − PT ) +
∫ T
0
θt− dPt.
P is an FM-adapted process, but θ is not. Hence,
∫ T
0 θt− dPt is not well-defined as an Itô integral,
in general. As pointed out by Aase et al. [1], the integral w.r.t. P could be understood as forward
integral. However, in this work, P always is an FI-semimartingale.
In the above argumentation, we used the fact that the convergence of the market price to
the fundamental value happens right after T but not in T , i.e. we have PT 6= VT in general,
but Pt = Vt for all t > T . If we assume that already PT = VT holds, we get by an analogous
argumentation in the discrete case
W θN = −
N∑
i=1
Pti(θti − θti−1) + θtNVtN
= −
N−1∑
i=1
Pti(θti − θti−1)− PtN (θtN − θtN−1) + θtNVtN
= −
N−1∑
i=1
Pti(θti − θti−1)− VtN (θtN − θtN−1) + θtNVtN
= −
N−1∑
i=1
Pti(θti − θti−1) + VtN θtN−1 .
In the continuous case, this corresponds to
W θT = θT−VT −
∫ T−
0
Pt− dθt − [P, θ]T− . (1.2)
If θ is continuous, there indeed is no difference between the representation of the final wealth in
(1.1) and (1.2). For reasons that will be explained later on in Chapter 3, we will always consider
the latter case, i.e. (1.2).
Optimal insider strategies
The insider is assumed to be rational and utility maximising. Let W θT denote her final wealth
as calculated in (1.2), U be a fixed utility function, i.e. a strictly increasing function, and S the
set of all admissible trading strategies. Then utility maximising means that the insider tries to
solve the following optimisation problem:
sup
θ∈S
E
(
U(W θT )
)
. (1.3)
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As pointed out above, S has to be a subset of all FI-semimartingales. Depending on the
particular model, further technical assumption are made to ensure the tractability of the model.
Definition 1.1. An admissible trading strategy θ ∈ S is called optimal (in S) if it solves the
optimisation problem stated in (1.3).
Furthermore, we note that an optimal strategy in S1 might not be optimal in S2 if S1 ⊂ S2.
For example, if θ is restricted to be absolutely continuous, i.e.
θt = θ0 +
∫ t
0
αs ds, t ≥ 0,
for some suitable integrable process α, then θ might not be optimal in a set of admissible
strategies that allows quadratic variation or discontinuity. However, sometimes even optimality
in the larger class can be proved, e.g. [7], [28], [26].
Admissible and rational pricing rules
Analogous to the insider strategies, the set of possible pricing rules is restricted to a certain
class P, called admissible pricing rules. Again the definition of admissible pricing rules gathers
technical conditions that ensure the tractability of a certain model. Typically it is assumed that
prices follow
Pt∧T = H(t ∧ T, Y˜t∧T )
where Y˜ is the weighted total order process, i.e.
Y˜t =
∫ t
0
λs dYs
for some positive andFM-adapted process λ, called price pressure, andH, called pricing function,
is a sufficiently smooth function such that H(t, ·) is strictly increasing for all t. In this case, the
pair (H,λ) is also called pricing rule. Furthermore, a rational pricing rule is defined as follows:
Definition 1.2. An admissible pricing rule P ∈ P is called rational if
Pt = E
(
VT
∣∣FMt ) , for all t ≥ 0. (1.4)
Equilibrium
After introducing optimal insider strategies and rational pricing rules, we can state the following:
The market price depends on the total order via a given pricing rule. Since the total order
contains the informed trading of the insider, too, the price is influenced by the insider strategy.
Conversely, the terminal wealth generated by a certain insider strategy depends on the market
price. Hence, optimality of an insider strategy depends on the particular form of the pricing
12
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rule, and rationality of a pricing rule depends on the insider strategy. The central question is,
whether there exists a pair comprising a pricing rule and an insider strategy that are rational
and optimal respectively.
Definition 1.3. A pair (θ, P ) ∈ S × P is called equilibrium (in (S,P)) if the following holds:
• P given θ is rational,
• θ given P is optimal.
1.2 A short review
This section gives a short summery about existing literature and models that follow the general
framework presented in the last section. We start with the so-called Kyle-Back model, which is
based on the seminal paper of Kyle [46] and was elaborated by Back [7]. Thereafter, different
extensions of this standard model are presented and classified. For a further survey on equilibrium
models under asymmetric information, including the Kyle-Back model and its extensions, we refer
to [33].
1.2.1 The Kyle-Back model
The model developed by Kyle [46] and elaborated by Back [7] (cf. also [25]) can be summarised as
follows: The order flow of the noise traders follows a Brownian motion B with constant volatility
σ, i.e.
dXt = σdBt.
The (constant) fundamental value V of the risky asset is to be published to the market at time
1. Furthermore, it is assumed that V can be described by V = h(Z) where Z ∼ N (0, 1). The
price Pt is based on the total order up to time t
Pt = H(t, Yt)
where H is required to be sufficiently smooth and H(t, ·) is strictly increasing for each t ∈ [0, 1].
The insider is risk neutral, i.e. U(W ) = W . It turns out that an equilibrium can be achieved if
• H satisfies the PDE
∂tH +
σ2
2
∂yyH = 0, (1.5)
• θ is absolutely continuous and Y is an FM-Brownian motion such that H(1, Y1) = V a.s.
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For σ = 1, this is the case if
H(t, y) = Eh(y +X1 −Xt)
and
θt = (1− t)
∫ t
0
h−1(V )−Xs
(1− s)2 ds
(cf. [7], Theorem 1). Cho [25] considers a larger class of possible pricing functions
H(t,
∫ t
0
λ(s) dYs) (1.6)
for a positive, smooth function λ, called price pressure. However, in the risk neutral case it turns
out that λ has to be constant.
1.2.2 The risk averse case
Cho [25] and Baruch [12] studied the Kyle-Back model under the presence of a risk averse insider.
More detailed, it is assumed that the utility function U has an exponential structure
U(W ) = β exp (βW ), β < 0.
It turns out that an equilibrium only exists in a linear framework, i.e. if the price is given by
Pt = H(t,
∫ t
0
λ(s) dYs) = p0 + q
∫ t
0
λ(s) dYs.
This in turn requires V being Gaussian (cf. [25], Proposition 3 and Lemma 8). The equilibrium
price pressure λ follows the dynamics
d
dt
(
λ(t)−1
)
= −βσ2∂yH(t, y).
In particular, λ is decreasing (recall that ∂yH > 0). Hence, intuitively speaking, the insider’s
risk that the noise trading might move the price towards the asset value is compensated by a
decreasing price pressure which makes later trades more favorable.
1.2.3 Imperfect dynamic information
Danilova [28] (see also [60] or [8] for additional time varying noise volatility) relaxes the strong
assumption regarding the insider’s knowledge of the fundamental value at the beginning. In
contrast to a constant signal the privileged information is given by the conditional expectation
f(t, Zt) of V = h(Z1) that can be expressed in terms of a sufficient statistics Zt of the insider’s
14
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information at time t. Here Z evolves according to
dZt = σz(t)dB
z
t
where Bz is a Brownian motion independent of the one that drives the noise traders’ demand.
Under certain assumptions on the volatility σz an equilibrium can be calculated. These assump-
tions ensure that the insider’s signal is always at least as precise as the one of the market makers
and even more precise close to the terminal time (cf. [28], Assumptions 2.2, 3.1, 3.2). For an
equilibrium the same characterisation as in the Kyle-Back model holds. The equilibrium insider
strategy is given by (cf. [28], Theorem 3.1)
θt =
∫ t
0
Zs − Ys∫ s
0 σz(u)
2 du− s+ σ2 ds
where σ is the volatility of noise trading.
Campi et al. [20] generalise the above setup to a non-Gaussian model where
dZt = σz(t)a(Σ(t), Zt)dB
z
t , Σ(t) = c+
∫ t
0
σz(s) ds.
1.2.4 Alternative noise dynamics
While the extensions in 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 mainly concerned the insider’s point of view, extensions
regarding the noise traders’ order flow also have been discussed.
Fractional Brownian motion
Biagini et al. [15] replace the Brownian motion B in the noise trader dynamics by a fractional
Brownian motion with Hurst parameter H > 12 , i.e. the increments are positively correlated (cf.
[14] for details on fractional Brownian motions). Heuristically this means that the noise traders
have some memory. For the class of insider trading strategies of the form
dθt = (V − Pt)αtdt
the optimal trading intensity αt can only be calculated implicitly, but again is proved to ensure
PT = V (cf. [15], Theorem 2.4).
Lévy noise
For the case of a constant signal V as in the Kyle-Back model, Corcuera et al. [26] consider
general noise dynamics of the form
dXt = µtdt+ σtdBt + dLt
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where µ and σ are deterministic functions and L is a pure jump Lévy process independent of
V and B. Given that admissible pricing rules take the form as in (1.6), it turns out that in
the presence of a risk neutral insider there exists an equilibrium if and only if L ≡ 0 (cf. [26],
Theorem 12 and Proposition 13). In contrast to the standard model PDE (1.5), the equilibrium
pricing rule H satisfies the PDE
∂tH + λtµt∂yH +
σ2t λ
2
t
2
∂yyH = 0. (1.7)
The additional term λtµt∂yH is due to the deterministic drift that is contained in the order flow
of the noise traders.
1.2.5 Random time horizon
Caldentey and Stacchetti [18] assume that the announcement of the fundamental value Vt = σvBvt
(Bv Brownian motion) happens randomly at some time T that is exponentially distributed with
scale parameter µ. In this case, the insider’s expected payoff from time s onward is given by
W θT = E
(∫ ∞
s
e−µ(t−s)(Vt − Pt) dθt +
∫ ∞
s
e−µ(t−s) d [θ, V − P ]t
)
.
Despite the fact that T is not predictable for the insider, an (linear) equilibrium can be calculated
(cf. [18], Theorem 3). Heuristically, the insider’s risk of not having used all available information
up to time T is compensated by a decreasing price pressure.
1.2.6 Defaultable bonds
Campi and Çetin [19] apply the Kyle-Back model to the case of a defaultable bond (that pays 1
unit of a currency at time 1), whose default time is known to the insider at time 0 and given by
τ := inf{t > 0 : Bt = −1}
where B is a Brownian motion. Similar to the Kyle-Back model it turns out that an equilibrium
(H, θ) can be characterised by H verifying PDE (1.5) and Y being a Brownian motion w.r.t. FM
such that limt→1H(τ ∧t, Yτ∧t) = 1[τ>1] (cf. [19], Lemma 3.4). By assumption, the default time is
totally inaccessible to the market. However, in equilibrium the default time gets predictable by
the presence of a risk neutral insider revealing her information in order to maximise her expected
profit. In [22] and [21] the assumption regarding the insider’s information is relaxed.
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Preliminary results on stochastic filtering
In this chapter, we present some preliminary results that are crucial for the analysis of insider
trading models. The first section describes common facts of stochastic filtering theory for con-
ditionally Gaussian diffusions. These are taken from Liptser and Shiryaev [49]. In the second
section, the results will be extended to a special case of conditionally Gaussian jump processes.
As we have seen in the introduction to order based insider trading models (cf. Section 1.1),
the market makers are facing the problem to infer Vt = h(Zt) from the observation of the total
order process
Yt = θt +Xt, t ≥ 0,
i.e. to derive E(h(Zt)|FMt ). Mathematically this leads to a so-called stochastic filtering problem
where the unobservable process Z is referred to as signal process and Y as observation process.
If Z and Y are diffusion type processes, the filter problem is solved by the so-called Kushner-
Stratonovich equation (cf. [10], Theorem 3.30, [48], Theorem 8.1). In the special case when Z is
constant and Y defined as solution of
dYt = a(t, Z)dt+ dWt
whereW is a Brownian motion independent of Z and a some well-behaved function, this equation
reads as
pit(h(Z)) = pi0(h(Z)) +
∫ t
0
pis(h(Z)a(s, Z))− pis(h(Z))pis(a(s, Z)) (dYs − pis(a(s, Z))ds) (2.1)
where pit(h(Z)) := E(h(Z)|FYt ). Similar results can be calculated for the case when Y and Z are
jump diffusions, as done in [24], see also [37], [23]. Roughly speaking, the incoming observation
dYt at t can be split into a predicted part pit(a(t, Z))dt and an additional part dYt− pit(a(t, Z)dt
containing new information that is independent of the current knowledge. Mathematically more
detailed, the so-called information process
Yt −
∫ t
0
pis(a(s, Z)) ds, t ≥ 0,
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is a Brownian motion w.r.t. the observation filtration FY (cf. [10], Proposition 2.30). Equation
(2.1) can then be understood as proceeding update of the estimator of h(Z) according to the
incoming new information.
However, even in the special case stated above, in order to determine pit(h(Z)) one has to
know pit(h(Z)a(t, Z)). For pit(h(Z)a(t, Z)) in turn one needs pit(h(Z)a(t, Z)2) and so on. Hence,
a general solution can only be obtained by an infinite dimensional system of stochastic differential
equations. For a closed form solution one has to search for an additional relation of the involved
conditional moments. In the case of Gaussian or conditionally Gaussian processes
pit(Z
3) = 3pit(Z)pit(Z
2)− 2(pit(Z))3
holds true. This leads to a closed system for pit(Z) and γt(Z) = pit(Z2)−(pit(Z))2. For continuous
processes this has been pointed out in [49], Chapter 12.
Since this result will turn out to be crucial for the solution of an equilibrium in an insider
trading model, we will reproduce it in the following section. As an application we will furthermore
state an extended result for the case of conditionally Gaussian jump diffusions, which will be
used in Chapter 4.
2.1 General results on optimal filtering for conditionally
Gaussian diffusions
Theorem 2.1 (cf. [49], Theorem 12.6, p. 31). Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space with
right continuous filtration (Ft)0≤t≤T and W (1) and W (2) be two mutually independent k and
l-dimensional Brownian motions. Furthermore, let Z = (Z(1)t , . . . , Z
(k)
t ), Y = (Y
(1)
t , . . . , Y
(l)
t ),
0 ≤ t ≤ T , be solutions to the following stochastic differential equations
dZt = (a0(t, Y ) + a1(t, Y )Zt) dt+
2∑
i=1
bi(t, Y ) dW
(i)
t , (2.2)
dYt = (A0(t, Y ) +A1(t, Y )Zt) dt+
2∑
i=1
Bi(t, Y ) dW
(i)
t (2.3)
where the elements of the vector functions
a0(t, x) = (a01(t, x), . . . , a0k(t, x)), A0(t, x) = (A01(t, x), . . . , A0l(t, x))
and matrices
a1(t, x) = ||a(1)ij (t, x)||(k×k), A1(t, x) = ||A(1)ij (t, x)||(l×k),
b1(t, x) = ||b(1)ij (t, x)||(k×k), b2(t, x) = ||b(2)ij (t, x)||(k×l),
B1(t, x) = ||B(1)ij (t, x)||(l×k), B2(t, x) = ||B(2)ij (t, x)||(l×l)
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are assumed to be measurable non-anticipative functionals on
{
[0, T ]× C0l ([0, T ]),B([0, T ])× Bl([0, T ])
}
, x = (x(1), . . . , x(l)) ∈ C0l ([0, T ]).
Furthermore, assume that for all i, j and all x ∈ C0l ([0, T ]) the following conditions hold P-a.s.
(1)
∫ T
0
|a0i(t, x)|+ |a(1)ij (t, x)|+
2∑
n=1
(b
(n)
ij (t, x))
2 + (B
(n)
ij (t, x))
2 dt <∞,
(2)
∫ T
0
(
(A0i(t, x))
2 + (A
(1)
ij (t, x))
2
)
dt <∞,
(3) the matrix B ◦B(t, x) := B1(t, x)B>1 (t, x)+B2(t, x)B>2 (t, x) is uniformly non-singular, i.e.
the elements of the reciprocal matrix are uniformly bounded,
(4) if g(t, x) denotes any element of the matrices B1(t, x) and B2(t, x), then, for x, y ∈
C0l ([0, T ])
|g(t, x)− g(t, y)|2 ≤ L1
∫ t
0
|x(s)− y(s)|2 dK(s) + L2|x(t)− y(t)|2,
g2(t, x) ≤ L1
∫ t
0
(1 + |x(s)|2) dK(s) + L2(1 + |x(t)|2)
where |x(t)|2 = (x(1)(t))2 + · · · + (x(l)(t))2 and K(t) is a non-decreasing right continuous
function, 0 ≤ K(t) ≤ 1,
(5)
∫ T
0
E|A(1)ij (t, Y )Z(j)t | dt <∞,
(6) E|Z(j)t | <∞, 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
(7) P
(∫ T
0
(
A
(1)
ij (t, Y )η
(j)
t
)2
dt <∞
)
= 1, where η(j)t = E(Z
(j)
t |FYt ),
(8) Z0 given Y0 is Gaussian, N (η0, γ0), with Sp γ0 <∞ P-a.s.
Then the process (Z, Y ) is conditionally Gaussian, i.e. for any 0 ≤ t0 < t1 < · · · < tn ≤ t, the
conditional distribution of Zt0 , . . . , Ztn given FYt is Gaussian.
Theorem 2.2 (cf. [49], Theorem 12.7, p. 33). Given the assumptions of Theorem 2.1 and addi-
tionally
(9) |a(1)ij (t, x)| ≤ L, |A(1)ij (t, x)| ≤ L,
(10)
∫ T
0
E
(
a40i(t, Y ) + (b
(1)
ij (t, Y ))
4 + (b
(2)
ij (t, Y ))
4
)
dt <∞,
(11) E
k∑
i=1
(Z
(i)
0 )
4 <∞.
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Then the vector ηt = E
(
Zt
∣∣FYt ) and the matrix γt = E ((Zt − ηt)(Zt − ηt)>∣∣FYt ) are unique
continuous FYt -measurable for any t solutions of the system of equations
dηt = (a0(t, Y ) + a1(t, Y )ηt) dt+
(
(b ◦B)(t, Y ) + γtA>1 (t, Y )
)
(B ◦B)−1(t, Y )
× (dYt − (A0(t, Y ) +A1(t, Y )ηt)dt) ,
(2.4)
d
dt
γt = a1(t, Y )γt + γta
>
1 (t, Y ) + (b ◦ b)(t, Y )−
(
(b ◦B)(t, Y ) + γtA>1 (t, Y )
)
× (B ◦B)−1(t, Y )
(
(b ◦B)(t, Y ) + γtA>1 (t, Y )
)> (2.5)
with initial conditions η0 = E(Z0|Y0), γ0 = E((Z0− η0)(Z0− η0)>|Y0). If in this case the matrix
γ0 is positive definite, then the matrices γt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , will have the same property.
The following two corollaries are applications of the above theorems. The special situation
described therein is used in the next section to identify the filter problem of a certain conditionally
Gaussian jump diffusion with that of a multi-dimensional conditionally Gaussian diffusion.
Corollary 2.3. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space with right continuous filtration
(Ft)0≤t≤T , Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) be an F0-measurable n-dimensional random vector and Y be a
(2n− 1)-dimensional, adapted stochastic process on [0, T ] defined by
Yt = (Y
(1)
t , . . . , Y
(2n−1)
t )
where
dY
(1)
t = A0(t, Y ) + A¯1(t, Y )Z dt+ σ dW
(1)
t ,
dY
(i)
t = σdW
(i)
t , i ∈ {2, . . . , 2n− 1}
and
Y
(i)
0 = Vi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} , Y (n+i−1)0 = Ti, i ∈ {2, . . . , n} ,
such that the following conditions hold:
(i) (W (1), . . . ,W (2n−1)) is an (2n− 1)-dimensional Brownian motion,
(ii) V = (V1, . . . , Vn) and T¯ = (T2, . . . , Tn) are F0-measurable random variables such that
T¯ ∈ (0, T )n−1, Ti < Ti+1, for i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}, independent of Z and V , and Z given V
is Gaussian, N (κ, χ), with
χ =

χ1 0 · · · 0
0 χ2 0
...
. . .
0 0 χn

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where
∏n
i=1 χi <∞ P-a.s.,
(iii) A0 and A¯1 are measurable non-anticipative functionals,
(iv) A¯1(t, Y ) = A1(t, Y )
(
1[T1,∞),1[T2,∞), . . . ,1[Tn,∞)
)
(t), for some one dimensional functional
A1 with |A1(t, Y )| ≤ L, T1 := 0,
(v)
∫ T
0 (A0(t, x))
2 dt <∞, for all x ∈ C02n−1([0, T ]),
(vi) E(Zi)4 <∞, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Then the conditions of Theorem 2.1 and 2.2 are satisfied and Z given FYt is distributed normally
with mean ηt and variance γt such that η and γ are unique solutions to
dη
(i)
t =
A1(t, Y )
σ2
n∑
j=1
γ
(ij)
t 1[Tj ,∞)(t)
dY (1)t − (A0(t, Y ) +A1(t, Y ) n∑
j=1
η
(j)
t 1[Tj ,∞)(t))dt
 , (2.6)
d
dt
γ
(ij)
t = −
A1(t, Y )
2
σ2
c
(ij)
t , (2.7)
c
(ij)
t =
n∑
l=1
n∑
k=1
γ
(ik)
t γ
(lj)
t 1[Tk∨Tl,∞)(t),
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
The proof of Corollary 2.3 is provided in Appendix A.1. It mainly consists of verifying the
conditions of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 and applying Equations (2.4) and (2.5) to the special situation
described above. The following corollary considers the same situation as in Corollary 2.3. It solves
a filter problem for a jump process with n − 1 FY0 -measurable jump times and FY0 -measurable
conditional jump sizes. Its proof is also provided in the appendix.
Corollary 2.4. Let the assumptions of Corollary 2.3 be satisfied. Furthermore, for t ∈ [0, T ],
define
η˜t := E
(
n∑
i=1
Zi1[Ti,∞)(t)
∣∣∣∣∣FYt
)
, γ˜t := E
( n∑
i=1
Zi1[Ti,∞)(t)− η˜t
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣FYt
 .
Then
∑n
i=1 Zi1[Ti,∞)(t) given FYt is distributed normally with mean η˜t and variance γ˜t such that
η˜ and γ˜ are unique solutions to
dη˜t = γ˜t
A1(t, Y )
σ2
(
dY
(1)
t − (A0(t, Y ) +A1(t, Y )η˜t) dt
)
+ d
n∑
i=2
κi1[Ti,∞)(t), η˜0 = κ1,
dγ˜t = −
(
A1(t, Y )
σ
γ˜t
)2
dt+ d
n∑
i=2
χi1[Ti,∞)(t), γ˜0 = χ1.
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2.2 Optimal filtering for conditionally Gaussian jump diffusions
In the last section, we presented general results on stochastic filtering for conditionally Gaussian
diffusions. From these we now deduce an analogous result for special jump processes.
Proposition 2.5. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space with right continuous filtration
(Ft)0≤t≤T and Z and Y be adapted, real-valued stochastic processes on [0, T ] defined by
Zt = V0 +
Nt∑
i=1
Vi,
Yt = U0 +
∫ t
0
(A0(s, Y ) +A1(s, Y )Zs) ds+ σBt +
Nt∑
i=1
Ui,
where the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) B is a Brownian motion
(ii) N is a Poisson process with jump times T1, T2, . . .
(iii) (Vi)i∈N0 and (Ui)i∈N0 are mutually independent sequences of random variables and for all
i ∈ N0, Vi given Ui is N (κi, χi) distributed, with
∏n
i=1 χi <∞ P-a.s., for all n ∈ N,
(iv) A0 and A1 are measurable non-anticipative functionals
(v)
∫ T
0 (A0(t, x))
2 dt < ∞, for all piecewise continuous, bounded functions x on [0, T ], and
|A1(t, x)| ≤ L,
(vi) E(Vn)4 <∞, for all n ∈ N0.
Then Zt given FYt is distributed normally with mean ηt := E
(
Zt
∣∣FYt ) and variance γt :=
E
(
(Zt − ηt)2
∣∣FYt ) such that η and γ are unique solutions to
dηt = γt
A1(t, Y )
σ2
(dY ct − (A0(t, Y ) +A1(t, Y )ηt) dt) + d
Nt∑
i=1
κi, η0 = κ0, (2.8)
dγt = −
(
A1(t, Y )
σ
γt
)2
dt+ d
Nt∑
i=1
χi, γ0 = χ0, (2.9)
on {NT <∞}.
Proof. For n ∈ N, define on [0, T ]
Znt := V0 +
Nt∧n∑
i=1
Vi
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and
Y nt := U0 +
∫ t
0
(A0(s, Y ) +A1(s, Y )Z
n
s ) ds+ σBt +
Nt∧n∑
i=1
Ui,
i.e. Zn and Y n are the signal and observation process with a stopped jump part after Tn. In par-
ticular, Y n is FY -adapted. Furthermore, let (Ω˜n, F˜n, P˜n) be an enlargement of our probability
space (Ω,F ,P) with
Ω˜n = Ω× Ωn, F˜n = F ⊗ Fn, P˜n = P⊗Pn
such that there exists a 2n-dimensional Brownian motion Wn independent of Y and Z (where
now all variables are defined on the enlarged probability space). Now, let (Fnt )t≥0 be the filtration
generated by Wn, and
F˜nt := σ(FY
n
t , FY
n,d
T ,Fnt ), t ∈ [0, T ].
In particular, for each t ∈ [0, T ], F˜nt contains all information about Y n,d, i.e. the discontinuous
part of Y n, up to time T . For any piecewise continuous and bounded function x on [0, T ] with
n points of discontinuity t1, . . . , tn ∈ [0, T ] there exist y ∈ C0([0, T ]) and u1, . . . , un ∈ R with
x(t) = y(t) +
∑n
i=1 ui1[ti,T ](t). Hence, for A0 and A1 we can find functionals A¯j , j ∈ {0, 1}, on
[0, T ]× C2n+1([0, T ]) with
A¯j(t, (y, u1, . . . , un, t1, . . . , tn)) = Aj(t, y +
n∑
i=1
ui1[ti,T ]).
In particular, there exist functionals A¯j , j ∈ {0, 1}, such that
A¯j(t, (Y
n,c, U1, . . . , Un, T1, . . . , Tn)) = Aj(t, Y
n)
where Y n,c denotes the continuous part of Y n (see notations for more details).
The filter problem induced by Zn and Y n on [0, T ] can now be identified with the situation of
Corollary 2.3 (with probability space (Ω˜n, F˜n, P˜n) and observation filtration (F˜nt )0≤t≤T ). Denote
by E˜n the expectation w.r.t. P˜n and define
η˜nt := E˜
n(Znt |F˜nt ), γ˜nt := E˜n((Znt − η˜nt )2 |F˜nt ).
Then, according to Corollary 2.4, η˜n and γ˜n are unique solutions to
dη˜nt = γ˜
n
t
A1(t, Y
n)
σ2
(dY n,ct − (A0(t, Y n) +A1(t, Y n)η˜nt ) dt) + d
n∑
i=1
κi1[Ti,∞)(t),
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dγ˜nt = −
(
A1(t, Y
n)
σ
γ˜nt
)2
dt+ d
n∑
i=1
χi1[Ti,∞)(t),
with initial conditions η˜n0 = κ0 and γ˜n0 = χ0. Due to the independence of Wn and (Y n, Zn),
coming back to our original probability space, we have that Zt given σ(FY nt ,FY
n,d
T ) is N (ηnt , γnt )
distributed where ηnt and γnt have the same dynamics as η˜nt and γ˜nt . Moreover, since Zn as well
as Y n,d have independent increments, we get
ηnt = E
(
Znt
∣∣∣σ(FY nt ,FY n,dT )) = E(Znt ∣∣∣FY nt )
and
γnt = E
(
(Znt − ηnt )2
∣∣∣σ(FY nt ,FY n,dT )) = E((Znt − ηnt )2∣∣∣FY nt ) .
Finally, Z1[0,Tn] = Z
n1[0,Tn] dt⊗dP-a.s. and Tn is adapted to (FY
n
t )0≤t≤T as well as (FYt )0≤t≤T .
Hence,
ηt1[0,Tn] = η
n
t 1[0,Tn], γt1[0,Tn] = γ
n
t 1[0,Tn].
Since Tn → +∞ P-a.s., for n→∞, we get the assertion.
Corollary 2.6. Let the assumptions of Proposition 2.5 be satisfied. Then,
γt =
(∫ t
0
A1(s, Y )
2σ−2 ds+
Nt∑
i=0
χ˜i
)−1
, (2.10)
with
χ˜0 = χ
−1
0 , χ˜i =
−χi
(γTi− + χi)γTi−
, for i ∈ N. (2.11)
Proof. As SDE (2.9) only consists of a jump and a drift part, we can derive a pathwise solution.
For fixed ω ∈ Ω consider now the function defined in (2.10). For t ∈ (Ti(ω), Ti+1(ω)) we have
d
dt
γt =
−A1(t, Y )2σ−2(∫ t
0 A1(s, Y )
2σ−2 ds+
∑i
j=0 χ˜j
)2 = −A1(t, Y )2γ2t σ−2.
This corresponds to the drift part of SDE (2.9). It remains to show that ∆γTi = γTi−γTi− = χi,
for all i ∈ N. This follows from
χ˜i = ∆γ
−1
Ti
= γ−1Ti − γ−1Ti− =
1
γTi
− 1
γTi−
=
γTi− − γTi
γTiγTi−
= − ∆γTi
(γTi− + ∆γTi)γTi−
.
Together with (2.11) this proves the assertion.
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Chapter 3
A market with semi-rational noise traders and
fixed time horizon
3.1 Introduction and model setup
As pointed out in the introduction, we want to analyse an order based insider trading model
as introduced in Section 1.1 where the demand process of the noise traders includes a part of
informed trading. The fundamental value V is assumed to be constant over a trading period
[0, T ], T ∈ R. As motivated in the introduction, from time T on the market price coincides with
the fundamental value, i.e. PT = V . The order process of the noise traders is given by
dXt = µ¯(t, Pt, V ) dt+ σ(t) dBt, t ∈ [0, T ],
where B is a Brownian motion independent of V , σ some deterministic, continuously differen-
tiable, positive function and µ¯ such that sgn(µ¯(t, Pt, V )) = sgn(V −Pt). Such an order process is
called semi-rational, meaning that the noise traders react on a possible under- or overpricing, but
are not (completely) rational, i.e. do not choose a strategy that optimises their terminal wealth.
As a result the demand process of the noise traders can be split into a part of informed trading,∫ t
0 µ(s, Ps, V ) ds, and a part of uniformed trading or noise trading,
∫ t
0 σ(s) dBs. Hence, referring
to X as the demand process of the noise traders is not completely accurate. Nevertheless, we
stick to this terminology referring to noise as not entirely rational behaviour.
As in [7] or [25] we assume that the trading horizon T ∈ R+ is fixed and the fundamental value
V is constant on [0, T ]. The insider’s filtration FI is the (completed) filtration generated by P
and V , i.e. FI = FP,V . The market makers’ information is reflected by FM = FY . Regarding
V we start with the following assumption:
Assumption 3.1. V = h(Z) where h is a continuously differentiable and strictly increasing
function, Z ∼ N (0, 1) and Eh(Z)2 <∞, E(∂yh(Z))2 <∞.
The Gaussian distribution of Z ensures the analytical tractability of the filter problem, which is
induced by insider trading and the market makers’ ambition to find a rational price by observing
the total order.
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In contrast to the market makers, the insider observes a certain realisation v ∈ V := h(R) of
V at time 0. As stated in Section 1.1, the insider’s objective is to maximise the expected utility
of the final wealth generated by her trading strategy θ, i.e. (cf. (1.3))
sup
θ
E U
(
θT−V −
∫ T−
0
Pt− dθt − [P, θ]T−
)
.
We analyse this model for the risk neutral case, i.e.
U(W ) = W, (3.1)
as well as a risk averse case with exponential utility, i.e.
U(W ) = β exp (βW ) , β < 0, (3.2)
where we refer to −β as degree of risk aversion. In order to characterise all possible utility
functions by β, we use β = 0 to identify the risk neutral case with utility function as in (3.1).
As in [25], we assume that the price P is set in the following way
Pt = H(t, Y˜t), Y˜t =
∫ t
0
λ(s) dYs, t ∈ [0, T ), (3.3)
for suitable functions H and λ. If λ and σ are bounded on [0, T ] there exists a unique strong
solution ξs,y to the SDE
dξt = λ(t)σ(t)dBt, ξs = y, (3.4)
for all initial conditions (s, y) ∈ [0, T ] × R (cf. [54], Section 1.3). More details and technical
conditions for (H,λ) are given in the following definition of admissible pricing rules.
Definition 3.2. The pair (H,λ) is called admissible pricing rule if
• λ : [0, T ]→ R ∈ C1([0, T ]) and λ(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ),
• H ∈ C1,2 ((0, T )×R) ∩ C0,1 ([0, T ]×R) and H(t, ·) is strictly increasing for all t ∈ [0, T ],
• supt∈[0,T ]E(y∗(t, V ))2 <∞ where y∗ is the implicit function defined by
H(t, y∗(t, v)) = v, t ∈ [0, T ], v ∈ V, (3.5)
• E ∫ T0 H(t, ξt)2 + (∂yH(t, ξt))2 dt <∞,
• EH(T, ξT )2 <∞.
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The set of all admissible pricing rules is denoted by P. In the sequel, we call H pricing function
and λ price pressure. According to Definition 1.2, (H,λ) is called rational if
H(t, Y˜t) = E
(
h(Z)
∣∣FMt ) , for all t ∈ [0, T ).
The implicit function y∗(t, v), (t, v) ∈ [0, T ]×V, is well-defined and unique sinceH ∈ C0,1([0, T ]×
R) is strictly increasing for all t ∈ [0, T ].
We now fix the set of admissible trading strategies.
Definition 3.3. Let −β ≥ 0 denote the degree of insider risk aversion. An insider strategy θ is
called (H,λ)-admissible if θ is an FI-semimartingale and
• E
∫ T
0
λ(t)2σ(t)2∂yH(t, Y˜t)
2 dt <∞,
• E
∫ T
0
σ(t)2H(t, Y˜t)
2 dt <∞,
• E exp
(
1
2
∫ T
0
β2σ(t)2(H(t, Y˜t)− V )2 dt
)
<∞.
The set of all (H,λ)-admissible, or short admissible, strategies is denoted by S(H,λ).
In the introduction of this section, we already claimed that the drift or informed part of the
noise traders’ order process is a function of the fundamental value V , the price P and the time.
Due to our restriction on pricing rules in (3.3), we are able to rewrite the noise drift as
µ¯(t, Pt, V ) = µ(t, Y˜t, V )
for a suitable function µ : [0, T ] ×R × V 7→ R. Moreover, we make the following assumptions
related to the order process of the noise traders:
Assumption 3.4. The order process of the noise traders is given by
dXt = µ(t, Y˜t, V )dt+ σ(t)dBt, X0 = 0,
where
(1) σ ∈ C1([0, T ]), σ(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ],
(2) µ(t, ·, v) ∈ C0(R) for all (t, v) ∈ [0, T )× V,
(3) µ(t, ·, v)(H(t, ·)− v) ∈ C1(R) for all (t, v) ∈ [0, T )× V,
(4) µ(t, y, v)

> 0, if y < y∗(t, v)
= 0, if y = y∗(t, v)
< 0, if y > y∗(t, v)
, for all (t, v) ∈ [0, T )× V,
with y∗(t, v) as defined in (3.5).
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In the sequel, we refer to µ as noise drift.
Remark 3.5. Due to the monotonicity of H, condition (4) is equivalent to
µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v)
= 0, if y = y∗(t, v)< 0, if y 6= y∗(t, v) , for all (t, v) ∈ [0, T )× V.
3.2 Absolutely continuous insider trading: HJB equation and
necessary conditions for equilibrium
After having introduced the model in the last section, we can now start with its analysis. The
first question to answer is whether there exist necessary conditions, especially for µ, to ensure the
existence of an equilibrium. We first assume that the insider strategy is absolutely continuous,
i.e.
θt =
∫ t
0
αs ds, t ∈ [0, T ], (3.6)
for a suitable FI-adapted process α such that there exists a strong solution to Y for any initial
condition (t, y) ∈ [0, T ]×R (denoted by Y t,y) and
E
v U
(∫ T
t
∣∣∣(V −H(s, Y˜ t,ys ))αs∣∣∣ ds) <∞, for all (t, y) ∈ [0, T ]×R,
where Ev is the expectation w.r.t. Pv = P(·|V = v), i.e. the measure under which V starts in
v ∈ V. By S˜(t, y) let us denote the set of all such α. For the value function J , defined by
J(t, y, v) := sup
α∈S˜(t,y)
E
v U
(∫ T
t
(V −H(s, Y˜ t,ys ))αs ds
)
, (3.7)
we can now calculate the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (HJB equation). For details on
the classical PDE approach to dynamic programming, we refer to Pham [54], Chapter 3. This
approach has also been used in other insider trading models, see e.g. [25] and [26], to solve the
optimisation problem of the insider. However, this section can be better understood as motivation
for a class of admissible noise drift since optimality in the whole class S(H,λ) is analysed in the
following section. In both cases, risk neutral and risk averse (exponential utility), we deduce
necessary conditions on µ and H for the existence of an equilibrium.
3.2.1 The risk neutral case
In the case of risk neutrality, the definition of J in (3.7) reads as
J0(t, y, v) = sup
α∈S˜(t,y)
E
v
∫ T
t
(V −H(s, Y˜ t,ys ))αs ds.
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To shorten the notation, we also write J0(t, y) instead of J0(t, y, v). For any t ∈ [0, T ) we can
split the integral at t+ ,  ∈ (0, T − t),
J0(t, y) = sup
α∈S˜(t,y)
E
v
(∫ t+
t
(V −H(s, Y˜ t,ys ))αs ds+
∫ T
t+
(V −H(s, Y˜ t,ys ))αs ds
)
= sup
α∈S˜(t,y)
E
v
(∫ t+
t
(V −H(s, Y˜ t,ys ))αs ds+ J0(t+ , Y˜ t,yt+)
)
.
(3.8)
Taking into account the dynamics of Y˜ and assuming that J0 is smooth enough, i.e. J0 ∈
C1,2([0, T ]×R), we can apply Itô’s formula (cf. [56], Theorem 33, Chapter II)
J0(t+ , Y˜t+) = J
0(t, Y˜t) +
∫ t+
t
λ(s)σ(s)∂yJ
0(s, Y˜s)dBs +
∫ t+
t
∂tJ
0(s, Y˜s) ds
+
∫ t+
t
λ(s)(µ(s, Y˜s, V ) + αs)∂yJ
0(s, Y˜s) +
λ(s)2σ(s)2
2
∂yyJ
0(s, Y˜s)ds.
(3.9)
Now, subtracting J0(t, y) on both sides of Equation (3.8) and inserting (3.9) into (3.8) leads to
0 = sup
α∈S˜(t,y)
E
v
(∫ t+
t
λ(s)σ(s)∂yJ
0(s, Y˜ t,ys )dBs +
∫ t+
t
(V −H(s, Y˜ t,ys ))αs + ∂tJ0(s, Y˜ t,ys )
+λ(s)(µ(s, Y˜ t,ys , V ) + αs)∂yJ
0(s, Y˜ t,ys ) +
λ(s)2σ(s)2
2
∂yyJ
0(s, Y˜ t,ys )ds
)
.
Under certain regularity conditions on J0, (
∫ t
0 λ(s)σ(s)∂yJ
0(s, Y˜ t,ys )dBs, t ≥ 0), is a true mar-
tingale. Then
0 = sup
α∈S˜(t,y)
E
v
(∫ t+
t
(V −H(s, Y˜ t,ys ))αs + ∂tJ0(s, Y˜ t,ys )
+λ(s)(µ(s, Y˜ t,ys , V ) + αs)∂yJ
0(s, Y˜ t,ys ) +
λ(s)2σ(s)2
2
∂yyJ
0(s, Y˜ t,ys )ds
)
.
Dividing this equation by  and sending  to zero, we get by the mean value theorem
0 = sup
α
(
(v −H(t, y))α+ ∂tJ0(t, y) + λ(t)(µ(t, y, v) + α)∂yJ0(t, y) + λ(t)
2σ(t)2
2
∂yyJ
0(t, y)
)
.
We note that the above HJB equation is linear in α. Hence, for a finite solution we necessarily
need, for all (t, y, v) ∈ (0, T )×R× V,
∂yJ
0(t, y, v) =
H(t, y)− v
λ(t)
, (3.10)
∂tJ
0(t, y, v) = −λ(t)µ(t, y, v)∂yJ0(t, y, v)− 1
2
σ(t)2λ(t)2∂yyJ
0(t, y, v). (3.11)
With the help of Equations (3.10) and (3.11), we now derive necessary conditions for the
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existence of an equilibrium.
Proposition 3.6. Let (H,λ) ∈ P and µ be as in Assumption 3.4. If there exists a function
J0 ∈ C1,2([0, T ] × R) such that (H,λ, J0) is a solution to the system of Equations (3.10) and
(3.11), then necessarily the following holds:
• H satisfies the PDE
∂tH(t, y) +
1
2
σ(t)2λ(t)2∂yyH(t, y) = 0, for all (t, y) ∈ (0, T )×R (3.12)
• µ has the form
µ(t, y, v) =
− λ
′(t)
λ(t)2
∫ y∗(t,v)
y H(t,x)−v dx
H(t,y)−v , if y 6= y∗(t, v)
0 , if y = y∗(t, v)
(3.13)
for all (t, v) ∈ (0, T )× V, where y∗(t, v) is defined as in (3.5).
In particular, µ (as defined in (3.13)) always verifies conditions (2) and (3) of Assumption 3.4,
and condition (4) if and only if λ is strictly decreasing.
Proof. Differentiation of (3.10) w.r.t. y and t yields
∂yyJ
0(t, y) =
∂yH(t, y)
λ(t)
, (3.14)
respectively
∂tyJ
0(t, y) =
∂tH(t, y)
λ(t)
− (H(t, y)− v) λ
′(t)
λ(t)2
. (3.15)
By inserting (3.14) and (3.10) into (3.11), we obtain
∂tJ
0(t, y) = −µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v)− 1
2
σ(t)2λ(t)∂yH(t, y). (3.16)
Now differentiating (3.16) w.r.t. y yields
∂ytJ
0(t, y) = −∂y(µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v))− 1
2
σ(t)2λ(t)∂yyH(t, y). (3.17)
Putting (3.15) and (3.17) together, we get for all (t, y, v) ∈ (0, T ) × R × V (v was arbitrarily
fixed)
∂tH(t, y)
λ(t)
+
σ(t)2λ(t)
2
∂yyH(t, y) = (H(t, y)− v) λ
′(t)
λ(t)2
− ∂y(µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v)). (3.18)
Observe that the left hand site of (3.18) does not depend on v, since the pricing rule (H,λ) has
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to be independent of v. Now let
f(t, y) :=
1
λ(t)
(
∂tH(t, y) +
1
2
σ(t)2λ(t)2∂yyH(t, y)
)
, (t, y) ∈ (0, T )×R,
and
µˆ(t, y, v) := µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v).
Following Assumption 3.4, µˆ(t, ·, v) ∈ C1(R) for all (t, v) ∈ [0, T )× V. The PDE
∂yµˆ(t, y, v) = (H(t, y)− v) λ
′(t)
λ(t)2
− f(t, y), (t, y, v) ∈ (0, T )×R× V, (3.19)
has the general solution
µˆ(t, y, v) =
∫ y
C1(t,v)
λ′(t)λ(t)−2(H(t, x)− v)− f(t, x) dx+ C2(t, v)
for suitable functions C1 and C2 (independent of y). Without loss of generality, we can set
C1(t, v) = y
∗(t, v). For y 6= y∗(t, v) it follows
µ(t, y, v) =
∫ y
y∗(t,v) λ
′(t)λ(t)−2(H(t, x)− v)− f(t, x) dx+ C2(t, v)
H(t, y)− v . (3.20)
Since y 7→ ∫ yy∗(t,v)H(t, x)− v dx as well as y 7→ H(t, y)− v are differentiable functions and H is
a strictly increasing function in y, i.e. ∂yH(t, y) > 0 for all y, we can apply l’Hospital’s rule in
the following way
lim
y→y∗(t,v)
∫ y
y∗(t,v)
λ′(t)
λ(t)2
(H(t, x)− v)− f(t, x) dx
H(t, y)− v = limy→y∗(t,v)
λ′(t)
λ(t)2
(H(t, y)− v)− f(t, y)
∂yH(t, y)
. (3.21)
As we assumed µ to be continuous in y and µ(t, y∗(t, v), v) = 0, we can directly conclude that
both, C2(t, v) and f(t, y∗(t, v)) have to equal zero for all (t, v) ∈ [0, T )×V. Since the pricing rule
(H,λ) has to be independent of v, this already leads to f ≡ 0. This proves (3.12) and (3.13).
Now, differentiability as well as continuity of µ in y 6= y∗(t, v) is obvious sinceH is continuously
differentiable. For y = y∗(t, v) we get the continuity by (3.21) with f = 0. Lastly, the strict
monotonicity of H and the definition of y∗(t, v) ensure that∫ y∗(t,v)
y
H(t, x)− v dx < 0, for all y ∈ R\{y∗(t, v)}.
By Remark 3.5 we get that sgn(µ(t, y, v)) = sgn(y∗(t, v)− y) if and only if λ′(t)λ(t)−2 < 0.
Before we give an interpretation of the preceding results, we analyse the risk averse case to
obtain analogous results. Their interpretation is presented thereafter.
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3.2.2 The risk averse case
To analyse exponential utility with parameter β < 0, we consider the value function (cf. (3.7))
Jβ(t, y) := Jβ(t, y, v) := sup
α∈S˜(t,y)
E
v β exp
(∫ T
t
β(V −H(s, Y˜ t,ys ))αs ds
)
.
As in the risk neutral case, we start with calculating the HJB equation. As a first step we again
split the integral at t+  ∈ (t, T )
Jβ(t, y) = sup
α∈S˜(t,y)
E
vβ
(
exp
(∫ T
t+
β(V −H(s, Y˜ t,ys ))αs ds
)
+ exp
(∫ T
t
β(V −H(s, Y˜ t,ys ))αs ds
)
×
(
1− exp
(∫ t+
t
−β(V −H(s, Y˜ t,ys ))αs ds
)))
= sup
α∈S˜(t,y)
E
v
(
Jβ(t+ , Y˜ t,yt+) + J
β(t, y)
(
1− exp
(
−
∫ t+
t
β(V −H(s, Y˜ t,ys ))αs ds
)))
.
If Jβ is smooth enough, Itô’s formula provides a representation of Jβ as in Equation (3.9) (in
place of J0). Furthermore, if we again assume that the local martingale term is indeed a true
martingale, we obtain
0 = sup
α∈S˜(t,y)
E
v
(
Jβ(t, y)
(
1− exp
(
−
∫ t+
t
β(V −H(s, Y˜ t,ys ))αs ds
))
+
∫ t+
t
λ(s)(µs + αs)∂yJ
β(s, Y˜ t,ys ) + ∂tJ
β(s, Y˜ t,ys ) +
λ(s)2σ(s)2
2
∂yyJ
β(s, Y˜ t,ys )ds
)
.
Since
lim
↘0
1− exp
(
− ∫ t+t β(V −H(s, Y˜ t,ys ))αs ds)

= β(V −H(t, y))αt,
dividing by  and sending  to zero yields
0 = sup
α
(
βJβ(t, y)(v −H(t, y))α+ ∂tJβ(t, y)
+ λ(t)(µ(t, y, v) + α)∂yJ
β(t, y) +
λ(t)2σ(t)2
2
∂yyJ
β(t, y)
)
.
By linearity in α we get the following system of PDEs, for all (t, y, v) ∈ (0, T )×R× V,
0 =
β(H(t, y)− v)
λ(t)
Jβ(t, y, v)− ∂yJβ(t, y, v), (3.22)
0 = ∂tJ
β(t, y, v) +
σ(t)2λ(t)2
2
∂yyJ
β(t, y, v) + λ(t)µ(t, y, v)∂yJ
β(t, y, v). (3.23)
Similarly to Subsection 3.2.1, the HJB approach leads to a system of two PDEs for Jβ . We
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now again try to use the special dependences of these equations to derive necessary conditions
on the pricing rule. We start with differentiating (3.22) w.r.t. y and t, respectively,
∂yyJ
β(t, y) =
β
λ(t)
∂yH(t, y)J
β(t, y) +
β
λ(t)
(H(t, y)− v)∂yJβ(t, y)
(3.22)
=
β
λ(t)
Jβ(t, y)
(
∂yH(t, y) +
β
λ(t)
(H(t, y)− v)2
)
, (3.24)
∂ytJ
β(t, y) =
(
β
λ(t)
∂tJ
β(t, y)− λ
′(t)
λ(t)2
βJβ(t, y)
)
(H(t, y)− v) + β
λ(t)
Jβ(t, y)∂tH(t, y).
By combination of the latter equation with (3.23) we obtain
∂ytJ
β(t, y) = − λ
′(t)
λ(t)2
β(H(t, y)− v)Jβ(t, y) + β
λ(t)
Jβ(t, y)∂tH(t, y)
+
β
λ(t)
(H(t, y)− v)
(
−σ(t)
2λ(t)2
2
∂yyJ
β(t, y)− λ(t)µ(t, y, v)∂yJβ(t, y)
)
.
(3.25)
Now, by inserting (3.22) and (3.24) into (3.25) we get
∂ytJ
β(t, y) = − λ
′(t)
λ(t)2
β(H(t, y)− v)Jβ(t, y) + β
λ(t)
Jβ(t, y)∂tH(t, y)
− β
λ(t)
(H(t, y)− v)
(
σ(t)2λ(t)2
2
β
λ(t)
Jβ(t, y)
(
∂yH(t, y) +
β
λ(t)
(H(t, y)− v)2
)
+ βµ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v)Jβ(t, y)
)
= Jβ(t, y)
(
− λ
′(t)
λ(t)2
β(H(t, y)− v) + β∂tH(t, y)
λ(t)
− σ(t)
2β3
2λ(t)
(H(t, y)− v)3
−σ(t)
2β2
2
(H(t, y)− v)∂yH(t, y)− β
2
λ(t)
µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v)2
)
.
(3.26)
On the other hand, inserting (3.24) into (3.23) yields
0 = ∂tJ
β(t, y) +
σ(t)2λ(t)β
2
Jβ(t, y)
(
∂yH(t, y) +
β
λ(t)
(H(t, y)− v)2
)
+ µ(t, y, v)β(H(t, y)− v)Jβ(t, y)
and differentiation w.r.t. y
0 = ∂ytJ
β(t, y) +
σ(t)2βλ(t)
2
∂yJ
β(t, y)
(
∂yH(t, y) +
β
λ(t)
(H(t, y)− v)2
)
+
σ(t)2λ(t)β
2
Jβ(t, y)
(
∂yyH(t, y) +
2β
λ(t)
∂yH(t, y)(H(t, y)− v)
)
+ β∂y (µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v)) Jβ(t, y) + βµ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v)∂yJβ(t, y).
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Together with (3.22) we obtain
0 = ∂ytJ
β(t, y) +
σ(t)2β2
2
(H(t, y)− v)Jβ(t, y)
(
∂yH(t, y) +
β
λ(t)
(H(t, y)− v)2
)
+
σ(t)2λ(t)β
2
Jβ(t, y)
(
∂yyH(t, y) +
2β
λ(t)
∂yH(t, y)(H(t, y)− v)
)
+ β∂y (µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v)) Jβ(t, y) + β
2
λ(t)
µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v)2Jβ(t, y)
= ∂ytJ
β(t, y) + Jβ(t, y)
(
σ(t)2β2
2
(H(t, y)− v)∂yH(t, y) + σ(t)
2β3
2λ(t)
(H(t, y)− v)3
+
σ(t)2λ(t)β
2
∂yyH(t, y) + σ(t)
2β2∂yH(t, y)(H(t, y)− v)
+β∂y (µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v)) + β
2
λ(t)
µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v)2
)
.
(3.27)
Adding (3.26) and (3.27) together and then dividing by β and Jβ(t, y) finally yields
0 =
1
λ(t)
∂tH(t, y) +
σ(t)2λ(t)
2
∂yyH(t, y)− λ
′(t)
λ(t)2
(H(t, y)− v)
+ σ(t)2β∂yH(t, y)(H(t, y)− v) + ∂y (µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v)) ,
(3.28)
for all (t, y, v) ∈ (0, T )×R× V. This leads to the following characterisation.
Proposition 3.7. Let (H,λ) ∈ P and µ be as in Assumption 3.4. If there exists a function
Jβ ∈ C1,2((0, T ) × R) such that (H,λ, Jβ) is a solution to the system of Equations (3.22) and
(3.23), then necessarily the following holds:
• H satisfies the PDE
∂tH(t, y) +
1
2
σ(t)2λ(t)2∂yyH(t, y) = 0, for all (t, y) ∈ (0, T )×R, (3.29)
• µ has the form
µ(t, y, v) =
− λ
′(t)
λ(t)2
∫ y∗(t,v)
y (H(t,x)−v) dx
H(t,y)−v − σ(t)
2β
2 (H(t, y)− v) , if y 6= y∗(t, v)
0 , if y = y∗(t, v)
, (3.30)
for all (t, v) ∈ (0, T )× V.
In particular µ, as defined in (3.30), always verifies conditions (2) and (3) of Assumption 3.4,
and condition (4) if and only if
0 < − λ
′(t)
λ(t)2
∫ y
y∗(t,v)
(H(t, x)− v) dx+ σ(t)
2β
2
(H(t, y)− v)2 (3.31)
holds for all (t, y, v) ∈ [0, T )×R× V.
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Proof. The proof of this proposition is nearly the same as the proof of Proposition 3.6. We only
have to replace (3.18) by (3.28) and solve
∂y(µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v)) = (H(t, y)− v)
(
λ′(t)
λ(t)2
− σ(t)2β∂yH(t, y)
)
− f(t, y),
for (t, y, v) ∈ (0, T )×R× V, instead of (3.19), where again
f(t, y) =
1
λ(t)
∂tH(t, y) +
λ(t)σ(t)2
2
∂yyH(t, y).
By an analogous argumentation as in the proof of Proposition 3.6, we obtain that µ has to take
the general form
µ(t, y, v) =
∫ y
y∗(t,v) (H(t, x)− v)
(
λ′(t)
λ(t)2
− σ(t)2β∂yH(t, x)
)
− f(t, x) dx+ C2(t, v)
H(t, y)− v (3.32)
and, furthermore, that C2 and f have to equal 0. Therefore, we get (3.29) and (3.30) since
µ(t, y, v) =
∫ y
y∗(t,v) (H(t, x)− v)
(
λ′(t)
λ(t)2
− σ(t)2β∂yH(t, x)
)
dx
H(t, y)− v (3.33)
=
∫ y
y∗(t,v) (H(t, x)− v) λ
′(t)
λ(t)2
dx
(H(t, y)− v) − σ(t)
2β
1
2(H(t, y)− v)2
(H(t, y)− v)
=
λ′(t)
λ(t)2
∫ y
y∗(t,v) (H(t, x)− v) dx
H(t, y)− v −
σ(t)2β
2
(H(t, y)− v). (3.34)
For the last part of the assertion observe that, according to Remark 3.5, condition (4) of Assump-
tion 3.4 is satisfied if and only if µ(t, y, v)(v−H(t, y)) > 0 for all y 6= v (again µ(t, y∗(t, v), v) = 0
holds by construction). Multiplying both sides of (3.34) with (v −H(t, y)) yields
µ(t, y, v)(v −H(t, y)) = − λ
′(t)
λ(t)2
∫ y
y∗(t,v)
(H(t, x)− v) dx+ σ(t)
2β
2
(H(t, y)− v)2.
3.2.3 Admissible noise drift
The preceding Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 state necessary conditions for the existence of an equi-
librium on µ and H for the risk neutral and risk averse case. In both cases
∂tH(t, y) +
1
2
σ(t)2λ(t)2∂yyH(t, y) = 0
has to hold. This is consistent with other insider trading models, for example [7], [25], [28], [19].
Furthermore, the above results suggest a class of admissible noise drift that is characterised in
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this subsection.
Characterisation of µ and connection to λ
If we identify β = 0 as the parameter for the risk neutral case, we can summarise that, according
to Propositions 3.6 and 3.7, µ has to take the special form
µ(t, y, v) =
m(t)
∫ y∗(t,v)
y H(t,x)−v dx
H(t,y)−v − σ(t)
2β
2 (H(t, y)− v) , if y 6= y∗(t, v)
0 , if y = y∗(t)
, (3.35)
where the second term vanishes in the risk neutral case (β = 0). Otherwise, there exists no
equilibrium. Hence, a noise drift that preserves the possibility for the existence of an equilibrium
having a form as in (3.35) can be called admissible. The terms of such a noise drift where V and
Y˜t enter, ∫ y∗(t,v)
y H(t, x)− v dx
H(t, y)− v and
σ(t)2β
2
(H(t, y)− v),
are fixed. Hence, admissible noise drift can be characterised by a deterministic positive coefficient
m(t) that is connected with the price pressure via
d
dt
λ(t) = −m(t)λ(t)2, t ∈ [0, T ), λ(0) = λ0 > 0. (3.36)
Note that the particular noise drift determines only the dynamics of the price pressure and not
its initial condition. The above Bernoulli type ODE (3.36) is solved by
λ(t) =
1
λ0 +
∫ t
0 m(s) ds
, (3.37)
given that we have ∫ t
0
m(s) ds <∞, for all t ∈ [0, T ).
This motivates the following assumption.
Assumption 3.8. The noise drift µ has the form (3.35) for a positive function m, called (noise)
drift intensity, such that m is bounded on [0, t], for all t ∈ [0, T ).
Remarks on the price pressure
In the special case when β = 0 and m = 0, we are in the situation of the classical model of Back
[7], see also [25]. According to these articles, λ is constant in equilibrium. This is consistent with
the form of λ in (3.37).
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Although we have neither shown the existence of a function J0 (or Jβ) that is a solution to
the system of Equations (3.10) and (3.11) ( (3.22) and (3.23) respectively) nor any other part
of the equilibrium, yet, we can state the following: If the equilibrium exists and the noise drift
intensity m is not equal to zero, we are in a model with non-constant price pressure or, more
detailed, with a (strictly) decreasing one.
Typically a decreasing price pressure would lead an insider to withhold her information, in
order to profit from the higher market depth at the end of the trading period, i.e. a higher trading
volume is required to reveal the information. In a market with partially informed noise traders,
on the one hand, waiting is penalised by revelation of information through the noise traders. On
the other hand, early trading (early revelation of information) is less profitable because of the
higher price pressure. Intuitively, these two effects should be neutralised by a suitable chosen
price pressure such that an equilibrium is possible. That this is indeed the case is shown in the
following sections.
Coming back to our initial considerations in the introduction of this thesis, a market becoming
less irrational should be reflected by an increasing drift intensity m. Alternatively, a decreasing
price pressure might also be an intuitive reference for the informational asymmetry since a
higher uncertainty about the real value of an asset should cause a more volatile market price.
This intuitive connection is provided by this model. Furthermore, a price pressure reaching the
state zero, i.e. limt→T λ(t) = 0, would reflect complete consensus of the market regarding the
price of the asset. As a consequence of the above results this is the case if and only if∫ t
0
m(s) ds↗∞, for t→ T,
i.e. if the (integrated) drift intensity increases to infinity. In the following paragraph, we will see
that in this case the market is efficient even in absence of an insider, i.e. we have
lim
t→T
H(t, X˜t) = V
where
X˜t :=
∫ t
0
λ(s) dXs, t ∈ [0, T ],
is the total weighted order in absence of the insider. This is different to all other Kyle-Back
type insider trading equilibria where efficiency is only provided by the insider. Furthermore,
this supports the assumption that from time T on the former noise traders act rational and the
market is strong form efficient.
Before we prove this important result, let us first come back to the initial considerations on
the calculation of the insider’s wealth in Chapter 1. We pointed out that the terminal wealth
depends on the assumption whether we have Pt = Vt fixed for t ≥ T or t > T , i.e. whether trades
in T are executed at the fundamental value or the market price that might not be equal to the
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fundamental value. If we assume the latter, in the case of a vanishing price pressure the insider
might have the possibility to gain infinite wealth from every trading strategy which leads the
market price to limt→T Pt 6= V . Since the price pressure in T is equal to zero, the trading volume
in T would have no influence on the price. Hence, exploiting the difference of V and PT , the
insider could generate infinite wealth. However, we assume that PT = V . As we mentioned above
this is plausible especially in case of an infinite trading intensity due to the following statement
on market efficiency.
Market efficiency in absence of the insider
Since we allow the noise drift intensity to be unbounded, one could ask whether the market is
already efficient without the presence of an insider. If m is bounded, this, quite obviously, is not
the case. But, if limt→T
∫ t
0 m(s) ds =∞, the market is efficient even without an insider.
Proposition 3.9. Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.8 be satisfied such that limt→T
∫ t
0 m(s) ds = ∞.
Furthermore, suppose that for (H,λ) ∈ P, (3.12), (3.37) and
sup
t∈[0,T ]
EH(t, X˜t)
2 <∞
hold. Then H(T, X˜T ) = V P-a.s.
Proof. In order to prove the assertion, we show for
M(t, y) :=
∫ y
y∗(t,V )
H(t, x)− V dx (3.38)
that
M(t, X˜t)
P−→ 0, t→ T.
This is indeed sufficient since the monotonicity of H and the definition of y∗ ensure
M(t, y) = 0 ⇔ y = y∗(t, V ).
We want to apply Itô’s formula to M(t, X˜t). Therefore, we start with the calculation of the
partial derivatives of M . Obviously,
∂yM(t, y) = H(t, y)− V, ∂yyM(t, y) = ∂yH(t, y).
To calculate the partial derivative w.r.t. t, let us first consider the function
M˜(t, y, z) :=
∫ y
z
H(t, x)− V dx, t ∈ (0, T ), (y, z) ∈ R2.
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Together with PDE (3.12) satisfied by H this yields
∂zM˜(t, y, z) = V −H(t, z),
∂tM˜(t, y, z) =
∫ y
z
∂tH(t, x) dx =
∫ y
z
−1
2
σ(t)2λ(t)2∂yyH(t, x) dx
= −1
2
σ(t)2λ(t)2 (∂yH(t, y)− ∂yH(t, z)) .
By differentiability of the implicit function y∗(·, v) (for all v ∈ V), we get
∂tM(t, y) = ∂tM˜(t, y, y
∗(t, V )) + ∂zM˜(t, y, y∗(t, V ))∂ty∗(t, V )
= −σ(t)
2λ(t)2
2
(∂yH(t, y)− ∂yH(t, y∗(t, V ))) + (V −H(t, y∗(t, V )))∂ty∗(t, V )
= −σ(t)
2λ(t)2
2
(∂yH(t, y)− ∂yH(t, y∗(t, V ))). (3.39)
With the above calculated partial derivatives we are now able to apply Itô’s formula
dM(t, X˜t) = ∂yM(t, X˜t)dX˜t +
1
2
∂yyM(t, X˜t)d〈X˜〉t + ∂tM(t, X˜t)dt
= ∂yM(t, X˜t)λ(t)µ(t, X˜t, V ) +
σ(t)2λ(t)2
2
∂yH(t, y
∗(t, V ))dt+ ∂yM(t, X˜t)λ(t)σ(t)dBt.
Since
µ(t, X˜t, V )∂yM(t, X˜t) =
(
−m(t) M(t, X˜t)
H(t, X˜t)− V
− σ(t)
2β
2
(
H(t, X˜t)− V
))(
H(t, X˜t)− V
)
= −m(t)M(t, X˜t)− σ(t)
2β
2
(
H(t, X˜t)− V
)2
,
we get
dM(t, X˜t) = −m(t)M(t, X˜t)λ(t)− λ(t)σ(t)
2β
2
(
H(t, X˜t)− V
)2
dt
+
(
H(t, X˜t)− V
)
λ(t)σ(t)dBt +
σ(t)2λ(t)2
2
∂yH(t, y
∗(t, V ))dt.
For t ∈ [0, T ), let
ρ(t) := exp
(∫ t
0
m(s)λ(s) ds
)
.
In particular,
dρ(t) = λ(t)m(t)ρ(t)dt.
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Moreover, limt→T ρ(t) =∞ because
lim
t→T
∫ t
0
m(s)λ(s) ds = lim
t→T
∫ t
0
m(s)∫ s
0 m(u) du+ λ
−1
0
ds
= lim
t→T
log
(∫ t
0
m(s) ds+ λ−10
)
− log(λ−10 ) =∞.
Now, integration by parts yields
dM(t, X˜t)ρ(t) = ρ(t)dM(t, X˜t) +M(t, X˜t)dρ(t)
= −ρ(t)
(
m(t)M(t, X˜t)λ(t) +
λ(t)σ(t)2β
2
(
H(t, X˜t)− V
)2)
dt
+ ρ(t)
(
H(t, X˜t)− V
)
λ(t)σ(t)dBt
+ ρ(t)
σ(t)2λ(t)2
2
∂yH(t, y
∗(t, V ))dt+M(t, X˜t)λ(t)m(t)ρ(t)dt
= ρ(t)
(
H(t, X˜t)− V
)
λ(t)σ(t)dBt + ρ(t)
σ(t)2λ(t)2
2
∂yH(t, y
∗(t, V ))dt
− ρ(t)λ(t)σ(t)
2β
2
(
H(t, X˜t)− V
)2
dt.
Using integral notation and multiplying ρ(t)−1 on both sides, we get
M(t, X˜t) = M(0, 0)ρ(t)
−1 + ρ(t)−1
∫ t
0
ρ(s)
(
H(s, X˜s)− V
)
λ(s)σ(s) dBs
+ ρ(t)−1
∫ t
0
ρ(s)
σ(s)2λ(s)
2
(
λ(s)∂yH(s, y
∗(s, V ))− β
(
H(s, X˜s)− V
)2)
ds.
(3.40)
Now, Itô isometry (cf. [52], Corollary 3.1.7) yields
E
(
ρ(t)−1
∫ t
0
ρ(s)
(
H(s, X˜s)− V
)
λ(s)σ(s) dBs
)2
= E
(
ρ(t)−2
∫ t
0
ρ(s)2
(
H(s, X˜s)− V
)2
λ(s)2σ(s)2 ds
)
≤ 2( sup
t∈[0,T ]
EH(t, X˜t)
2 +EV 2)
(
ρ(t)−2
∫ t
0
ρ(s)2λ(s)2σ(s)2 ds
)
.
If the integral term in the last line is bounded, the whole term vanishes for t → T since
limt→T ρ−1(t) = 0. Otherwise, we get with l’Hospital’s rule
lim
t→T
ρ(t)−2
∫ t
0
ρ(s)2λ(s)2σ(s)2 ds = lim
t→T
ρ(t)2λ(t)2σ(t)2
2ρ(t)2m(t)λ(t)
= 0.
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Applying the same arguments to
ρ(t)−1
∫ t
0
ρ(s)λ(s)σ(s)2 ds
this proves the assertion since
λ(t)∂yH(t, y
∗(t, V ))− β
(
H(t, X˜t)− V
)2
is pathwise bounded.
From the representation of M(t, X˜t) in (3.40) we can conclude that a vanishing noise, i.e.
σ(t)↘ 0, for t→ T , would not lead to market efficiency since the terms on the right hand side
only vanish if ρ−1 does, too. The latter happens if and only if
∫ t
0 m(s) ds ↗ ∞, t → T . Hence,
efficiency does not follow from decreasing noise trading, but from increasing informed trading.
The risk premium
Let us now again come back to the special form of admissible noise drift. Due to the additional
part σ(t)
2β
2 (H(t, y)− V ) in the risk averse case, the price pressure
λ(t) =
1
λ−10 +
∫ t
0 m(s) ds
, t ≥ 0,
is related to a slightly different noise drift compared to the risk neutral case. Since β < 0,
this additional term makes the drift, roughly speaking, less rational. σ(t)
2β
2 (H(t, y) − V ) might
therefore be seen as a risk premium on informed trading for the insider. However, we cannot
guarantee that condition (3.31) holds in general. This strongly depends on H. It might rather
happen that there exists no semi-rational noise drift at all which has the form as in Assumption
3.8. But, in contrast to Cho [25], equilibria are still possible beyond a linear framework. We now
give a sufficient condition for the existence of an admissible semi-rational noise drift.
Proposition 3.10. Let β < 0 and H be an admissible pricing function such that ∂yH(t, y) < C
is bounded. Then there exists a semi-rational noise drift as in Assumption 3.8.
Proof. Let m be an integrable function that is bounded from above on [0, t] for all t ∈ [0, T )
and bounded from below by −σ(t)2βC +  for some  > 0. Then (cf. Equation (3.33))
µ(t, y, v) =
∫ y
y∗(t,v) (H(t, x)− v)
(−m(t)− σ(t)2β∂yH(t, x)) dx
H(t, y)− v .
Due to our assumptions
−m(t)− σ(t)2βH(t, y) < − for all (t, y) ∈ [0, T ]×R.
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It follows
µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v) ≤ −
∫ y
y∗(t,v)
(H(t, x)− v)dx < 0 for all y 6= y∗(t, v).
Hence, µ is semi-rational (cf. Remark 3.5).
We close this subsection with an example for the above situation.
Example 3.11. Let H(t, y) := p0 + qy, q > 0. In the standard insider model analysed in [25]
this is a necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium in the risk averse case. We have
y∗(t, v) =
v − p0
q
.
Furthermore,∫ y
y∗(t,v)
H(t, x)− v dx =
∫ y
(v−p0)q−1
p0 + qx− v dx = 1
2q
(qy + p0 − v)2 .
Hence, according to Proposition 3.7, µ is semi-rational if m(t)q−1 + σ(t)2β > 0. If we choose
m(t) = −σ(t)2βq, we have µ = 0. This is the case considered in [25]. Indeed, according to (3.36),
λ−1 then has the dynamics
d(λ(t)−1) = −σ(t)2βqdt.
This coincides with the equilibrium price pressure in [25] (cf. Subsection 1.2.2).
3.3 Optimality: risk neutral insider
In the last section we have derived necessary conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in
the case of absolutely continuous insider trading. We now enlarge the class of possible insider
strategies to S(H,λ). In particular, we allow discontinuous trading strategies and strategies with
quadratic variation. However, it turns out that an optimal trading strategy has to be absolutely
continuous under the conditions that have been pointed out to be necessary for an equilibrium
in the case of absolutely continuous insider trading. One of these conditions was the special
form of µ as in Assumption 3.8. As we have seen in Subsection 3.2.3, λ(T ) = 0 if and only if∫ t
0 m(s)ds↗∞, for t→ T . Mathematically, this case involves certain technical difficulties since
the definition of the value function contains the term λ(T )−1. Heuristically, one might wonder
whether the fact that the market is efficient by itself (see Subsection 3.2.3) has an impact on
the optimality of an insider strategy. Therefore, we start our analysis of optimality with the
bounded case. This ensures that λ is bounded away from zero on the whole interval [0, T ]. The
case where λ(T ) = 0 is considered separately thereafter.
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3.3.1 Bounded drift intensity
First of all, we determine the value function J0 considered in Subsection 3.2.1.
Lemma 3.12. Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.8 be satisfied such that m is bounded from above on
[0, T ]. Furthermore, suppose that for (H,λ) ∈ P, (3.12) and (3.37) hold and for (t, y, v) ∈
[0, T ]×R× V define
J0(t, y, v) := Ev
(∫ T
t
µ(s, ξt,ys , V )(H(s, ξ
t,y
s )− V ) ds+ λ(T )−1
∫ ξt,yT
y∗(T,V )
(H(T, y)− V ) dy
)
(3.41)
where ξt,y is defined as in (3.4). Then the triple (H,λ, J0) is a solution to the system of Equations
(3.10) and (3.11). In particular, J0(T, y, v) ≥ 0, for all y ∈ R, with equality if and only if
y = y∗(T, v).
Proof. First of all, we have to show that J0 is well-defined. To see this, note that for all
(t, y) ∈ [0, T ] × R we have µ(t, y, V )(H(t, y) − V ) ≤ 0 (cf. Remark 3.5). Hence, we get with
Fubini’s theorem
E
(∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
µ(s, ξs, V )(H(s, ξs)− V ) ds
∣∣∣∣) = E(−∫ T
0
µ(s, ξs, V )(H(s, ξs)− V ) ds
)
= −
∫ T
0
E (µ(s, ξs, V )(H(s, ξs)− V )) ds.
Now by (3.35) and the monotonicity of H
−
∫ T
0
E (µ(s, ξs, V )(H(s, ξs)− V )) ds =
∫ T
0
m(s)E
(∫ ξs
y∗(s,V )
H(s, x)− V dx
)
ds
≤
∫ T
0
m(s)E ((ξs − y∗(s, V ))(H(s, ξs)− V )) ds.
Let m be bounded by some constant M . This yields∫ T
0
m(s)E ((ξs − y∗(s, V ))(H(s, ξs)− V )) ds
≤M
∫ T
0
E
(
(ξs)
2 + (y∗(s, V ))2 + (H(s, ξs))2 + V 2
)
ds.
Since ξt =
∫ t
0 λ(s)σ(s) dBs, for t ∈ [0, T ], and
E
(∫ t
0
λ(s)σ(s) dBs
)2
=
∫ t
0
σ(s)2λ(s)2 ds ≤ λ(0)2
∫ T
0
σ(s)2 ds <∞,
we get together with supt∈[0,T ]E(y∗(t, V ))2 <∞ thatE
(
(ξt)
2 + (y∗(t, V ))2
)
is uniformly bounded
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on [0, T ]. Finally, the properties of a rational pricing function H ensure
E
(∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
µ(s, ξs, V )(H(s, ξs)− V ) ds
∣∣∣∣) <∞. (3.42)
Furthermore, for the C2 function
y 7→ λ(T )−1
∫ y
y∗(T,V )
H(T, y)− V dy
an analogous argumentation leads to
E
∣∣∣∣∣λ(T )−1
∫ ξT
y∗(T,V )
H(T, y)− V dy
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ λ(T )−1E ((ξT )2 + (y∗(T, V ))2 +H(T, ξT )2 + V 2) <∞.
Now, in order to prove that J0 satisfies the PDEs (3.10) and (3.11), we consider the equivalent
system
∂yJ
0(t, y, v) =
H(t, y)− v
λ(t)
, (3.43)
∂tJ
0(t, y, v) = −µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v)− 1
2
σ(t)2λ(t)2∂yyJ
0(t, y, v). (3.44)
The smoothness of J0 follows from definition (see also [43], Section 4.3). Due to Feynman-
Kac’s formula (or the calculations made for the HJB equation in Subsection 3.2.1) we know that
J0(t, y, v) is a solution to Equation (3.44) for all (t, y) ∈ (0, T )×R if
E
v
∫ T
0
λ(s)2σ(s)2∂yJ
0(s, ξs, V )
2 ds <∞,
which ensures that
∫ ·
0 λ(s)σ(s)∂yJ
0(s, ξs, v) dBs is a martingale. If (3.43) holds,
E
v
∫ T
0
λ(s)2σ(s)2∂yJ
0(s, ξs, V )
2 ds = Ev
∫ T
0
σ(s)2 (H(s, ξs)− V )2 ds <∞.
It remains to show that the partial derivative of J0 w.r.t. y verifies (3.43). Using dominated
convergence and Fubini’s theorem we get
lim
↓0
1

E
v
(∫ T
t
m(s)
∫ y∗(s,V )
ξt,ys +
H(s, x)− V dx ds−
∫ T
t
m(s)
∫ y∗(s,V )
ξt,ys
H(s, x)− V dx ds
)
= lim
↓0
1

E
v
(∫ T
t
m(s)
∫ ξt,ys
ξt,ys +
H(s, x)− V dx ds
)
=
∫ T
t
m(s)Ev
(
lim
↓0
1

∫ ξt,ys
ξt,ys +
H(s, x)− V dx
)
ds
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=
∫ T
t
−m(s)Ev (H(s, ξt,ys )− V ) ds
=
∫ T
t
−m(s)(H(t, y)− v) ds
= −(H(t, y)− v)
∫ T
t
m(s) ds
where in the second to last line we have used the fact that (due to PDE (3.12) and admissibility
of (H,λ)) (H(t, ξt), t ∈ [0, T ]) is a martingale. An analogous calculation for  ↑ 0 yields the same
result. Thus,
∂yE
v
(∫ T
t
m(s)
∫ y∗(s,V )
ξt,ys
H(s, x)− V dx ds
)
= −(H(t, y)− v)
∫ T
t
m(s) ds.
With the same arguments we can deduce
∂yE
v
(
λ(T )−1
∫ ξt,yT
y∗(T,V )
(H(T, x)− V ) dx
)
= (H(t, y)− v)λ(T )−1.
Together this yields
∂yJ
0(t, y, v) = (H(t, y)− v)
(
λ(T )−1 −
∫ T
t
m(s) ds
)
(3.37)
= (H(t, y)− v)λ(t)−1.
Last but not least, strict monotonicity of H directly implies J0(T, y, v) ≥ 0 for all (y, v) ∈ R×V
with equality if and only if y = y∗(T, v). This proves the second part of the assertion.
With the help of the preceding lemma, we are now able to derive sufficient conditions for the
optimality of insider strategies. For necessity we have to show that there indeed exists a strategy
that satisfies the below given criteria. This is done in Section 3.6. Furthermore, we note that
the given optimality criteria correspond to those of other insider trading models, e.g. [7] or [28].
Hence, given that µ satisfies the conditions of Assumption 3.8 with a bounded drift intensity
and that the price pressure is chosen correspondently, i.e. according to (3.37), the presence of
partially informed noise traders has no influence on the structure of optimal strategies, so far.
Proposition 3.13. Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.8 be satisfied such that m is bounded from above
on [0, T ]. Furthermore, suppose that for (H,λ) ∈ P, (3.12) and (3.37) hold. Then θ ∈ S(H,λ)
is optimal if
(1) H(T, Y˜T ) = V P-a.s.,
(2) θ is of finite variation and continuous.
Proof. In the sequel, we make use of the notation J0s instead of J0(s, Y˜s, V ) and Hs instead of
H(s, Y˜s). As pointed out in (1.2), the insider’s wealth at time T corresponding to a strategy θ
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can be written as
W θT =
∫ T−
0
V −Hs− dθs + [θ, V −H]T− (3.45)
where we used the fact that Vt is constant on [0, T ]. Since
Ht = H0 +
∫ t
0
∂yHs−λ(s) dY cs +
∫ t
0
∂tHs ds+
1
2
∫ t
0
∂yyHsλ(s)
2 d〈Y c〉s +
∑
s≤t
∆Hs,
the quadratic variation term [θ, V −H]T− = −[θ,H]T− can be written as
[θ, V −H]T− = −
∫ T
0
λ(s)∂yHs d〈θc〉s −
∫ T
0
λ(s)σ(s)∂yHs d〈θc, B〉s −
∑
s<T
∆Hs∆θs.
Together with (3.45) this leads to the following representation of the insider’s terminal wealth
W θT =
∫ T−
0
V −Hs− dθs −
∫ T
0
λ(s)∂yHs d〈θc〉s
−
∫ T
0
λ(s)σ(s)∂yHs d〈θc, B〉s −
∑
s<T
∆Hs∆θs.
(3.46)
Consider now J0(s, Y˜s) with J0 as in (3.41). According to Lemma 3.12
λ(s)∂yJ
0
s = Hs − V.
This implies
∆Hs = ∆(Hs − V ) = ∆(λ(s)∂yJ0s ).
Inserting this into (3.46) yields
W θT =−
∫ T−
0
λ(s)∂yJ
0
s− dθs −
∫ T
0
λ(s)2∂yyJ
0
s d〈θc〉s
−
∫ T
0
λ(s)2σ(s)∂yyJ
0
s d〈θc, B〉s −
∑
s<T
∆(λ(s)∂yJ
0
s )∆θs
=−
∫ T
0
λ(s)∂yJ
0
s− dθ
c
s −
∫ T
0
λ(s)2∂yyJ
0
s d〈θc〉s
−
∫ T
0
λ(s)2σ(s)∂yyJ
0
s d〈θc, B〉s −
∑
s<T
λ(s)∂yJ
0
s∆θs.
(3.47)
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On the other hand, we have by Itô’s formula
J0T = J
0
0 +
∫ T
0
∂yJ
0
s− dY˜
c
s +
∫ T
0
∂tJ
0
s ds+
1
2
∫ T
0
∂yyJ
0
s d〈Y˜ c〉s +
∑
s≤T
∆J0s
= J00 +
∫ T
0
λ(s)∂yJ
0
s− dY
c
s +
∫ T
0
∂tJ
0
s ds+
1
2
∫ T
0
λ(s)2∂yyJ
0
s d〈Y c〉s +
∑
s≤T
∆J0s
= J00 +
∫ T
0
λ(s)σ(s)∂yJ
0
s− dBs +
∫ T
0
λ(s)∂yJ
0
s− dθ
c
s +
∫ T
0
λ(s)2σ(s)∂yyJ
0
s d〈θc, B〉s
+
1
2
∫ T
0
λ(s)2∂yyJ
0
s d〈θc〉s +
∫ T
0
∂tJ
0
s +
λ(s)2σ(s)2
2
∂yyJ
0
s + λ(s)µs∂yJ
0
s ds+
∑
s≤T
∆J0s .
Again together with Lemma 3.12 (PDE (3.11)) we obtain
J0T =J
0
0 +
∫ T
0
λ(s)σ(s)∂yJ
0
s− dBs +
∫ T
0
λ(s)∂yJ
0
s− dθ
c
s
+
1
2
∫ T
0
λ(s)2∂yyJ
0
s d〈θc〉s +
∫ T
0
λ(s)2σ(s)∂yyJ
0
s d〈θc, B〉s +
∑
s≤T
∆J0s . (3.48)
Now putting (3.47) and (3.48) together, we get
W θT = J
0
0 − J0T− +
∫ T
0
σ(s)λ(s)∂yJ
0
s− dBs −
∫ T
0
λ(s)2
2
∂yyJ
0
s d〈θc〉s +
∑
s<T
∆J0s − λ(s)∂yJ0s∆θs.
Since
E
∫ T
0
σ(s)2(Hs − V )2 ds <∞,
we have that ∫ t
0
σ(s)λ(s)∂yJ
0
s− dBs, t ∈ [0, T ],
is a (true) martingale, in particular
E
∫ T
0
σ(s)λ(s)∂yJ
0
s− dBs = 0.
Hence,
EW θT = E
(
J00 − J0T− −
∫ T
0
1
2
λ(s)2∂yyJ
0
s d〈θc〉s +
∑
s<T
∆J0s − λ(s)∂yJ0s∆θs
)
. (3.49)
With the help of Equation (3.49), we now show that EW θT ≤ EJ00 , for all θ ∈ S(H,λ) . First
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observe that
−
∫ T
0
1
2
λ(s)2∂yyJ
0
s d〈θc〉s ≤ 0
since
∂yyJ
0
s = λ(s)
−1∂y(Hs − V ) = λ(s)−1∂yHs > 0,
with equality if and only if 〈θc〉· = 0. On the other hand, by convexity of J0 (∂yyJ0 > 0) together
with continuity of λ we get
∆J0s − λ(s)∂yJ0s∆θs
= J0(s, Y˜s− + λ(s)∆θs, V )− J0(s, Y˜s−, V )− ∂yJ0(s, Y˜s− + λ(s)∆θs, V )λ(s)∆θs ≤ 0
with equality if and only if ∆θs = 0. Last but not least, we can deduce from Lemma 3.12 that
E(J00 − J0T−) ≤ EJ00 −EJ0T− ≤ EJ00 ,
with equality if and only if Y˜T− = y∗(T, V ), P-a.s. If θ is continuous, this is equivalent to
H(T, Y˜T ) = V , P-a.s. For an admissible strategy θ∗ that satisfies conditions (1) and (2) and any
other admissible strategy θ it follows
EW θT ≤ EJ00 = EW θ
∗
T .
This proves the sufficiency of the criteria.
Remark 3.14. In the case where the terminal wealth of the insider is given by
W θT =
∫ T
0
V −Hs− dθs + [θ, V −H]T ,
i.e. in a model where Pt = V only for t ∈ (T,∞) but not necessarily t = T (cf. (1.1)), we get by
an analogous argumentation as in the preceding proof that
EW θT ≤ E(J00 − J0T ) ≤ EJ00
with equality if and only if the conditions of Proposition 3.13 are satisfied. We note that the
exact distinction of the trading horizon is irrelevant in the case of bounded drift intensity. This
changes in the case of unbounded drift intensity, which is considered next.
3.3.2 Unbounded drift intensity
In this subsection, we want to generalise the results of Proposition 3.13 to the case where the
(integrated) noise drift intensity m is not necessarily bounded. According to Proposition 3.9
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we already have H(T, X˜T ) = V if limt→T
∫ t
0 m(s) ds = ∞. Hence, this situation should place
additional demands on an optimal strategy. Otherwise, the strategy θ = 0 already would be
optimal according to Proposition 3.13.
While assuming the boundedness of m on [0, T ] in the previous subsection, we ensured that
the corresponding price pressure
λ(t) =
1∫ t
0 m(s) ds+ λ
−1
0
is bounded away from zero on the whole interval [0, T ]. Now, if we allow∫ t
0
m(s) ds↗∞, for t→ T,
the price pressure λ converges to zero. Mathematically, this poses the problem that we cannot
define the value function of our optimisation problem as we did in Lemma 3.12 by
J0(t, y, v) = Ev
(∫ T
t
µ(s, ξt,ys , V )(H(s, ξ
t,y
s )− V ) ds+ λ(T )−1
∫ ξt,yT
y∗(T,V )
(H(T, y)− V ) dy
)
since the factor λ(T )−1 appears in the second part of the right hand side. Our solution to this
problem is to consider auxiliary optimisation problems on the interval [0, t] for t < T . These can
be solved with the help of Proposition 3.13. In a second step, we show that the terminal wealth
of the general optimisation problem can be represented as limit of the terminal wealth of the
auxiliary problems.
Proposition 3.15. Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.8 be satisfied and suppose that for (H,λ) ∈ P,
(3.12) and (3.37) hold. Then θ ∈ S(H,λ) is optimal if
(1) θ is continuous and of finite variation,
(2) limt→T EJ
0,t
t = 0, where J
0,t
t = λ(t)
−1 ∫ Y˜t
y∗(t,V )H(t, y)− V dy, t ∈ [0, T ).
In particular, if θ verifies condition (1) and (2), H(T, Y˜T ) = V holds P-a.s.
As stated above, we introduce some auxiliary models to analyse our optimisation problem.
This is done with the following lemma.
Lemma 3.16. Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.8 be satisfied and suppose that for (H,λ) ∈ P, (3.12)
and (3.37) hold. For t′ ∈ [0, T ) and for all (t, y, v) ∈ [0, t′]×R× V define
J0,t
′
(t, y, v) := Ev
(∫ t′
t
µ(s, ξt,ys , V )(H(s, ξ
t,y
s )− V ) ds+ λ(t′)−1
∫ ξt,y
t′
y∗(t′,V )
(H(t′, x)− V ) dx
)
.
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Then J0,t′ satisfies the following system of PDEs for all (t, y, v) ∈ (0, t′)×R× V
∂yJ
0,t′(t, y, v) =
H(t, y)− v
λ(t)
,
∂tJ
0,t′(t, y, v) = −λ(t)µ(t, y, v)∂yJ0,t′(t, y, v)− 1
2
σ(t)2λ(t)2∂yyJ
0,t′(t, y, v).
Furthermore, for all v ∈ V, the map t 7→ J0,t(0, 0, v) is positive, increasing and bounded from
above, in particular, limt→T J0,t(0, 0, v) exists and is finite.
Proof. Since (H(t, ξt), t ≥ 0) is a martingale, we have for all t′ ∈ [0, T )
EH(t′, ξt′)2 ≤ EH(T, ξT )2 <∞.
Hence, H is admissible on [0, t′]. Furthermore, m is bounded on [0, t′] (Assumption 3.8). In
particular, the assumptions of Lemma 3.12 are satisfied on the intervall [0, t′] and the first part
of the assertion follows with the same arguments.
For the second part again considerM as defined in (3.38). Together with the partial derivatives
of M calculated in the proof of Proposition 3.9 Itô’s formula yields
dM(s, ξs) = ∂yM(s, ξs)dξs +
1
2
∂yyM(s, ξs)σ(s)
2λ(s)2ds+ ∂tM(s, ξs)ds
= (H(s, ξs)− V )λ(s)σ(s)dBs + 1
2
σ(s)2λ(s)2∂yH(s, y
∗(s, V ))ds.
Together with integration by parts we get
J0,t(0, 0, v) = Ev
(
−
∫ t
0
M(s, ξs) dλ(s)
−1 + λ(t)−1M(t, ξt)
)
= Ev
(
λ(0)−1M(0, 0) +
∫ t
0
λ(s)−1 dM(s, ξs)
)
= Ev
(
λ(0)−1M(0, 0) +
∫ t
0
(H(s, ξs)− V )σ(s) dBs
+
∫ t
0
λ(s)σ(s)2
2
∂yH(s, y
∗(s, V )) ds
)
= λ(0)−1EvM(0, 0) +
∫ t
0
λ(s)σ(s)2∂yH(s, y
∗(s, v)) ds
= λ(0)−1
∫ 0
y∗(0,v)
H(0, x)− V dx+
∫ t
0
λ(s)σ(s)2∂yH(s, y
∗(s, v)) ds.
Since λ(s)σ(s)2∂yH(s, y∗(s, v)) ≥ 0 and∫ t
0
λ(s)σ(s)2∂yH(s, y
∗(s, v)) ds ≤
∫ T
0
λ(s)σ(s)2∂yH(s, y
∗(s, v)) ds <∞,
(recall that ∂yH ∈ C0([0, T ]×R)) this proves the assertion.
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With the help of Lemma 3.16, we are now in the position to prove Proposition 3.15.
Proof of Proposition 3.15. For any t ∈ [0, T ) and any admissible insider strategy θ ∈ S(H,λ)
define
W˜ θt :=
(
V −H(t, Y˜t)
)
θt +
∫ t
0
θs− dH(s, Y˜s). (3.50)
In a model with announcement of V in t+, i.e. Ps = V for all s > t, W˜ θt is the terminal wealth of
the insider strategy θ|[0,t] (observe that all admissible trading strategies on [0, T ] are admissible
in the reduced model on [0, t] and all admissible pricing rules on [0, T ] are admissible pricing rules
on [0, t]). Furthermore, J0,t, as defined in Lemma 3.16, is the value function of the corresponding
optimisation problem, and by Remark 3.14 and an analogous argumentation as in Proposition
3.13, with W˜ θt in place of W θT and J
0,t instead of J0, we get
W˜ θt = J
0,t(0, 0, V )− J0,t(t, Y˜t, V )−
∫ t
0
1
2
λ(s)2∂yyJ
0,t(s, Y˜s, V ) d〈θc〉s
+
∑
s≤t
∆J0,t(s, Y˜s, V )− λ(s)∂yJ0,t(s, Y˜s, V )∆θs +
∫ t
0
σ(s)(H(s, Y˜s−)− V ) dBs
≤ J0,t(0, 0, V ) +
∫ t
0
σ(s)(H(s, Y˜s−)− V ) dBs
In particular, for t ∈ [0, T )
J0,t(0, 0, V ) = W˜ θt + J
0,t(t, Y˜t, V )−
∑
s≤t
∆J0,t(s, Y˜s, V )− λ(s)∂yJ0,t(s, Y˜s, V )∆θs
+
∫ t
0
1
2
λ(s)2∂yyJ
0,t(s, Y˜s, V ) d〈θc〉s −
∫ t
0
σ(s)(H(s, Y˜s−)− V ) dBs.
is uniformly integrable with respect to Pv, for all v ∈ V (cf. Lemma 3.16). Since
lim
t↑T
W˜ θt =
(
V −H(T−, Y˜T−)
)
θT− +
∫ T−
0
θs− dH(s, Y˜s) = W θT ,
we get
lim
t→T
J0,t(0, 0, v) = lim
t→T
E
vJ0,t(0, 0, V )
= Ev lim
t→T
(
W˜ θt + J
0,t(t, Y˜t, V )−
∑
s≤t
∆J0,t(s, Y˜s, V )− λ(s)∂yJ0,t(s, Y˜s, V )∆θs
+
∫ t
0
1
2
λ(s)2∂yyJ
0,t(s, Y˜s, V ) d〈θc〉s −
∫ t
0
σ(s)(H(s, Y˜s−)− V ) dBs
)
≥ Ev
(
lim
t→T
W˜ θt −
∫ T
0
σ(s)(H(s, Y˜s−)− V ) dBs
)
= EvW θT .
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In particular, (where J0,t0 = J
0,t(0, 0, V ))
EW θT = EE
vW θT ≤ E lim
t→T
J0,t0 . (3.51)
Furthermore, W˜ θt corresponds to the terminal wealth (in T ) of the strategy θ stopped at time t,
i.e.
W θ
t
T = V θ
t
T− −
∫ T−
0
H(s−, Y˜s−) dθts − [H(·, Y˜·), θt]T−
= V θt −
∫ t
0
H(s−, Y˜s−) dθs − [H(·, Y˜·), θ]t
= W˜ θt
for θts := θt∧s, s ∈ [0, T ]. For any optimal strategy θ and t ∈ [0, T ) obviously EW θ
t
T ≤ EW θT
holds. Hence, from (3.51) it follows, for all t ∈ [0, T ),
EW˜ θt ≤ EW θT ≤ E lim
t→T
J0,t0 . (3.52)
On the other hand, with the same arguments as in Proposition 3.13, we have
EW˜ θt ≤ E
(
J0,t0 − J0,tt
)
,
with equality if and only if θ|[0,t] is continuous and of finite variation. And since J
0,t
t ≥ 0, for all
t ∈ [0, T ), we get for all those θ that
EW˜ θt = E
(
J0,t0 − J0,tt
)
≤ EJ0,t0 .
In particular, monotone convergence (J0,t0 is positive and increasing, cf. Lemma 3.16) then yields
lim
t→T
EW˜ θt = lim
t→T
E
(
J0,t0 − J0,tt
)
≤ E lim
t→T
J0,t0
and
lim
t→T
EW˜ θt = E lim
t→T
J0,t0
if limt→T EJ
0,t
t = 0. Together with (3.52) we get the optimality of a strategy that satisfies
conditions (1) and (2).
We finally have to show that EJ0,tt → 0 implies H(T, Y˜T ) = V P-a.s. From the definition of y∗,
the strict monotonicity of H(t, ·) and positivity of λ we get for all t ∈ [0, T ] that EJ0,tt ≥ 0, with
equality if and only if Y˜t = y∗(t, V ) or equivalently H(t, Y˜t) = V . Finally, the L1 convergence
lim
t→T
E|J0,tt | = lim
t→T
EJ0,tt = 0
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implies convergence in probability of J0,tt to 0. Since Y˜ is continuous, we get H(T, Y˜T ) = V
P-a.s.
In the first instance, a comparison of the optimality criteria of Propositions 3.13 and 3.15
shows that a vanishing price pressure does not affect the general structure of an optimal insider
strategy. In both cases the insider has to ensure that the price converges to V , i.e. to provide
market efficiency, by using an absolutely continuous trading strategy. If the price pressure
vanishes, the convergence has, roughly speaking, only to be fast enough w.r.t. λ. This is quite
intuitive since, in this case, the market is already efficient without an insider (cf. Proposition
3.9). However, efficiency is provided faster in the presence of an insider, trading according to
Proposition 3.15. To realise this, consider
J0,t(t, X˜t) =
M(t, X˜t)
λ(t)
with M as defined in (3.38). Analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.9, we can calculate the
dynamics of this process
d(M(t, X˜t)λ(t)
−1) = λ(t)−1dM(t, X˜t) +M(t, X˜t)dλ(t)−1
= (H(t, X˜t)− V )σ(t)dBt + σ(t)
2λ(t)
2
∂yH(t, y
∗(t, V ))dt.
Obviously, it does not converge to V .
3.4 Optimality: risk averse insider
In the previous section, we studied optimality for a risk neutral insider. This section is devoted
to analogous results for a risk averse insider.
3.4.1 Bounded drift intensity
We again start with determining the value function.
Lemma 3.17. Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.8 be satisfied such that m is bounded from above on
[0, T ]. Furthermore, suppose that for (H,λ) ∈ P, (3.12) and (3.37) hold and define
Kβ(t, y, v) :=Ev
(∫ T
t
µ(s, ξt,ys , V )(H(s, ξ
t,y
s )− V ) +
σ(s)2β
2
(H(s, ξt,ys )− V )2 ds
+λ(T )−1
∫ ξt,yT
y∗(T,V )
(H(T, x)− V ) dx
)
,
(3.53)
for (t, y, v) ∈ [0, T ]×R× V, with ξt,ys as in (3.4) and
Jβ(t, y, v) := β exp
(
βKβ(t, y, v)
)
. (3.54)
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Then the triple (H,λ,Kβ) is a solution to the following system of PDEs:
0 =
H(t, y)− v
λ(t)
− ∂yKβ(t, y, v), (3.55)
0 = ∂tK
β(t, y, v) +
σ(t)2λ(t)2
2
∂yyK
β(t, y, v) +
σ(t)2β
2
(H(t, y)− v)2 + µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v),
(3.56)
for all (t, y, v) ∈ (0, T )×R×V. In particular, Kβ(T, y, v) ≥ 0, for all y ∈ R, with equality if and
only if y = y∗(T, v). Furthermore, the triple (H,λ, Jβ) is a solution to the system of Equations
(3.22) and (3.23) and Jβ(T, y, v) ≥ β, for all y ∈ R, with equality if and only if y = y∗(T, v).
Proof. An analogous proof of Lemma 3.12 where we replace∫ T
t
µ(s, ξt,ys , V )(H(s, ξ
t,y
s )− V ) ds
by ∫ T
t
µ(s, ξt,ys , V )(H(s, ξ
t,y
s )− V ) +
σ(s)2β
2
(H(s, ξt,ys )− V )2 ds
shows that Kβ is a solution to (3.55) and (3.56). Differentiation of (3.55) w.r.t. y yields
∂yyK
β(t, y, v) =
∂yH(t, y)
λ(t)
(3.57)
and inserting in (3.56)
∂tK
β(t, y, v) = −σ(t)
2λ(t)
2
∂yH(t, y)− σ(t)
2β
2
(H(t, y)− v)2 − µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v). (3.58)
Now consider Jβ as defined in (3.54). Using the partial derivatives of Kβ calculated in (3.55),
(3.57), and (3.58), yields
∂yJ
β(t, y, v) = β∂yK
β(t, y, v)Jβ(t, y, v) = β
H(t, y)− v
λ(t)
Jβ(t, y, v), (3.59)
∂yyJ
β(t, y, v) = β∂yyK
β(t, y, v)Jβ(t, y, v) + β2(∂yK
β(t, y, v))2Jβ(t, y, v)
= β
∂yH(t, y)
λ(t)
Jβ(t, y, v) + β2
(
H(t, y)− v
λ(t)
)2
Jβ(t, y, v)
and
∂tJ
β(t, y, v) = β∂tK
β(t, y, v)Jβ(t, y, v)
= βJβ(t, y, v)
(
−σ(t)
2λ(t)
2
∂yH(t, y)− σ(t)
2β
2
(H(t, y)− v)2 − µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v)
)
.
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From this we deduce that
0 = ∂tJ
β(t, y, v) +
1
2
σ(t)2λ(t)2∂yyJ
β(t, y, v) + λ(t)µ(t, y, v)∂yJ
β(t, y, v).
Together with (3.59) Jβ is a solution to the system of Equations (3.22) and (3.23). As in Lemma
3.12 we get that Kβ(T, y, v) ≥ 0, for all y ∈ R, with equality if and only if y = y∗(T, v). Hence,
Jβ(T, y, v) ≥ β, for all y ∈ R, with equality if and only if y = y∗(T, v).
Lemma 3.17 shows that the optimisation problem in the case of absolutely continuous insider
trading is related to that in the risk neutral case because the risk averse value function of the
HJB equation approach in Subsection 3.2.2 is a transform of the corresponding risk neutral
value function. It seems to be plausible that this analogy persists in the case of general insider
strategies.
Proposition 3.18. Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.8 be satisfied such that m is bounded from above
on [0, T ]. Furthermore, suppose that for (H,λ) ∈ P, (3.12) and (3.37) hold. Then θ ∈ S(H,λ)
is optimal if
(1) H(T, Y˜T ) = V P-a.s.,
(2) θ is of finite variation and continuous.
Proof. The proof makes use of the same techniques as the proof of Proposition 3.13. We only
have to take into account that we now have to maximise the utility U(W θT ) of the final wealth
W θT generated by the trading strategy θ as in (3.45), where U(x) = β exp (βx). With the same
arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3.13 and using Lemma 3.17 we get
W θT =−
∫ T
0
λ(s)∂yK
β
s− dθ
c
s −
∫ T
0
λ(s)2∂yyK
β
s d〈θc〉s
−
∫ T
0
λ(s)2σ(s)∂yyK
β
s d〈θc, B〉s −
∑
s<T
λ(s)∂yK
β
s ∆θs
(3.60)
with Kβs = Kβ(s, Y˜s, V ) according to (3.53). On the other hand, Itô’s formula yields
KβT = K
β
0 +
∫ T
0
λ(s)σ(s)∂yK
β
s− dBs +
∫ T
0
λ(s)∂yK
β
s− dθ
c
s +
∫ T
0
λ(s)2σ(s)∂yyK
β
s d〈θc, B〉s
+
∫ T
0
λ(s)µs∂yK
β
s + ∂tK
β
s +
λ(s)2σ(s)2
2
∂yyK
β
s ds+
∫ T
0
λ(s)2
2
∂yyK
β
s d〈θc〉s +
∑
s≤T
∆Kβs .
Using PDE (3.56) (Lemma 3.17) this can be simplified to
KβT =K
β
0 +
∫ T
0
λ(s)σ(s)∂yK
β
s− dBs +
∫ T
0
λ(s)∂yK
β
s− dθ
c
s −
∫ T
0
σ(s)2β
2
(Hs − V )2 ds
+
∫ T
0
λ(s)2
2
∂yyK
β
s d〈θc〉s +
∫ T
0
λ(s)2σ(s)∂yyK
β
s d〈θc, B〉s +
∑
s≤T
∆Kβs .
(3.61)
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Putting (3.60) and (3.61) together, we get
W θT =K
β
0 −KβT− +
∫ T
0
σ(s)λ(s)∂yK
β
s− dBs −
∫ T
0
σ(s)2λ(s)2β
2
(
∂yK
β
s
)2
ds
−
∫ T
0
λ(s)2
2
∂yyK
β
s d〈θc〉s +
∑
s<T
∆Kβs − λ(s)∂yKβs ∆θs.
(3.62)
Now, define
K˜βT := K
β
0 −KβT− −
∫ T
0
λ(s)2
2
∂yyK
β
s d〈θc〉s +
∑
s<T
∆Kβs − λ(s)∂yKβs ∆θs.
With the same arguments as in Proposition 3.13 we get K˜βT ≤ Kβ0 P-a.s. with equality if and
only if θ is absolutely continuous and HT = V P-a.s. We conclude that
β exp
(
βK˜βT
)
≤ β exp
(
βKβ0
)
P-a.s.
with equality if and only if θ is absolutely continuous and HT = V P-a.s. Hence,
EU(W θT ) = βE
(
exp
(
βK˜βT +
∫ T
0
βσ(s)λ(s)∂yK
β
s− dBs −
∫ T
0
σ(s)2λ(s)2β2
2
(
∂yK
β
s
)2
ds
))
≤ βE exp
(
βKβ0
)
E
v exp
(∫ T
0
βσ(s)λ(s)∂yK
β
s− dBs −
∫ T
0
σ(s)2λ(s)2β2
2
(
∂yK
β
s
)2
ds
)
.
Since (admissibility of θ)
E
(
exp
(∫ T
0
β2σ(s)2λ(s)2
2
(∂yK
β
s )
2 ds
))
= E
(
exp
(∫ T
0
β2σ(s)2
2
(Hs − V )2 ds
))
<∞,
Novikov’s condition (cf. [42], Prop. 1.7.6.1) is satisfied. Hence,
exp
(∫ t
0
βσ(s)λ(s)∂yK
β
s− dBs −
∫ t
0
σ(s)2λ(s)2β2
2
(
∂yK
β
s
)2
ds
)
, t ∈ [0, T ],
is a uniformly integrable martingale. In particular,
E
v exp
(∫ T
0
βσ(s)λ(s)∂yK
β
s− dBs −
∫ T
0
σ(s)2λ(s)2β2
2
(
∂yK
β
s
)2
ds
)
= 1.
Altogether, we have
EU(W θT ) ≤ βE exp
(
βKβ0
)
with equality if θ is absolutely continuous and such that HT = V .
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Remark 3.19. In the preceding proof we identified
exp
(∫ t
0
βσ(s)(H(s, Y˜s−)− V ) dBs − 1
2
∫ t
0
β2σ(s)2(H(s, Y˜s)− V )2 ds
)
, t ∈ [0, T ],
as strictly positive and uniformly integrable martingale. By
dPβ
dP
= exp
(∫ T
0
βσ(s)(H(s, Y˜s−)− V ) dBs − 1
2
∫ T
0
β2σ(s)2(H(s, Y˜s)− V )2 ds
)
(3.63)
=: E
(∫ T
0
βσ(s)(H(s, Y˜s−)− V ) dBs
)
we can therefore define a probability measure Pβ on FT , equivalent to P.
3.4.2 Unbounded drift intensity
We now consider the case of an unbounded drift intensity in a risk averse setting. The following
proposition is the risk averse analogue to Proposition 3.15.
Proposition 3.20. Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.8 be satisfied and suppose that for (H,λ) ∈ P,
(3.12) and (3.37) hold. Then θ ∈ S(H,λ) is optimal if
(1) θ is continuous and of finite variation,
(2) limt→T Eβ exp
(
−βJ0,tt
)
= 1, where Eβ denotes the expectation w.r.t. Pβ as defined in
(3.63) and J0,tt is defined as in Proposition 3.15.
In particular, if θ verifies condition (1) and (2), H(T, Y˜T ) = V holds P-a.s.
Proof. Similarly to Lemma 3.16, we can define for t′ ∈ [0, T ) and, (t, y, v) ∈ [0, t′]×R× V
Kβ,t
′
(t, y, v) := Ev
∫ t′
t
µ(s, ξt,ys , V )(H(s, ξ
t,y
s )− V ) +
σ(s)2β
2
(H(s, ξt,ys )− V )2 ds
+Evλ(t′)−1
∫ ξx,t
t′
y∗(t′,V )
(H(t′, y)− V ) dy.
(3.64)
With an analogous proof we get for all t′ ∈ [0, T ) that Kβ,t′ solves (3.55) and (3.56) on [0, t′)×
R and that Kβ,t(0, 0, V ) is positive, increasing (for t ∈ [0, T )) and bounded from above. In
particular, limt→T Kβ,t(0, 0, V ) < ∞ exists. We then proceed with the same arguments as in
Proposition 3.15. For
W˜ θt =
(
V −H(t, Y˜t)
)
θt +
∫ t
0
θs− dH(s, Y˜s)
we get a representation corresponding to (3.62). Furthermore, using the uniform integrability of
β exp
(
βKβ,t0
)
E
(∫ t
0
βσ(s)(H(s, Y˜s−)− V ) dBs
)
, t ∈ [0, T ),
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with respect to Pv (for all v ∈ V), it follows that
E
vU(W θT ) = Ev lim
t→T
U(W˜ θt )
≤ Ev lim
t→T
β exp
(
βKβ,t0
)
E
(∫ t
0
βσ(s)(H(s, Y˜s−)− V ) dBs
)
= lim
t→T
β exp
(
βKβ,t(0, 0, v)
)
.
Hence,
EU(W θT ) ≤ E lim
t→T
β exp
(
βKβ,t0
)
.
On the other hand,
EU(W˜ θt ) ≤ βE exp
(
βKβ,t0
)
,
for all t ∈ [0, T ), and
lim
t→T
EU(W˜ θt ) ≤ E lim
t→T
β exp
(
βKβ,t0
)
with equality if θ is absolutely continuous and
lim
t→T
E
(
exp
(
−βKβ,tt
)
E
(∫ t
0
βσ(s)(H(s, Y˜s)− V ) dBs
))
= lim
t→T
E
β exp
(
−βKβ,tt
)
= 1.
Since Kβ,tt = J
0,t
t , we get the optimality of θ if condition (1) and (2) are satisfied. It remains
to show that the optimality criteria imply H(T, Y˜T ) = V . With the same arguments as in the
proof of Proposition 3.15 we obtain
J0,tt
P
β−−→ 0, for t→ T,
and thus H(T, Y˜T ) = V Pβ-a.s. Since Pβ and P are equivalent probability measures, we also
get the P-almost sure equality.
3.5 Rationality
In the previous sections, we derived criteria for the optimality of an insider strategy for the risk
neutral as well as the risk averse case. In both cases, we get as one criterion the continuity and
finite variation of the insider strategy. This motivates the following notation
θt =
∫ t
0
αs ds, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (3.65)
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for some suitable FI-adapted process α. As a next step, we present a characterisation of ra-
tionality of the pricing function. Recall that in the risk neutral case as well as the risk averse
case
∂tH(t, y) +
1
2
σ(t)2λ(t)2∂yyH(t, y) = 0, for all (t, y) ∈ (0, T )×R (3.66)
was identified as a necessary condition for an equilibrium to exist under the assumption of
absolutely continuous insider trading (cf. Propositions 3.6 and 3.7). The next proposition states
equivalent conditions for the case when H is rational and satisfies (3.66). We can conclude
that these conditions are also necessary for equilibrium. Furthermore, it turns out that these
conditions characterise the insider strategy. More precisely, the resulting equivalent condition is
the so-called inconspicuousness of insider trading and means that the market makers’ expectation
regarding the informed trading is zero or equivalently that Y is an integrated Brownian motion
w.r.t. FM. In the standard model (where noise trading is given by a Brownian motion) this reads
as E
(
αt
∣∣FMt ) = 0 (cf. [25] or [28]). In our setup this condition changes to E (αt + µt∣∣FMt ) =
0, i.e. all informed trading has to be considered. Thus, we also have a slight change in the
interpretation of an insider strategy that behaves as above. While in the standard case the
insider has to trade such that his own strategy is not detected, now the insider has to take care
that the whole informed trading is hidden behind the noise. One could characterise this more
precisely as inconspicuousness of informed trading. We furthermore stress that the following
characterisation does not depend on a special form of µ as in Assumption 3.8.
Proposition 3.21. Let (H,λ) ∈ P be a rational pricing rule and θ ∈ S(H,λ) an admissible
trading strategy that is continuous and of finite variation. Then the following conditions are
equivalent:
(1) H satisfies (3.66),
(2) E(αt + µt|FMt ) = 0 dt⊗ dP-a.s.,
(3) Y¯ is a Brownian motion w.r.t. FM on [0, T ] where
Y¯t =
∫ t
0
σ(s)−1 dYs, t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.67)
Proof. For t ∈ [0, T ] apply Itô’s formula to H and Y˜ where Y˜ is now continuous (recall that we
use short notation Ht in place of H(t, Y˜t) and µt instead of µ(t, Y˜t, V ))
Ht = H0 +
∫ t
0
∂tHs ds+
∫ t
0
∂yHs dY˜s +
1
2
∫ t
0
∂yyHs d〈Y˜ 〉s
= H0 +
∫ t
0
∂tHs +
λ(s)2σ(s)2
2
∂yyHs + ∂yHsλ(s)(µs + αs) ds+
∫ t
0
∂yHsλ(s)σ(s) dBs
= H0 +
∫ t
0
∂tHs +
λ(s)2σ(s)2
2
∂yyHs + ∂yHsλ(s)(µˆs + αˆs) ds+
∫ t
0
∂yHsλ(s)σ(s) dIs
59
3. A market with semi-rational noise traders and fixed time horizon
where
It :=
∫ t
0
(µs + αs − µˆs − αˆs)σ(s)−1 ds+Bt, (3.68)
and
µˆt = E
(
µt
∣∣FMt ) , αˆt = E (αt∣∣FMt ) .
Obviously, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
It =
∫ t
0
σ(s)−1 dYs −
∫ t
0
σ(s)−1 (µˆs + αˆs) ds. (3.69)
All processes on the right hand side of Equation (3.69) are FM-adapted. Hence, I is FM-
adapted. By Lévy’s characterisation theorem (cf. [56], Theorem 39, Chapter II) I is a Brownian
motion w.r.t. FM since I is continuous, 〈I〉t = 〈B〉t = t and I is a martingale. To realise the
latter, observe that for all 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T we have∫ t
s
E
(
αu + µu
∣∣FMs ) du = ∫ t
s
E
(
αˆu + µˆu
∣∣FMs ) du,
and therefore
E
(
It
∣∣FMs ) = E(Bt −Bs + ∫ t
s
(αu + µu)σ(u)
−1 du−
∫ t
s
(αˆu + µˆu)σ(u)
−1 du
∣∣∣∣FMs )+ Is
= E
(
Bt −Bs
∣∣FMs )+ ∫ t
s
σ(u)−1E
(
αu + µu
∣∣FMs ) du
−
∫ t
s
σ(u)−1E
(
αˆu + µˆu
∣∣FMs ) du+ Is = Is.
Now, by (3.69) we get the equivalence of (2) and Y¯ = I. Hence, (2) ⇒ (3). On the other hand,
if (2) did not hold, Y¯ would be no FM-martingale and therefore no FM-Brownian motion. This
yields the equivalence of (2) and (3). For the equivalence of (1) and (2) note that along with I,
H is a martingale, too (rationality). Furthermore, by admissibility of θ we have that
E
∫ T
0
(∂yHsλ(s)σ(s))
2 ds <∞.
Hence, ∫ t
0
∂yHsλ(s)σ(s) dIs, t ∈ [0, T ],
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also is a martingale. It follows that necessarily∫ t
0
∂tHs +
λ(s)2σ(s)2
2
∂yyHs ds+
∫ t
0
∂yHsλ(s)(µˆs + αˆs) ds = 0, dt⊗ dP-a.s.
Since ∂yHsλ(s) > 0, we get dt⊗ dP-a.s. the required equivalence of
∂tHt +
λ(t)2σ(t)2
2
∂yyHt = 0 and µˆt + αˆt = 0.
3.6 Equilibrium
In the last three sections, we derived sufficient conditions for the optimality of an insider strategy
and necessary conditions for an equilibrium. Both we did for the risk neutral as well as for the
risk averse case. We are now in the position to state sufficient conditions for an equilibrium.
Recall that we associate β = 0 to the case of risk neutrality.
Proposition 3.22. Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.8 be satisfied, (H,λ) ∈ P and θ ∈ S(H,λ). Then
(H,λ, θ) is an equilibrium if the following conditions are fulfilled:
(i) H satisfies (3.12), and λ is chosen as in (3.37),
(ii) θ is continuous and of finite variation,
(iii) Y¯ , as defined in (3.67), is an FM-Brownian motion on [0, T ],
(iv) lim
t→T
EJ0,tt = 0, if β = 0, and lim
t→T
E
β exp (−βJ0,tt ) = 1, if β < 0, with J0,tt as in Proposi-
tion 3.15.
If m is bounded, condition (iv) can be replaced by
(v) H(T, Y˜T ) = V P-a.s.
Proof. We directly get the optimality of θ from condition (i), (ii), and (iv) and Proposition
3.15 if β = 0 or Proposition 3.20 if β < 0. For t ≥ 0 now apply Itô’s formula to H(t, Y˜t). With
condition (ii) and dY˜t = λ(t)σ(t)dY¯t this yields
Ht =H0 +
∫ t
0
∂yHs dY˜s +
∫ t
0
∂tHs ds+
1
2
∫ t
0
∂yyHs d〈Y˜ 〉s
=H0 +
∫ t
0
∂yHsσ(s)λ(s) dY¯s +
∫ t
0
∂tHs +
1
2
∂yyHsσ(s)
2λ(s)2 ds.
Since Y¯ is an FM-Brownian motion and H satisfies PDE (3.12), it follows that (H(t, Y˜t))t≥0 is
an FM-martingale with H(T, Y˜T ) = V (Proposition 3.15 or Proposition 3.20). Hence,
H(t, Y˜t) = E
(
H(T, Y˜T )
∣∣∣FMt ) = E (V ∣∣FMt ) , for all t ∈ [0, T ],
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i.e. (H,λ) is a rational pricing rule. Together the optimal trading strategy θ and the rational
pricing rule (H,λ) form an equilibrium. If m is bounded, the optimality already follows from (v)
instead of (iv) with Proposition 3.13 or Proposition 3.18.
Remark 3.23. Since the assumptions of Proposition 3.22 match those of Proposition 3.21,
condition (iii) could be replaced by E
(
αˆt + µˆt
∣∣FMt ) = 0.
With the help of Proposition 3.22, we are able to state the main result of this model – the
existence and form of an equilibrium. The main task is to show that the controlled order process
is an FM-Brownian bridge with suitable terminal value. We start with the risk neutral case.
Theorem 3.24. Let β = 0 and Assumptions 3.1 and 3.8 be satisfied. Define
H(t, y) := E (h(y + ξT − ξt)) , (3.70)
with ξ as in (3.4) and
λ(t)−1 :=
∫ t
0
m(s) ds+ λ−10 ,
with λ0 > 0 such that ∫ T
0
λ(s)2σ(s)2 ds = 1.
Furthermore, let
θt :=
∫ t
0
−µs + a(s)(Z − Y˜s) ds, with a(t) := λ(t)σ(t)
2
1− ∫ t0 λ(s)2σ(s)2 ds. (3.71)
If supt∈[0,T ]E(y∗(t, V ))2 <∞ and m is bounded, then the triple (H,λ, θ) defines an equilibrium.
If additionally {J0,tt , t ∈ [0, T )} is uniformly integrable, limt→T λ(t)a(t) = ∞ and if there exist
T ′ < T and  > 0 such that m(t)/a(t) ≤ 1 −  for any t ∈ (T ′, T ), then (H,λ, θ) defines an
equilibrium even if m is unbounded. In particular, {J0,tt , t ∈ [0, T )} is uniformly integrable if
sup
t∈[0,T )
E
(
y∗(T, V )− y∗(t, V )
λ(t)
)2
<∞.
Proof. First of all, we show that there indeed always exists a λ0 > 0 such that∫ T
0
(∫ t
0
m(s) ds+ λ−10
)−2
σ(t)2 dt = 1.
Obviously, the function
f : R+ → R+, x 7→
∫ T
0
(∫ t
0
m(s) ds+ x
)−2
σ(t)2 dt
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is continuous. On the one hand, we have
f(x) ≤
∫ T
0
x−2σ(t)2 dt.
Since σ is bounded, there exists an x > 0 such that f(x) ≤ 1. On the other hand, for some
t ∈ (0, T ) there exist constants ,K ∈ R+ with σ(s) ≥  and m(s) ≤ K for all s ∈ [0, t].
Furthermore,
f(x) ≥ 2
∫ t
0
(sK + x)−2 ds = 2
t
x(Kt+ x)
.
This shows the existence of x > 0 such that f(x) ≥ 1. Altogether, we can find an x > 0 with
f(x) = 1.
We conclude that λ is strictly positive on [0, T ). Furthermore, H satisfies the conditions of
Definition 3.2. To see this, observe that (H(t, ξt))t∈[0,T ] is a martingale. Hence, (H(t, ξt)2)t∈[0,T ]
is a submartingale. Moreover, ξT
d
= Z since λ is chosen such that
∫ T
0 λ(s)
2σ(s)2 ds = 1. In
particular,
EH(t, ξt)
2 ≤ EH(T, ξT )2 = Eh(Z)2 <∞. (3.72)
Smoothness and monotonicity follow directly from the definition (for smoothness see also [43],
Section 4.3). Together, (H,λ) is an admissible pricing rule.
As a next step, we show that θ ∈ S(H,λ). Due to Lemma 3.26 we know that for all t ∈ [0, T ]
Y˜t
d
= ξt.
Hence, as in (3.72), we get
EH(t, Y˜t)
2 = EH(t, ξt)
2 < Eh(Z)2 <∞. (3.73)
Furthermore, due to the monotonicity and differentiability of h, we get by dominated convergence
that
∂yH(t, y) = ∂yEh(y + ξT − ξt) = E∂yh(y + ξT − ξt).
Thus, together with Jensen’s inequality
E(∂yH(t, Y˜t)
2) = E(∂yH(t, ξt)
2) ≤ E∂yh(ξT )2 = E∂yh(Z)2 <∞.
In particular, θ is admissible.
Now, to prove our result, it suffices to check the corresponding conditions of Proposition 3.22.
Obviously, λ verifies (3.37). (3.12) for H follows again from Feynman-Kac’s formula. Moreover,
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θ is continuous and of finite variation. In addition, Y¯ is an FM-Brownian motion according to
Lemma 3.26. If m is bounded, it is enough to show that H(T, Y˜T ) = V . Due to the special
structure of H, this is the case if and only if Y˜T = Z. This is shown in Lemma 3.27. If m is
unbounded, we may check condition (iv) of Proposition 3.22 instead of condition (v), i.e.
lim
t→T
EJ0,tt = 0.
This follows from Lemma 3.28.
Let us now consider the risk averse case.
Theorem 3.25. Let β < 0 and Assumption 3.8 be satisfied such that m is bounded on [0, T ].
Then, under the assumptions of Theorem 3.24, the triple (H,λ, θ) defines an equilibrium if
E exp
(
1
2
∫ T
0
β2σ(t)2(H(t, Y˜t)− V )2 dt
)
<∞.
If m is unbounded and the conditions of Theorem 3.24 are satisfied, (H,λ, θ) is an equilibrium if
additionally {exp (−βJ0,tt ), t ∈ [0, T )} is uniformly integrable w.r.t. Eβ.
The proof is provided at the end of the next section.
3.7 Auxiliaries for the proofs of Theorem 3.24 and Theorem 3.25
Lemma 3.26. In the situation of Theorem 3.24, (Y¯t)0≤t≤T , as defined in (3.67), is an FM-
Brownian motion.
Proof. Due to the special form of θ in (3.71), on [0, T ] we get the following dynamics for the
total order process Y
dYt = a(t)
(
Z − Y˜t
)
dt+ σ(t) dBt, Y0 = 0,
the weighted order process Y˜
dY˜t = λ(t)a(t)
(
Z − Y˜t
)
dt+ σ(t)λ(t) dBt, Y˜0 = 0, (3.74)
and the information process, defined in (3.68),
dIt = a(t)σ(t)
−1 (Z −E(Z|FMt )) dt+ dBt, I0 = 0. (3.75)
Now, for T ′ ∈ [0, T ) the process (Z, Y˜t)t∈[0,T ′] defines a Gaussian filter problem w.r.t. the filtration
(FMt )t∈[0,T ′] (remember Z = h−1(V ), Z ∼ N (0, 1)). According to Theorem 2.2, we have for
t ∈ [0, T ′] (observe that a is bounded on [0, T ′])
E(Z|FMt ) ∼ N (ηt, γt),
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where
d
dt
γt = −
(
γtλ(t)a(t)
λ(t)σ(t)
)2
= −γ
2
t a(t)
2
σ(t)2
, γ0 = 1, (3.76)
dηt =
γta(t)λ(t)
λ(t)2σ(t)2
(
dY˜t − λ(t)a(t)
(
ηt − Y˜t
)
dt
)
, η0 = 0. (3.77)
Furthermore, ODE (3.76) is solved by
γt =
(∫ t
0
a(s)2σ(s)−2 ds+ 1
)−1
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Hence, (3.77) is equivalent to
dηt =
γta(t)
σ(t)2
λ(t)−1
(
λ(t)dYt − λ(t)a(t)
(
ηt − Y˜t
)
dt
)
=
γta(t)
σ(t)2
σ(t) dIt
=
a(t)σ(t)−1∫ t
0 a(s)
2σ(s)−2 ds+ 1
dIt, η0 = 0.
Following Lemma A.1, a, as defined in (3.71), satisfies the integral equation
a(t)σ(t)−1∫ t
0 a(s)
2σ(s)−2 ds+ C
= λ(t)σ(t), for all t ∈ [0, T ).
Therefore, we can write η as
ηt =
∫ t
0
λ(s)σ(s) dIs. (3.78)
(3.74), (3.75) and (3.78) together yield
dY˜t = λ(t)a(t)
(
Z − Y˜t
)
dt+ λ(t)σ(t) dBt
= λ(t)a(t)
(
ηt − Y˜t
)
dt+ λ(t)σ(t) dIt
= λ(t)a(t)
(∫ t
0
λ(s)σ(s) dIs − Y˜t
)
dt+ λ(t)σ(t) dIt, Y˜0 = 0.
On the one hand, this SDE has a unique strong solution on [0, T ′] given by
Y˜t =
∫ t
0
λ(s)σ(s) dIs.
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On the other hand, we have for t ∈ [0, T )
Y˜t =
∫ t
0
λ(s) dYs =
∫ t
0
λ(s)σ(s) dY¯s.
Hence, It = Y¯t on [0, T ′] and I is an FM-Brownian motion. Since this holds true for all T ′ ∈ [0, T )
and Y¯ is continuous, this proves the assertion.
Lemma 3.27. For t ∈ [0, T ) let
ρ(t) := exp
(
−
∫ t
0
k(s) ds
)
, k(t) := λ(t)(a(t)−m(t)).
Then
Z − Y˜t
λ(t)
∼ N
(
0, ρ(t)2
(
λ(0)−2 +
∫ t
0
ρ(s)−2σ(s)2 ds
))
,
for all t ∈ [0, T ), where
lim
t→T
ρ(t)2
(
λ(0)−2 +
∫ t
0
ρ(s)−2σ(s)2 ds
)
= 0.
In particular, Y˜T = Z P-a.s.
Proof. Since
dλ(t)−1 = m(t)dt,
we obtain with integration by parts
d
Z − Y˜t
λ(t)
= −λ(t)−1dY˜t + (Z − Y˜t)dλ(t)−1
= (m(t)− a(t))(Z − Y˜t)dt− σ(t)dBt.
Furthermore, obviously
dρ(t)−1 = λ(t)(a(t)−m(t))ρ(t)−1dt.
Again integration by parts yields for t ∈ [0, T )
ρ(t)−1
Z − Y˜t
λ(t)
=
Z
λ(0)
−
∫ t
0
ρ(s)−1σ(s) dBs −
∫ t
0
ρ(s)−1(λ(s)(a(s)−m(s))(Z − Y˜s)
λ(s)
ds
+
∫ t
0
ρ(s)−1λ(s)(a(s)−m(s))Z − Y˜s
λ(s)
ds.
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Multiplying ρ(t) on both sides results in
Z − Y˜t
λ(t)
= ρ(t)
Z
λ(0)
− ρ(t)
∫ t
0
ρ(s)−1σ(s) dBs.
For every t ∈ [0, T ), the deterministic function ρ(·)−1 is bounded on [0, t]. In particular,∫ t
0 ρ(s)
−2σ(s)2 ds <∞ and hence
ρ(t)
∫ t
0
ρ(s)−1σ(s) dBs ∼ N
(
0, ρ(t)2
∫ t
0
ρ(s)−2σ(s)2 ds
)
.
Since B is independent of Z,
Z − Y˜t
λ(t)
∼ N
(
0, ρ(t)2
(
λ(0)−2 +
∫ t
0
ρ(s)−2σ(s)2 ds
))
.
With l’Hospital’s rule we get
lim
t→T
ρ(t)2
∫ t
0
ρ(s)−2σ(s)2 ds = lim
t→T
σ(t)2ρ(t)−2
2k(t)ρ(t)−2
= lim
t→T
σ(t)2
2k(t)
= 0
since limt→T k(t) = ∞. If m is bounded and, in particular, λ(T ) > 0, this is obvious. If m is
unbounded, limt→T k(t) = limt→T λ(t)a(t)(1−m(t)/a(t)) =∞ holds by assumption.
This shows the convergence in distribution of Z−Y˜tλ(t) to the constant 0 and therefore the con-
vergence in probability. In particular Y˜t converges to Z in probability. Due to the almost sure
uniqueness of the limit we get the last part of our statement.
In the case when λ(T ) > 0, Lemma 3.27 already proves the optimality of our insider strategy.
Nevertheless, for the general case, λ(T ) ≥ 0, more work has to be done.
Lemma 3.28. Given the situation of Theorem 3.24 such that {J0,tt , t ∈ [0, T )} is uniformly
integrable. Then EJ0,tt → 0, t→ T . In particular, {J0,tt , t ∈ [0, T )} is uniformly integrable if
sup
t∈(0,T )
E
(
y∗(T, V )− y∗(t, V )
λ(t)
)2
<∞. (3.79)
Proof. Since, by assumption, J0,tt > 0 is uniformly integrable, the L1 convergence follows from
convergence in probability. For the latter first observe that
∫ Y˜t
y∗(t,V )
H(t, x)− V dx ≤
∣∣∣Y˜t − Z∣∣∣ ∣∣∣H(t, Y˜t)− V ∣∣∣+ ∫ y∗(T,V )
y∗(t,V )
H(t, x)− V dx P-a.s. (3.80)
To realise this, consider the following cases:
(1) Z ∈ [y∗(t, V ), Y˜t] or Z ∈ [Y˜t, y∗(t, V )]
(2) Z < min(y∗(t, V ), Y˜t)
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(3) Z > max(y∗(t, V ), Y˜t)
Due to the special form of H, we have Z = y∗(T, V ).
1. In the first case, ∣∣∣H(t, Y˜t)− V ∣∣∣ ≥ |H(t, Z)− V |
due to the monotonicity of H. Hence,∣∣∣∣∣
∫ Y˜t
Z
H(t, x)− V dx
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣Y˜t − Z∣∣∣ ∣∣∣H(t, Y˜t)− V ∣∣∣ .
2. If Z < min(y∗(t, V ), Y˜t), we get∫ Y˜t
y∗(t,V )
H(t, x)− V dx ≤
∣∣∣Y˜t − y∗(t, V )∣∣∣ ∣∣∣H(t, Y˜t)− V ∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣Y˜t − Z∣∣∣ ∣∣∣H(t, Y˜t)− V ∣∣∣ .
3. If Z > max(y∗(t, V ), Y˜t), we get∫ Y˜t
y∗(t,V )
H(t, x)− V dx ≤
∫ Z
y∗(t,V )
H(t, x)− V dx.
This finally proves (3.80).
We can now demonstrate the convergence in probability in two steps. Firstly, due to Lemma
3.27, (Y˜t − Z)λ(t)−1 converges to 0. Secondly, for any v ∈ V,
λ(t)−1
∫ y∗(T,v)
y∗(t,v)
H(t, x)− v dx t→T−−−→ 0.
If λ(T ) > 0, this follows from continuity of y∗(·, v). If λ(T ) = 0, we get with l’Hospital’s rule
and (3.39)
lim
t→T
λ(t)−1
∫ y∗(T,v)
y∗(t,v)
H(t, x)− v dx = lim
t→T
σ(t)2λ(t)2 (∂yH(t, y
∗(T, v))− ∂yH(t, y∗(t, v)))
2m(t)λ(t)2
= lim
t→T
σ(t)2
2m(t)
(∂yH(t, y
∗(T, v))− ∂yH(t, y∗(t, v)))
= 0
since ∂yH ∈ C0([0, T ]). Altogether, this proves J0,tt → 0 in probability.
It remains to show that J0,tt is uniformly integrable if (3.79) holds. Since
E
(
λ(t)−1
∫ Y˜t
y∗(t,V )
H(t, x)− V dx
)
≤ E Y˜t − y
∗(t, V )
λ(t)
(
H(t, Y˜t)− V
)
,
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Cauchy-Schwarz inequality yields
E
(
λ(t)−1
∫ Y˜t
y∗(t,V )
H(t, x)− V dx
)
≤
E( Y˜t − y∗(t, V )
λ(t)
)21/2(E(H(t, Y˜t)− V )2)1/2 .
Due to (3.73), the second factor of the right hand side is uniformly bounded. It is therefore
enough to show that
sup
t∈(0,T )
E
(
Y˜t − y∗(t, V )
λ(t)
)2
is bounded, too. Since Z = y∗(T, V ), we obviously have
E
(
Y˜t − y∗(t, V )
λ(t)
)2
≤ E
(
Y˜t − Z + y∗(T, V )− y∗(t, V )
λ(t)
)2
≤ 2E
(
Y˜t − Z
λ(t)
)2
+ 2E
(
y∗(T, V )− y∗(t, V )
λ(t)
)2
.
The first term in the last line converges to 0 due to Lemma 3.27. Now uniform integrability
follows from (3.79).
Proof of Theorem 3.25. Admissibility of (H,λ) and θ follow analogously to the proof of
Theorem 3.24 under the additional condition that
E exp
(
1
2
∫ T
0
β2σ(t)2(H(t, Y˜t)− V )2 dt
)
<∞.
Ifm is bounded, the conditions of Proposition 3.22 can easily be verified (Lemmas 3.26 and 3.27).
If m is unbounded, the convergence of Eβ exp (J0,tt ) to 1 follows from uniform integrability and
convergence in probability. Following Lemma 3.27,
Z − Y˜t
λ(t)
= −ρ(t)
∫ t
0
ρ(s)σ(s) dBs +
Zρ(t)
λ(0)
.
Due to Girsanov’s theorem (cf. [56], Theorem 39, Chapter III)
Bβt := Bt −
∫ t
0
βσ(s)(H(s, Y˜s)− V ) ds, t ∈ [0, T ],
defines a Brownian motion w.r.t. Pβ . It follows that
Z − Y˜t
λ(t)
+ ρ(t)
∫ t
0
ρ(s)−1βσ(s)2(H(s, Y˜s)− V ) ds− Z
λ(0)
ρ(t)
is distributed normally w.r.t. Pβ with vanishing variance for t→ T . As in Lemma 3.27 we again
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get with l’Hospital’s rule that the second part converges to 0 in probability (Pβ). From this it
follows that Z−Y˜tλ(t) converges to 0 in probability, too. With an analogous argumentation as in
Lemma 3.28 we conclude that J0,tt converges to 0 in probability (w.r.t. Pβ).
3.8 Remarks and example
3.8.1 Additional deterministic noise drift
One can show analogous results for the case when the noise drift contains a deterministic com-
ponent, i.e.
µ(t, y, V ) = µ1(t, y, V ) + µ2(t) (3.81)
where µ2 is some deterministic càdlàg function. For the existence of an equilibrium (cf. Propo-
sitions 3.6 and 3.7) we would get the necessary condition
∂tH(t, y) + λ(t)µ2(t)∂yH(t, y) +
1
2
σ(t)2λ(t)2∂yyH(t, y) = 0,
instead of (3.12) and µ1 being as in Assumption 3.8. This PDE for H turns out to be the PDE
of an equilibrium pricing rule in Corcuera et al. [26] (without jumps), see also (1.7), where an
insider model with deterministic noise drift (not depending on V , i.e. µ1 = 0) is analysed. This
particular model would be generalised by the consideration of an additional deterministic drift
term in our model. However, we would no longer have semi-rationality of µ, i.e. sgn(µ¯(t, Pt, V )) =
sgn(V − Pt).
3.8.2 A larger class of admissible noise drift
It seems natural to ask whether there exists a possibility to extend our model to a larger class
of noise drift. As plausible candidate consider
µ(t, y, v) =
∫ y∗(t,v)
y m(t, x)(H(t, x)− v) dx
H(t, y)− v , (3.82)
i.e. we preserve the general structure calculated in Section 3.2, but allow the drift intensity m to
depend on the weighted total order. This could be covered by a price pressure λ that depends on
the total order, too. To see this, we proceed analogously to the HJB equation approach made in
Subsection 3.2.1 (in particular we consider the risk neutral case). Assuming σ ≡ 1, this means
that we start with a system of equations corresponding to (3.10) and (3.11),
∂yJ(t, y) =
H(t, y)− v
λ(t, y)
, (3.83)
∂tJ(t, y) = −λ(t, y)µ(t, y, v)∂yJ(t, y)− 1
2
λ(t, y)2∂yyJ(t, y). (3.84)
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The same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3.6, i.e. differentiating (3.83) w.r.t. y and t,
∂yyJ(t, y) =
∂yH(t, y)
λ(t, y)
− (H(t, y)− v)∂yλ(t, y)
λ(t, y)2
,
∂ytJ(t, y) =
∂tH(t, y)
λ(t, y)
− (H(t, y)− v)∂tλ(t, y)
λ(t, y)2
,
and combining this with the partial derivative of (3.84) w.r.t. y,
∂tyJ(t, y) = −1
2
λ(t, y)∂yyH(t, y)− ∂y(µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v)) + 1
2
∂yyλ(t, y)(H(t, y)− v),
leads to
∂tH(t, y)
λ(t, y)
+
λ(t, y)
2
∂yyH(t, y)
= (H(t, y)− v)
(
∂tλ(t, y)
λ(t, y)2
+
∂yyλ(t, y)
2
− ∂y(µ(t, y, v)(H(t, y)− v))
(H(t, y)− v)
)
.
Incorporating the semi-rationality of µ, this yields similarly to the proof of Proposition 3.6
m(t, y) = −∂tλ(t, y)
λ(t, y)2
− 1
2
∂yyλ(t, y),
for m as in (3.82).
We note that if we allowed dependence of λ w.r.t. Y˜t, we could even cover the case of more
complex noise drift in the sense that these noise drift terms do not violate the initial necessary
condition for the existence of an equilibrium. However, this complicates the optimisation problem
a lot since the insider could take effect on the price pressure by her trading strategy. An approach
as in Theorem 3.24 would require λ to ensure∫ T
0
λ(s, Y˜s)
2 ds = 1 P-a.s.
To make this accordable with the path dependence of λ, we have to permit further dependences,
e.g. in Λt :=
∫ t
0 λ(s, Y˜s)
2 ds. This in turn would again complicate the optimisation problem.
3.8.3 Example
We close this chapter with an example.
Example 3.29. Assume that β = 0 and h(y) = exp(y). Then
H(t, y) = E exp (y + ξT − ξt) ,
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where
ξT − ξt ∼ N
(
0,
∫ T
t
σ(s)2λ(s)2 ds
)
.
For notational convenience define
L(t) :=
1
2
∫ T
t
σ(s)2λ(s)2 ds, t ∈ [0, T ].
Together with the moment generating function of the normal distribution it follows that
H(t, y) = exp (y + L(t)) .
We then get
y∗(t, v) = H(t, ·)−1(v) ⇔ exp (y∗(t, v) + L(t)) = v ⇔ y∗(t, v) = log(v)− L(t).
Furthermore, we have
µ(t, y, v) = m(t)
∫ y∗(t,v)
y H(t, x)− v dx
H(t, y)− v
= m(t)
∫ log(v)−L(t)
y exp (x+ L(t))− v dx
exp (y + L(t))− v
= m(t)
v − exp (y + L(t))− v (log(v)− L(t)− y)
exp (y + L(t))− v
= m(t)
(
−1− v (log(v)− L(t)− y)
exp (y + L(t))− v
)
as equilibrium noise drift. Incorporating the resulting total order flow, the market price is given
by
Pt = exp
(
L(0) +
∫ t
0
λ(s)a(s)
(
Z − Y˜s
)
ds+
∫ t
0
λ(s)σ(s) dBs − 1
2
∫ t
0
σ(s)2λ(s)2 ds
)
,
and hence has the following dynamics
dPt = Pt
(
λ(t)a(t)
(
Z − Y˜t
)
dt+ λ(t)σ(t)dBt
)
.
Since
λ(t)a(t)
(
Z − Y˜t
)
=
λ(t)2σ(t)2
1− ∫ t0 λ(s)2σ(s)2 ds (Z − log (Pt) + L(t)) ,
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it holds that
dPt = Pt
(
λ(t)2σ(t)2
2L(t)
(Z − log (Pt) + L(t)) dt+ λ(t)σ(t)dBt
)
. (3.85)
For σ = 1, T > 0 and n ∈ N let
C =
√
2n+ 1
T 2n+1
and
m(t) =
n
C
(T − t)−(n+1).
Then ∫ t
0
m(s) ds =
1
C
(T − t)−n − 1
C
T−n t→T−−−→∞.
Now for λ−10 =
1
CT
−n, define λ by
λ(t) =
1
λ−10 +
∫ t
0 m(s) ds
=
1
1
C (T − t)−n
= C(T − t)n.
In particular, λ(T ) = 0 and
1−
∫ t
0
λ(s)2 ds = 1− C
2
2n+ 1
(
T 2n+1 − (T − t)2n+1) = C2
2n+ 1
(T − t)2n+1.
Hence,
1−
∫ T
0
λ(s)2 ds = 0.
We can now verify the conditions of Theorem 3.24. We have
a(t)λ(t) =
λ(t)2
1− ∫ t0 λ(s)2 ds =
C2(T − t)2n
C2
2n+1(T − t)2n+1
=
2n+ 1
(T − t)
t→T−−−→∞.
Furthermore
m(t)
a(t)
=
n
C
(T − t)−(n+1) 1−
∫ t
0 λ(s)
2 ds
λ(t)
=
n
C
(T − t)−(n+1) C
2n+ 1
(T − t)n+1 = n
2n+ 1
< 1
and again with l’Hospital’s rule
E
(
y∗(T, V )− y∗(t, V )
λ(t)
)2
=
(
L(t)
λ(t)
)2
t→T−−−→ 0,
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Figure 3.1. Sample paths for different models with identical noise part and different informed trading
and weighting. P (0) = 130, V = 100, h = exp, T = 1, σ = 1, m(t) = C(T − t)−2 (plot 1 and 2). The
price in the first two plots gets less volatile due to the decreasing price pressure. The convergence of the
price in a model with insider (plot 1) is faster than in a model without insider trading (plot 2).
since
−λ(t)
2
λ′(t)
=
C2(T − t)2n
nC(T − t)n−1 =
C
n
(T − t)n+1 t→T−−−→ 0.
Altogether, the conditions of Theorem 3.24 are satisfied.
Finally, inserting the derived coefficient functions into Equation (3.85)
dPt = Pt
(
2n+ 1
T − t
(
Z − log (Pt) + C
2
4n+ 2
(T − t)2n+1
)
dt+ C(T − t)ndBt
)
.
If m were equal to 0 and T = 1, we had (compare Cho [25], Example 1 and 2)
dPt = Pt
(
1
1− t
(
Z − log (Pt) + 1− t
2
)
dt+ dBt
)
.
Furthermore, it follows that
αt = a(t)
(
Z − Y˜t
)
− µ(t, Y˜t, V )
= m(t)
2n+ 1
n
(log(V )− Y˜t) + 1 +
V
(
log(V )− L(t)− Y˜t
)
exp
(
Y˜t + L(t)
)
− V
 .
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A market with reinforcing irrational behaviour
4.1 Introduction
We want to extend the model of Chapter 3 to a setting where the arrival of new information
reinforces the irrational behaviour of the market and leads to further over- or underreaction. As
we pointed out in the introduction, this reinforcement is expressed by an increasing time that is
needed for the market to cool down from irrationality. If no further information arrives and the
market cools down completely, the market price is assumed to coincide with the fundamental
value according to the efficient market hypothesis. Hence, the trading horizon T is a stopping
time, in general, and we have Pt∨T = Vt∨T , for all t ≥ 0. Over- or underreactions are brought
to the market via some shot noise that is correlated to the dynamics of the fundamental value.
Information arrival is modelled with the help of a Poisson process N .
Primarily, new information should have an impact on the fundamental value. Hence, we
consider value processes V that have the form
Vt = h (Zt) , t ≥ 0, (4.1)
where h again is a strictly increasing function and (Zt)t≥0 is some pure jump process with
mutually independent distributed increments and driven by a Poisson process N with jump
times 0 < T1 < T2 < . . . . Between the times of information arrival the noise traders act like
in Chapter 3, i.e. orders are made according to a semi-rational drift and a noise part, given
by a Brownian motion. If new information arrives while the market is still cooling down, this
leads to an order shock. This shock is represented by a jump in the demand process that might
again contain an over- or underreaction. Hence, the cumulated order flow of the noise traders is
assumed to have the following dynamics
dXt = µt1[0,T ](t)dt+ σdBt + dX
d
t , t ≥ 0, (4.2)
where B again is a Brownian motion and µ a semi-rational noise drift. The additional part Xd
is a jump process driven by N (i.e. with the same jump times as Z).
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The market makers observe the jump times of N and the total order process
Yt = θt1[0,T ](t) +Xt, t ≥ 0,
but not the jumps of Z. In particular, if θ is continuous, the market makers observe the jumps of
X. The conditional distribution of the jumps of Z with respect to the market makers’ filtration
at time Ti, i.e. ∆ZTi given ∆XdTi is assumed to be Gaussian, N (κi, χi).
As mentioned above, the trading horizon T is a stopping time. More detailed, we assume that
T = inf {t ≥ 0 : St = 0} (4.3)
where
St = S0 +
Nt∑
i=1
∆STi − t, t ≥ 0, S0 > 0,
is the process associated to the market cooling, i.e. for t ≥ 0, St denotes the time (from time t on)
that is needed for the market to cool down completely if no further market shocks arrive till then.
The increments ∆STi are assumed to be FMTi -measurable, non-negative random variables. As a
consequence, S is an FM-adapted process and thus T is an FM-stopping time. In particular, the
market makers’ observation filtration can be described as FM = FY,S . The insider’s filtration
again contains additional information about the fundamental value process, i.e. FI = FP,S,Z .
In contrast to the model analysed in Chapter 3, the present setting only allows constant
volatility of the continuous noise part B. This is mainly for notational convenience. Additionally,
with regard to the previous chapter, one could argue that the presence of a deterministic volatility
does not effect the substancial structure of an equilibrium. Furthermore, we will restrict ourselves
to the case of a risk neutral insider.
After this short introduction of the jump model’s framework, we want to develop some intuition
on the model’s behaviour in equilibrium. This will provide a better understanding of the following
approach regarding the dynamics and dependences of the pricing rule.
Let us therefore assume that we already derived sufficient conditions for an equilibrium and it
turned out that, analogous to Chapter 3, we want to choose an insider strategy θ with
θt =
∫ t∧T
0
−µs + as
(
Zs − Y˜s
)
ds
where Y˜ again denotes the weighted total order and a is an FM-adapted process such that
• σ−1Y c is an FM-Brownian motion (where Y c denotes the continuous part of Y ) and
• Y˜T = ZT P-a.s.
The resulting linear structure of the dynamics of Y c in Z together with the conditional distribu-
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tion of the increments then enables us to explicitly solve the corresponding filter problem w.r.t.
F
M. On [0, T ], according to Proposition 2.5, Zt given FMt is distributed normally, N (ηt, γt),
with
dηt =
γtat
σ2
(
dY ct − (at(ηt − Y˜t))dt
)
+ d
Nt∑
i=1
κi, η0 = κ0, (4.4)
dγt = −
(atγt
σ
)2
dt+ d
Nt∑
i=1
χi, γ0 = χ0. (4.5)
According to Corollary 2.6 we have
γt =
(∫ t
0
a2sσ
−2 ds+
Nt∑
i=0
χ˜i
)−1
, with χ˜i = − χi
(γTi− + χi)γTi−
.
If we adopt the idea of Chapter 3, we choose a in a way that enables us to show, with the
help of Equation (4.4), that σ−1Y c is an FM-Brownian motion. For this now assume that the
continuous part of Y is again weighted according to a price pressure λ, i.e.
Y˜ ct =
∫ t
0
λs dY
c
s
and a is chosen such that
γtat
σ2
= λt. (4.6)
Now, Equation (4.4) leads to the following representation of the continuous part ηc of η:
ηct =
∫ t
0
λsσ dIs
where
It =
∫ t
0
asσ
−1(Zs − ηs) ds+Bt
again is the so-called information process (w.r.t. the given filter problem) and an FM-Brownian
motion. We then obtain that
dY˜ ct = λtat(Zt − Y˜t)dt+ λtσdBt
= λtat(ηt − Y˜t)dt+ λtσdIt. (4.7)
If the weighting of the jumps is chosen such that
ηdt = Y˜
d
t , (4.8)
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it follows
ηt − Y˜t = ηct − Y˜ ct =
∫ t
0
λsσ dIs − Y˜ ct
and hence, by (4.7), ∫ t
0
λsσ dIs = Y˜
c
t =
∫ t
0
λs dY
c
s .
This shows that σ−1Y c indeed is an FM-Brownian motion.
From the above considerations two consequences arise: First, the weighting of the jumps has
to be chosen according to (4.8). In general, this requires a different weighting of continuous and
discontinuous changes of the total order process. For the case of uniform weighting it has been
shown by Corcuera et al. [26] that no equilibrium exists if there are jumps (uncorrelated to V ) in
the order flow of the noise traders. However, a different weighting in turn might offer additional
arbitrage opportunities to an insider. To realise this, assume that the weighting of continuous
changes were higher than the weighting of discontinuous ones. Then buying the asset according
to a continuous strategy for an average price p1 and selling the same amount discontinuously
could result in a price p2 > p1. Therefore, we will only consider continuous insider strategies in
this model. We also refer to Remark 4.11 for further analysis of discontinuous trading strategies.
As second consequence, it turns out that a, as in (4.6), has the following form (cf. Lemma A.3)
a(t) =
λtσ
2∑Nt
i=0 χi −
∫ t
0 λ
2
sσ
2 ds
.
Since Y˜T has to equal ZT , it seems plausible to require at → ∞, for t → T . Then λ has to be
chosen such that
NT∑
i=0
χi −
∫ T
0
λ2sσ
2 ds = 0, P-a.s. (4.9)
If λ only depended on t, (4.9) would not hold in general. Therefore, it seems plausible that the
dynamics of λt somehow depend on St and also
Λt :=
Nt∑
i=0
χi −
∫ t
0
λ2sσ
2 ds. (4.10)
4.2 Model Setup
Let N(dt,dζ), ζ = (ζ1, ζ2, ζ3) be a Poisson random measure on R3 with finite Lévy measure
ν(dζ) := ν1(dζ1)⊗ ν2(dζ2)⊗ ν3(dζ3).
78
4.2. Model Setup
In the sequel, we will denote by
N¯(dt,dζ) = N(dt,dζ)− ν(dζ)dt
the compensated Poisson random measure, i.e. N¯(t, B) is a martingale for any Borel set B ∈ B3.
Furthermore, Nt := N(t,R3 \ {0}) is the associated Poisson process with jump times (Ti)i∈N.
For further details on Poisson random measures we refer to [53], Chapter 1.
The fundamental value process V , the trading horizon T and the cumulated order flow of the
noise traders are defined as in (4.1), (4.3) and (4.2), respectively, such that Z, S and X are
solutions to the following SDEs
dZt =
∫
R3
φZt (ζ)N(dt,dζ), t ≥ 0, (4.11)
dSt = −dt+
∫
R3
φSt (ζ)N(dt,dζ), t ≥ 0, S0 > 0, (4.12)
dXt = µt1[0,T ](t)dt+ σdBt +
∫
R3
φXt (ζ)N(dt,dζ), t ≥ 0, X0 = 0, (4.13)
where
φXt (ζ) = φ
X(t, ζ2), φ
Z
t (ζ) = φ
Z(t, ζ1, ζ2), φ
S
t (ζ) = φ
S(t, St−, ζ2, ζ3),
such that φS ≥ 0 and, for given (t, ζ2) ∈ R+ ×R,
φZ(t, ζ1, ζ2)
ν1(dζ1)
ν1(R3)
∼ N (κ(t, φX(t, ζ2)), χ(t, φX(t, ζ2))) (dζ1) (4.14)
for suitable functions
κ : [0,∞)×R 7→ R, χ : [0,∞)×R 7→ R+,
i.e. the jumps of Z, ∆ZTi , i ∈ N, are conditionally Gaussian given the jumps of X, ∆XTi , i ∈ N,
with mean κi := κ(Ti,∆Xi) and variance χi := χ(Ti,∆Xi).
Further technical conditions are summarised in the following assumption:
Assumption 4.1. T , V , X are defined as above. Furthermore, the following conditions hold
• T <∞ P-a.s.,
• Z0 given FM0 is N (κ0, χ0) distributed for κ0 ∈ R and χ0 ∈ R+
• E(∆ZTi)4 <∞, for all i ∈ N0,
• E(h(ZT )2) < ∞, furthermore there exists a sufficiently smooth function F such that, for
every t ≥ 0,
F (t ∧ T,Zt∧T , St∧T ) := E
(
h(ZT )
∣∣FIt ) . (4.15)
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Sufficiently smooth here means that F is continuously differentiable w.r.t. all variables.
• E
(∫ T
0 F (t, Zt, St)
2 dt
)
<∞,
• E ∫ T0 ∫R3 (F (t, Zt + φZt (ζ), St + φSt (ζ))− F (t, Zt, St))2 ν(dζ)dt <∞.
The assumption on the conditional distribution of the increments of the fundamental value
process is the analogue to Assumption 3.1. It turns out to be crucial for the analytical tractability
of the stochastic filter problem which is induced by insider trading and rationality of the market
makers.
As in Chapter 3, we only allow pricing functions that have a special form. Despite the depen-
dence on certain variables, as motivated in the introduction of this chapter, we again want the
price at time t to depend on a functional Y˜t of the total order process
Yt = Xt + θt1[0,T ](t) = Y
c
t +
∫ t
0
∫
R3
φX(s, ζ2)N(ds, dζ), t ≥ 0.
Note that in the above representation of the total order process we have used the continuity of
θ. In particular, the jump part of the noise traders’ order process,
∫ t
0
∫
R3
φX(s, ζ2)N(ds, dζ),
t ≥ 0, is adapted w.r.t. FM.
As we argued above, we should allow a different weighting of continuous and discontinuous
changes of the total order process. We therefore consider weighted total order processes Y˜ that
have the following general form
Y˜t =
∫ t
0
λs− dY cs +
∫ t
0
∫
R3
ϕs(ζ)N(ds, dζ), t ≥ 0, (4.16)
for suitable FM-adapted processes ϕ and λ where
dλt = lt dt+
∫
R3
φλt (ζ)N(dt,dζ),
such that a.s. ∫ T
0
λ2s ds <∞.
Recall that we pointed out that Λ, as defined in (4.10), also plays an important role in the
dynamics of the equilibrium price pressure. Adopting the notation of this section for Λ, we write
dΛt = −λ2tσ2dt+
∫
R3
φΛt (ζ)N(dt,dζ), t ≥ 0, Λ0 = χ0, (4.17)
where φΛt (ζ) = χ(t, φX(t, ζ2)) with χ as in (4.14).
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Before we address the precise form of a pricing rule, let us introduce the following notations:
U¯t := (Λt, λt, St), φ
U¯
t (ζ) = φ
U¯ (t, U¯t−, ζ) := (φΛt (ζ), φ
λ
t (ζ), φ
S
t (ζ)) (4.18)
and
Ut := (U¯t, Zt, Y˜t), φ
U
t (ζ) = φ
U (t, Ut−, ζ) = (φU¯t (ζ), φ
Z
t (ζ), ϕt(ζ)). (4.19)
Furthermore, let D¯ denote the state space of the process (t∧ T, U¯t∧T )t≥0. In particular, we have
for all u¯ ∈ D¯ ∩ (R3 × (0,∞)) that t < T given U¯t = u¯.
In Chapter 3, a pricing rule was characterised by a pair (H,λ) of a pricing function H and a
price pressure λ. Since now Y c and Y d are weighted differently according to λ and ϕ, respectively,
we need a triple (H,λ, ϕ) to completely characterise a pricing rule
Pt = H(t ∧ T, Y˜t∧T , U¯t∧T ), t ≥ 0.
Here H is assumed to be a continuously differentiable function w.r.t. all variables and twice
continuously differentiable with respect to the second variable. Furthermore, H again is supposed
to be strictly increasing in the second variable. For λ and ϕ, as defined above, we assume that
ϕt(ζ) = ϕ(t, U¯t−, φX(t, ζ2))
and
φλt (ζ) = φ
λ(t, U¯t−, φX(t, ζ2), φS(t, St−, ζ2, ζ3)), lt = l(t, U¯t−),
for suitable functions φλ and l such that λ > 0 P-a.s., and that there exists a unique strong
solution to the SDE
dξt = λt−σdBt +
∫
R3
ϕ(t, U¯t−, φX(t, ζ2))N(dt,dζ), t ≥ s, ξs = x, U¯s = u¯, (4.20)
for all (x, u¯) ∈ R×D¯. In particular, we can define U ξt := (U¯t, Zt, ξt) and D∗ as the state space of
(t∧ T,U ξt∧T )t≥0. Observe that, analogous to Chapter 3, ξ denotes the weighted total uninformed
order, i.e. the total order without the semi-rational part of X and without insider trading.
Further details and technical conditions regarding the admissibility of pricing rules are given
in the following definition.
Definition 4.2. We call (H,λ, ϕ) admissible pricing rule ((H,λ, ϕ) ∈ P) if H, λ and ϕ are
defined as above such that for all (t, u) = (t, u¯, z, y) ∈ D∗ the following conditions hold:
• |y∗(t, u)| <∞ where y∗(t, u) is the implicit function defined by
H(t, y∗(t, u), u¯) = F (t, z, S), (4.21)
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• E
(∫ T
0 ξ
2
t + (y
∗(t, U ξt ))2 + (H(t, ξt, U¯t))2 dt
)
<∞,
• E
(
(ξ2T + (y
∗(T,U ξT ))
2 + (H(T, ξT , U¯T ))
2 + F 2T )λ
−2
T
)
<∞,
• E
(∫ T
0 (∂yH(t, ξt, U¯t))
2 dt
)
<∞,
• E
(∫ T
0
∫
R3
(
H(t, ξt− + ϕt(ζ), U¯t− + φU¯t (ζ))−H(t, ξt−, U¯t−)
)2
ν(dζ)dt
)
<∞,
• E
(∫ T
0
∫
R3
(
H(t,ξt−+ϕt(ζ),U¯t−+φU¯t (ζ))
λt−+φλt (ζ)
− H(t,ξt−,U¯t−)λt−
)2
ν(dζ)dt
)
<∞,
• E
(∫ T
0
∫
R3
(
F (t,Zt−+φZt (ζ),St−+φSt (ζ))
λt−+φλt (ζ)
− F (t,Zt−,St−)λt−
)2
ν(dζ)dt
)
<∞.
According to Definition 1.2, a pricing rule (H,λ, ϕ) is said to be rational if
H(t ∧ T, Y˜t∧T , U¯t∧T ) = E
(
h(ZT )
∣∣FMt∧T ) , t ≥ 0.
As in the previous chapter, we want to consider a semi-rational noise drift µ. In particu-
lar, µ depends on the price and the estimated fundamental value, i.e. F (t, Zt, St). Due to the
dependences of H, we consider
µt = µ(t, Ut), t ≥ 0.
Semi-rationality now reads as
sgn (µ(t, Ut))1[0,T ](t) = sgn
(
F (t, Zt, St)−H(t, Y˜t, U¯t)
)
1[0,T ](t), t ≥ 0.
By analogy to Chapter 3, we develop a class of admissible noise drift in the following section via
an HJB equation approach.
4.3 Absolutely continuous insider trading: HJB equation and
necessary conditions for equilibrium
In this section, we again identify necessary conditions for equilibrium as we did in Section 3.2.
These conditions will help us to derive optimality criteria for general insider trading. We again
start with the assumption of absolutely continuous insider trading, i.e.
θt =
∫ t∧T
0
αs ds, t ≥ 0, (4.22)
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for a suitable FI-adapted process α ∈ S˜(t, u) that ensures the existence of a unique strong
solution to U for all initial conditions (t, u) ∈ D∗ and
E
t,u
∫ T
t
∣∣∣(F (s, Zs, Ss)−H(s, Y˜s, U¯s))αs∣∣∣ ds <∞
where Et,u denotes the conditional expectation given Ut = u. For the value function, defined by
J(t, u) := sup
α∈S˜(t,u)
E
t,u
(∫ T
t
(F (s, Zs, Ss)−H(s, Y˜s, U¯s))αs ds
)
, (t, u) ∈ D∗, (4.23)
we can now derive the corresponding HJB equation, assuming J is smooth enough. For further
details and a more general treatment of HJB equations for optimal control of jump diffusions we
refer to Øksendal and Sulem [53], Chapter 3.
Due to the special structure of the stopping time T , for any (t, u) ∈ D := D∗∩(R3×(0,∞)×R2)
there exists an u > 0 such that T (ω) > t+ u, for all ω ∈ {Ut = u}. Hence,
E
t,u
∫ (t+)∧T
t
(Fs −Hs)αs ds = Et,u
∫ t+
t
(Fs −Hs)αs ds, for all  ∈ [0, u],
and
E
t,u
∫ T
(t+)∧T
(Fs −Hs)αs ds = Et,u
∫ T
t+
(Fs −Hs)αs ds, for all  ∈ [0, u],
where we use Ht and Ft as a short notation instead of H(t, Y˜t, U¯t) and F (t, Zt, St), respectively.
It follows
J(t, u) = sup
α∈S˜(t,u)
E
t,u
(∫ t+
t
(Fs −Hs)αs ds+ J(t+ , Ut+)
)
, for all  ∈ [0, u]. (4.24)
Now, by Itô’s formula (cf. [56], Theorem 33, Chapter II) we get, given Ut = u, u ∈ D,
J(t+ , Ut+)
= J(t, u) +
∫ t+
t
λs−σ∂yJ(s, Us−) dBs +
∫ t+
t
∫
R3
J(s, Us− + φUs (ζ))− J(s, Us−) N¯(ds, dζ)
+
∫ t+
t
∂tJ(s, Us) + l(s, U¯s)∂λJ(s, Us)− λ2sσ2∂ΛJ(s, Us)− ∂SJ(s, Us) +
σ2λ2s
2
∂yyJ(s, Us) ds
+
∫ t+
t
∫
R3
J(s, Us + φ
U
s (ζ))− J(s, Us) ν(dζ) ds+
∫ t+
t
λs(αs + µ(s, Us))∂yJ(s, Us) ds
where we took into account that J was assumed to be smooth enough and that
dY˜t = λt(αt + µt)dt+ σλtdBt +
∫
R3
ϕt(ζ)N(dt,dζ).
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In combination with (4.24) this yields
0 = sup
α∈S˜(t,u)
E
(∫ t+
t
λs−σ∂yJs− dBs +
∫ t+
t
∫
R3
J(s, Us− + φUs (ζ))− J(s, Us−) N¯(ds, dζ)
+
∫ t+
t
αs (λs∂yJs + (Fs −Hs)) ds+
∫ t+
t
∫
R3
J(s, Us + φ
U
s (ζ))− J(s, Us) ν(dζ) ds
+
∫ t+
t
∂tJs + λsµs∂yJs +
λ2sσ
2
2
∂yyJs − λ2sσ2∂ΛJs − ∂SJs + ls∂λJs ds
)
.
If the first two terms on the right hand side are true martingales, they cancel out in expectation.
Dividing by  and sending  to zero leads to
sup
α
(
∂tJ(t, u) + λµ(t, u)∂yJ(t, u) + λ
2σ2(
∂yyJ(t, u)
2
− ∂ΛJ(t, u)) + l(t, u¯)∂λJ(t, u)− ∂SJ(t, u)
+
∫
R3
J(t, u+ φU (t, u, ζ))− J(t, u) ν(dζ) + αλ∂yJ(t, u) + (F (t, z, S)−H(t, y, u¯))α
)
= 0
for all (t, u) = (t, u¯, z, y) = (t,Λ, λ, S, z, y) ∈ D. Due to the linearity of this equation, a finite
solution can only be found if the following system of PIDEs is satisfied
0 =
H(t, y, u¯)− F (t, z, S)
λ
− ∂yJ(t, u), (4.25)
0 = ∂tJ(t, u) + µ(t, u)(H(t, y, u¯)− F (t, z, s)) + λ
2σ2
2
∂yyJ(t, u)− λ2σ2∂ΛJ(t, u)
+ l(t, u¯)∂λJ(t, u)− ∂SJ(t, u) +
∫
R3
J(t, u+ φU (t, u, ζ))− J(t, u) ν(dζ),
(4.26)
for all (t, u) = (t, u¯, z, y) = (t,Λ, λ, S, z, y, ) ∈ D.
Like in Chapter 3, the HJB equation approach leads to a system of two equations that have
to be satisfied by J for the existence of a finite equilibrium. The special dependences of these
equations can be used to derive necessary conditions for the pricing rule.
We start with differentiating (4.25) w.r.t. y,Λ, λ, S and t, respectively:
∂yyJ(t, u) = ∂yH(t, y, u¯)λ
−1, ∂yyyJ(t, u) = ∂yyH(t, y, u¯)λ−1,
∂yΛJ(t, u) = ∂ΛH(t, y, u¯)λ
−1, ∂ytJ(t, u) = (∂tH(t, y, u¯)− ∂tF (t, z, S))λ−1,
∂yλJ(t, u) = (F (t, z, S)−H(t, y, u¯))λ−2 + ∂λH(t, y, u¯)λ−1,
∂ySJ(t, u) = (∂SH(t, y, u¯)− ∂SF (t, z, S))λ−1.
(4.27)
Differentiating (4.26) w.r.t. y yields
0 = ∂tyJ(t, u) + ∂y(µ(t, u)(H(t, y, u¯)− F (t, z, s))) + λ
2σ2
2
∂yyyJ(t, u)− λ2σ2∂ΛyJ(t, u)
+ l(t, u¯)∂λyJ(t, u)− ∂SyJ(t, u) +
∫
R3
∂yJ(t, u+ φ
U (t, u, ζ))− ∂yJ(t, u) ν(dζ).
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Now, inserting the partial derivatives calculated in (4.27) leads to
0 = (∂tH(t, y, u¯)− ∂tF (t, z, S))λ−1 + ∂y(µ(t, u)(H(t, y, u¯)− F (t, z, S))) + λσ
2
2
∂yyH(t, y, u¯)
− λσ2∂ΛH(t, y, u¯) + l(t, u¯)λ−1∂λH(t, y, u¯)− l(t, u¯)λ−2(H(t, y, u¯)− F (t, z, S))
− (∂SH(t, y, u¯)− ∂SF (t, z, S))λ−1 +
∫
R3
H(t, y + ϕt(ζ), u¯+ φ
U¯
t (ζ))
λ+ φλt (ζ)
− H(t, y, u¯)
λ
ν(dζ)
−
∫
R3
F (t, z + φZt (ζ), S + φ
S
t (ζ))
λ+ φλt (ζ)
− F (t, z, S)
λ
ν(dζ). (4.28)
Despite the integral terms that occur due to the jumps of the involved variables and those which
reflect the non-constant behaviour of F , i.e. ∂tF and ∂SF , we have a similar structure as in
Chapter 3 (cf. (3.18) and (3.28)). If we assume that for (t, u) = (t, u¯, z, y) = (t,Λ, λ, S, z, y) ∈ D
∂y (µ(t, u)(H(t, y, u¯)− F (t, z, S))) = l
(1)(t, u¯)
λ2
(H(t, y, u¯)− F (t, z, S)) , (4.29)
for a suitable function l(1), we get by an analogous argumentation as in the proof of Proposition
3.6 that a semi-rational µ (with analogous properties as in Assumption 3.4) has the following
representation
µ(t, u) = m(t, u¯)
∫ y∗(t,u)
y H(t, x, u¯)− F (t, z, S) dx
H(t, y, u¯)− F (t, z, S) (4.30)
where
m(t, u¯) = − l
(1)(t, u¯)
λ2
> 0
and y∗(t, u) is as defined in (4.21). The above considerations motivate the following assumption:
Assumption 4.3. µ takes the special form as in (4.30) where m(t, u¯) is some positive function
bounded by M ∈ (0,∞).
If this assumption is satisfied, Equation (4.28) allows the following conclusion:
Proposition 4.4. Let Assumption 4.3 be satisfied and (H,λ, ϕ) be an admissible pricing rule.
For (t, u¯) ∈ D¯ define
l(2)(t, u¯) := l(t, u¯) +m(t, u¯)λ2.
If there exists a sufficiently smooth function J such that (H,λ, ϕ, J) is a solution to the system
of Equations (4.25) and (4.26), then necessarily the following two PIDEs hold for all (t, u) =
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(t, u¯, z, y) = (t,Λ, λ, S, z, y) ∈ D
0 =
∂tH(t, y, u¯)
λ
+
λσ2
2
∂yyH(t, y, u¯)− l
(2)(t, u¯)
λ2
H(t, y, u¯)− λσ2∂ΛH(t, y, u¯)− ∂SH(t, y, u¯)
λ
+
l(t, u¯)
λ
∂λH(t, y, u¯) +
∫
R3
H(t, y + ϕ(t, u¯, φX(t, ζ2)), u¯+ φ
U¯ (t, u¯, ζ))
λ+ φλ(t, u¯, φX(t, ζ2), φS(t, S, ζ2, ζ3))
− H(t, y, u¯)
λ
ν(dζ)
(4.31)
and
0 = − l
2(t, u¯)
λ2
F (t, z, S) +
∂tF (t, z, S)− ∂SF (t, z, S)
λ
+
∫
R3
F (t, z + φZ(t, ζ1, ζ2), S + φ
S(t, S, ζ2, ζ3))
λ+ φλ(t, u¯, φX(t, ζ2), φS(t, S, ζ2, ζ3))
− F (t, z, S)
λ
ν(dζ).
(4.32)
Proof. Recall that H has to be independent on z. Inserting (4.29) in Equation (4.28) and
separating the terms that depend on z and those which do not yields (4.31) and (4.32).
4.4 Price pressure
If Assumption 4.3 is satisfied and (H,λ, ϕ) ∈ P, Proposition 4.4 states that λ has to satisfy
(4.32) and
dλt = −m(t, U¯t)λ2t + l(2)(t, U¯t)dt+
∫
R3
φλt (ζ)N(dt,dζ). (4.33)
Since λ is assumed to be strictly positive, we can alternatively consider λ−1. Due to Itô’s formula
λ−1 has the following dynamics:
dλ−1t = m(t, U¯t)− l(2)(t, U¯t)λ−2t dt+
∫
R3
φλ
−1
(t, U¯t−, ζ2, ζ3)N(dt,dζ) (4.34)
where for u¯ = (Λ, λ, S) ∈ D¯
φλ
−1
(t, u¯, ζ2, ζ3) = − φ
λ(t, u¯, φX(t, ζ2), φ
S(t, S, ζ2, ζ3))
(λ+ φλ(t, u¯, φX(t, ζ2), φS(t, S, ζ2, ζ3)))λ
.
Using the martingale property of (Ft∧T )t≥0, PIDE (4.32) can be simplified as shown subsequently.
Proposition 4.5. Let Assumption 4.1 be satisfied and λ−1 be as in (4.34). Then (4.32) is
equivalent to
0 = − l
(2)(t, u¯)
λ2
F (t, z, S)
+
∫
R3
F (t, z + φZ(t, ζ1, ζ2), St + φ
S(t, S, ζ2, ζ3))φ
λ−1(t, u¯, ζ2, ζ3) ν(dζ), (t, u) ∈ D.
(4.35)
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Proof. Since F (t ∧ T,Zt∧T , St∧T ), t ≥ 0, and∫ t∧T
0
∫
R3
F (s, Zs− + φZs (ζ), Ss− + φ
S
s (ζ))− F (s, Zs−, Ss−) N¯(ds, dζ), t ≥ 0,
are martingales (Assumption 4.1), an argumentation as in the previous section shows that
0 = ∂tF (t, z, S)− ∂SF (t, z, S)
+
∫
R3
F (t, z + φZ(t, ζ1, ζ2), S + φ
S(t, S, ζ2, ζ3))− F (t, z, S) ν(dζ),
(4.36)
for all (t, u) = (t,Λ, λ, S, z, y) ∈ D. Taking into account that∫
R3
F (t, z + φZ(t, ζ1, ζ2), S + φ
S(t, S, ζ2, ζ3))
λ+ φλ(t, u¯, φX(t, ζ2), φS(t, S, ζ2, ζ3))
− F (t, z, S)
λ
ν(dζ)
= λ−1
∫
R3
F (t, z + φZ(t, ζ1, ζ2), S + φ
S(t, S, ζ2, ζ3))− F (t, z, S) ν(dζ)
+
∫
R3
F (t, z + φZ(t, ζ1, ζ2), S + φ
S(t, S, ζ2, ζ3))φ
λ−1(t, u¯, ζ2, ζ3) ν(dζ),
(4.37)
the equivalence of (4.32) and (4.35) follows from (4.36).
Remark 4.6. Obviously, (4.35) is always satisfied if we choose l(2) = φλ−1 = 0. Together with
the other drift part, −m(t, U¯t)λ−2t , λ would behave as in Chapter 3. Until now it is not clear
why we should choose λ in a different way. But as we argued in the introduction of this chapter,
the case where ΛT = 0 will play an important role later on. However, it is not obvious whether
non-trivial l(2) and φλ−1 exist such that
1 =
∫
R3
F (t, z + φZ(t, ζ1, ζ2), S + φ
S(t, S, ζ2, ζ3))
F (t, z, S)
φλ
−1
(t, u¯, ζ2, ζ3)λ
2
l(2)(t, u¯)
ν(dζ)
since l(2) and φλ−1 are not allowed to depend on z or ζ1. If for some c ∈ R
c =
∫
R3
F (t, z + φZ(t, ζ1, ζ2), S + φ
S(t, S, ζ2, ζ3))
F (t, z, S)
ν(dζ),
one might choose
φλ
−1
(t, u¯, ζ2, ζ3)λ
2ν(R3) =
l(2)(t, u¯)
c
.
4.5 Optimality
For the HJB equation approach in Section 4.3 we assumed that an admissible θ is absolutely
continuous. It turned out that the corresponding value function J has to satisfy Equations (4.25)
and (4.26). Such a function will be specified in the following lemma.
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Lemma 4.7. Let Assumptions 4.1 and 4.3 be satisfied and (H,λ, ϕ) ∈ P such that (4.31), (4.33)
and (4.35) hold. For (t, u) ∈ D∗, the function
J(t, u) := E
(∫ T
t
µ(s, U ξs )(H(s, ξs, U¯s)− F (s, Zs, Ss)) ds
+ λ−1T
∫ ξT
y∗(T,UξT )
(H(T, y, U¯T )− F (T,ZT , ST )) dy
∣∣∣∣∣U ξt = u
) (4.38)
is well-defined. In particular, J(T,UT ) ≥ 0, with equality if and only if Y˜T = y∗(T,UT ). If
furthermore J is smooth enough and
E
∫ T
0
∫
R3
(J(t, U ξt− + φ
U (t, U ξt−, ζ))− J(t, U ξt−))2 ν(dζ)dt <∞, (4.39)
then (H,λ, ϕ, J) is a solution to the system of Equations (4.25) and (4.26).
Proof. In this proof, denote H(t, ξt, U¯t) by Ht, F (t, Zt, St) by Ft, µ(t, U
ξ
t ) by µt, etc. As a first
step, we show that J is well-defined. Again we have that µt(Ht−Ft) < 0 , 0 ≤ mt ≤M and the
monotonicity of H. An argumentation similar to that in Lemma 3.12 yields
E
(∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
µs(Hs − Fs) ds
∣∣∣∣) ≤ E(M ∫ T
0
(ξs − y∗s)(Hs − Fs) ds
)
≤
(
ME
∫ T
0
(ξs)
2 + (y∗s)
2 +H2s + F
2
s ds
)
.
Furthermore, we get with the same arguments
E
(∫ ξT
y∗T
(H(T, x, U¯T )− FT )λ−1T dx
)
≤ E
(
ξ2T + (y
∗
T )
2 +H2T + F
2
T
λ2T
)
.
According to Assumption 4.1 and Definition 4.2 all terms in the above inequalities are bounded.
Altogether J is well-defined.
As a second step, we have to verify (4.25) and (4.26). We start with (4.26). First observe that
J(t ∧ T,U ξt∧T ) +
∫ t∧T
0
µ(s, U ξs )(H(s, ξs, U¯s)− F (s, Zs, Ss)) ds, t ≥ 0,
is a martingale by definition. Analogous to Section 4.3, we get for any (t, u) ∈ D
Jt+ − Jt =
∫ t+
t
∂tJs + ls∂λJs − λ2sσ2∂ΛJs − ∂SJs +
λ2sσ
2
2
∂yyJs ds
+
∫ t+
t
∫
R3
J(s, U ξs− + φ
U (s, U ξs−, ζ))− J(s, Us−) ν(dζ)ds
+
∫ t+
t
λs−σ∂yJs− dBs +
∫ t+
t
∫
R3
J(s, U ξs− + φ
U (s, U ξs−, ζ))− J(s, Us−) N¯(ds, dζ)
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for all  ∈ (0, S). Due to condition (4.39) the integral w.r.t. N¯(dt,dζ) is a martingale (cf. [16],
Corollary 4, Chapter VIII). Furthermore, if (4.25) holds, the dB term is a martingale, too. Then,
with the same arguments used in Section 4.3 for the calculation of the HJB equation, we get
that (4.26) holds. It remains to prove that J satisfies (4.25).
An argumentation similar to the one used in Lemma 3.12 yields
∂yJ(t, u) = E
(∫ T
t
−ms(Hs − Fs) ds+ (HT − FT )λT
∣∣∣∣U ξt = u) . (4.40)
Furthermore, we get by Itô’s formula in combination with PIDEs (4.31) and (4.35) and Propo-
sition 4.5
HT − FT
λT
=
Ht∧T − Ft∧T
λt∧T
+
∫ T
t∧T
ms(Hs − Fs) ds
+
∫ T
t∧T
σ∂yHs− dBs +
∫ T
t∧T
∫
R3
Hs − Fs
λs
− Hs− − Fs−
λs−
N¯(ds, dζ).
(4.41)
Admissibility of (H,λ, ϕ) ensures that the last two integrals are uniformly integrable martingales
(Itô-Lévy-Isometry, cf. [53], Theorem 1.17). In particular,
E
(∫ T
t
σ∂yHs− dBs +
∫ T
t
∫
R3
Hs − Fs
λs
− Hs− − Fs−
λs−
N¯(ds, dζ)
∣∣∣∣U ξt = u) = 0.
Finally, (4.41) in combination with (4.40) yields
∂yJ(t, u) =
H(t, y, u¯)− F (t, z, S)
λ
.
In contrast to the diffusion case of Chapter 3 we cannot conclude smoothness of J from its
definition in (4.38). In the sequel, we therefore assume that this condition is satisfied.
Assumption 4.8. There exists a sufficiently smooth function J , such that (4.38) and (4.39)
hold. Sufficiently smooth here means that J is continuously differentiable w.r.t. all variables and
twice continuously differentiable w.r.t. to the last variable.
According to the HJB equation approach we would now be able to deduce optimality criteria
from Lemma 4.7 for admissible insider strategies that are continuous and of finite variation.
However, we want to characterise optimality in a larger class which is not restricted to finite
variation strategies. As pointed out in the introduction of this chapter, discontinuous strategies
might allow infinite wealth. Remark 4.11 illuminates this subsequent to the next proposition.
We therefore exclude discontinuous strategies. Further details and technical conditions for ad-
missibility of trading strategies are presented in the following definition.
Definition 4.9. A continuous FI-semimartingale θ is called admissible trading strategy (w.r.t.
(H,λ, ϕ)) if the following conditions hold:
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• E
(∫ T
0 (λt−σ∂yJ(t, Ut−))
2 dt
)
<∞,
• E
(∫ T
0
∫
R3
(J(t, Ut− + φUt (ζ))− J(t, Ut−))2 ν(dζ)dt
)
<∞,
• E
(∫ T
0
∫
R
(θt(F (t, Zt− + φZt (ζ), St− + φSt (ζ))− F (t, Zt−, St−)))2 ν(dζ)dt
)
<∞,
• E
(∫ T
0 λ
2
t∂yH(t, Y˜t, U¯t)
2 dt
)
<∞,
• E
(∫ T
0
∫
R3
(H(t, Y˜t− + ϕt(ζ), U¯t− + φU¯t )−H(t, Y˜t−, U¯t−))2 ν(dζ)dt
)
<∞.
The set of all admissible strategies is denoted by S(H,λ, ϕ).
We are now in the position to characterise optimality.
Proposition 4.10. Let Assumptions 4.1, 4.3, and 4.8 be satisfied and (H,λ, ϕ) ∈ P such that
(4.31), (4.33) and (4.35) hold. Then, θ ∈ S(H,λ, ϕ) is optimal if
• θ is of finite variation
• H(T, Y˜T , U¯T ) = h(ZT ) P-a.s.
Proof. To shorten the notation, we write Ht instead of H(t, Y˜t, U¯t), Ft instead of F (t, Zt, St),
etc., as long as this does not cause confusion.
As stated in (1.2), the final wealth corresponding to a certain strategy θ is given by
W θT = θT−VT −
∫ T−
0
Pt− dθt − [P, θ]T− .
Continuity of θ leads to
W θT = θTVT −
∫ T
0
Pt− dθt − 〈P, θ〉T .
Since F (T,ZT , ST ) = VT by definition, integration by parts yields the following representation
of the final wealth:
W θT =
∫ T
0
Fs− −Hs− dθs +
∫ T
0
θs− dFs + 〈θ, F −H〉T . (4.42)
Now, due to Itô’s formula
Ht∧T = H0 +
∫ t∧T
0
λs−σ∂yHs− dBs +
∫ t∧T
0
λs∂yHs− dθs +
∑
s≤t∧T
∆Hs + drift term,
where the so-called drift term is continuous and of finite variation. Hence,
〈θ,H〉T =
∫ T
0
λs∂yHs d〈θ〉s +
∫ T
0
λsσ∂yHs d〈θ,B〉s, 〈θ, F 〉T = 0.
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Putting this into (4.42) leads to
W θT =
∫ T
0
Fs− −Hs− dθs +
∫ T
0
θs− dFs −
∫ T
0
λs∂yHs d〈θ〉s −
∫ T
0
λsσ∂yHs d〈θ,B〉s.
Consider now Js = J(s, Us) with J as defined in (4.38). Due to Lemma 4.7 we have
∂yJs =
Hs − Fs
λs
.
Inserting this in the above representation of the final wealth yields
W θT =−
∫ T
0
λs−∂yJs− dθs +
∫ T
0
θs− dFs −
∫ T
0
λ2s∂yyJs d〈θ〉s −
∫ T
0
λ2sσ∂yyJs d〈θ,B〉s. (4.43)
On the other hand, we have by Itô’s formula and 〈Y c〉t = σ2t+ 2σ〈B, θ〉t + 〈θ〉t that
JT = J0 +
∫ T
0
∂tJs + ls∂λJs − λ2sσ2∂ΛJs − ∂SJs ds
+
∫ T
0
λs−∂yJs− dY cs +
1
2
∫ T
0
λ2s∂yyJs d〈Y c〉s +
∑
s≤T
∆Js
= J0 +
∫ T
0
∂tJs + ls∂λJs − λ2sσ2∂ΛJs − ∂SJs +
σ2λ2s
2
∂yyJs + λsµs∂yJs ds
+
∫ T
0
λs−σ∂yJs− dBs +
∫ T
0
λs−∂yJs− dθs +
∫ T
0
λ2sσ∂yyJs d〈B, θ〉s
+
1
2
∫ T
0
λ2s∂yyJs d〈θ〉s +
∑
s≤T
∆Js.
Using PIDE (4.26) (cf. Lemma 4.7) yields
JT =J0 +
∫ T
0
λs−σ∂yJs− dBs +
∫ T
0
λs−∂yJs− dθs +
∫ T
0
λ2sσ∂yyJs d〈B, θ〉s
+
1
2
∫ T
0
λ2s∂yyJs d〈θ〉s +
∑
s≤T
∆Js
−
∫ T
0
∫
R3
J(s, Us− + φU (s, Us−, ζ))− J(s, Us−) ν(dζ)ds.
(4.44)
Merging (4.43) and (4.44) leads to the following representation of the final wealth:
W θT = J0 − JT +
∫ T
0
λs−σ∂yJs− dBs +
∫ T
0
θs− dFs −
∫ T
0
1
2
λ2s∂yyJs d〈θ〉s
+
∫ T
0
∫
R3
J(s, Us− + φUs (ζ))− J(s, Us−) N¯(ds, dζ).
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Since θ is admissible we have
E
(∫ T
0
∫
R3
J(s, Us− + φUs (ζ))− J(s, Us−) N¯(ds, dζ)
)
= 0
as well as
E
(∫ T
0
λs−σ∂yJs− dBs
)
= 0, and E
(∫ T
0
θs− dFs
)
= 0.
Hence,
E(W θT ) = E
J0 − JT − ∫ T
0
1
2
λ2s∂yyJs d〈θ〉s
 . (4.45)
With the same arguments as in Proposition 3.13 we obtain that
−
∫ T
0
1
2
λ2s∂yyJs d〈θ〉s ≤ 0,
with equality if and only if 〈θ〉· = 0 and that
EJ0 − JT ≤ EJ0 −EJT ≤ EJ0 <∞,
with equality if and only if Y˜T = y∗(T,UT ) P-a.s. Thus, the conditions of this proposition indeed
are sufficient for optimality in S(H,λ, ϕ).
Remark 4.11. As in Proposition 3.13, we could have considered more general, i.e. discontinuous
trading strategies. Denote ϕ(s, U¯s−,∆Ys) by ϕ(∆Ys) and ϕ(s, U¯s−,∆Xs) by ϕ(∆Xs). A similar
argumentation as in the proof of Proposition 3.13 would have led to
EW θT = E
J0 − JT− − ∫ T
0
1
2
λ2s∂yyJs d〈θc〉s
+
∑
s<T
J(s, U¯s, Zs, Y˜s− + ϕ(∆Ys))− J(s, U¯s, Zs, Y˜s− + ϕ(∆Xs))− λs∂yJs∆θs
)
in place of Equation (4.45) (cf. Equation (3.49)).
For optimality in the larger class of trading strategies we then would have to show that addi-
tionally ∑
s<T
J(s, U¯s, Zs, Y˜s− + ϕ(∆Ys))− J(s, U¯s, Zs, Y˜s− + ϕ(∆Xs))− λs∂yJs∆θs ≤ 0
with equality if and only if ∆θ = 0. Obviously, this does not hold true in general, but if
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ϕ(y) = λty, we get by the convexity of J in y that
J(s, U¯s, Zs, Y˜s− + ϕ(∆Ys))− J(s, U¯s, Zs, Y˜s− + ϕ(∆Xs))− λs∂yJ(s, U¯s, Zs, Y˜s− + ϕ(∆Ys))∆θs
= J(s, U¯s, Zs, Y˜s− + λs∆Ys)− J(s, U¯s, Zs, Y˜s− + λs∆(Ys − θs))
− ∂yJ(s, U¯s, Zs, Y˜s− + λs∆Ys))λs∆θs
≤ 0.
4.6 Rationality
In Proposition 4.4, we found out that PIDE (4.31) is a necessary condition for the existence of
an equilibrium in the case of absolutely continuous insider trading. Furthermore, Proposition
4.10 characterises optimality of an insider strategy for the case when (4.31) is satisfied. We
now again turn our focus to rational pricing functions and state equivalent conditions to this
PIDE. The following proposition is the jump analogue to Proposition 3.21 and can be proved
in a similar way. The differences in the particular PIDE that characterises H compared to that
in Chapter 3 (cf. Equation (3.12)) are due to the more complex dependences in the jump case.
As a remarkable difference to Chapter 3 and to other insider equilibrium models, for example,
[25], [28], [26] or [19] (cf. Section 1.2), we do no longer necessarily have the inconspicuousness of
informed trading, i.e. Y c is not necessarily an FM-martingale.
Proposition 4.12. Let (H,λ, ϕ) ∈ P, θ ∈ S(H,λ, ϕ) and f some sufficiently smooth function
on [0,∞)×R4. Then the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) σ−1
(
Y c − ∫ ·∧T0 (λs∂yH(s, Y˜s, U¯s))−1f(s, Y˜s, U¯s) ds) is an FM-Brownian motion on [0, T ],
(2) E((αt + µt)1[0,T ](t)|FMt ) = (λt∂yH(t, Y˜t, U¯t))−1f(t, Y˜t, U¯t)1[0,T ](t), for all t ≥ 0,
(3) for all (t, u) = (t, u¯, z, y) ∈ D, H satisfies
0 = ∂tH(t, y, u¯) + λ
2σ2
(
∂yyH(t, y, u¯)
2
− ∂ΛH(t, y, u¯)
)
+ l(t, u¯)∂λH(t, y, u¯)− ∂SH(t, y, u¯)
+
∫
R3
H(t, y + ϕ(t, u¯, φX(t, ζ2)), u¯+ φ
U¯ (t, u¯, ζ))−H(t, y, u¯) ν(dζ) + f(t, y, u¯).
(4.46)
If we furthermore assume that (H,λ, ϕ) satisfies PIDE (4.31) then (1)− (3) are equivalent to
(4) λ−1f(t, y, u¯) = −l(2)(t, u¯)λ−2H(t, y, u¯)
+
∫
R3
H(t, y + ϕ(t, u¯, φX(t, ζ2)), u¯+ φ
U¯ (t, u¯, ζ))φλ
−1
(t, u¯, ζ2, ζ3)ν(dζ),
(4.47)
for all (t, u) = (t, u¯, z, y) ∈ D.
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Proof. Again, we use the short notation Ht instead of H(t, Y˜t, U¯t) and µt instead of µ(t, Ut),
etc., as long as this does not lead to confusion. Taking in mind the dynamics of the involved
proces, application of Itô’s formula to H yields
Ht∧T = H0 +
∫ t∧T
0
∂tHs +
σ2λ2s
2
∂yyHs + ls∂λHs − λ2sσ2∂ΛHs − ∂SHs ds
+
∫ t∧T
0
∫
R3
H(s, Y˜s− + ϕs(ζ), U¯s− + φU¯s (ζ))−H(s, Y˜s−, U¯s−) ν(dζ) ds
+
∫ t∧T
0
λs(µˆs + αˆs)∂yHs ds+
∫ t∧T
0
λs−σ∂yHs− dIs
+
∫ t∧T
0
∫
R3
H(s, Y˜s− + ϕs(ζ), U¯s− + φU¯s (ζ))−H(s, Y˜s−, U¯s−) N¯(ds, dζ)
(4.48)
where
It :=
∫ t∧T
0
(µs + αs − µˆs − αˆs)σ−1 ds+Bt, t ≥ 0, (4.49)
and
µˆt := E
(
µt
∣∣FMt ) , αˆt := E (αt∣∣FMt ) .
Since T is an FM-stopping time, we have
E
(∫ t∧T
s
αu + µu du
∣∣∣∣FMs ) = ∫ t
s
E
(
E
(
(αu + µu)1[0,T ](u)
∣∣FMu )∣∣FMs ) du
=
∫ t
s
E
(
E
(
(αu + µu)
∣∣FMu )1[0,T ](u)∣∣FMs ) du
= E
(∫ t∧T
s
αˆu + µˆu du
∣∣∣∣FMs ) .
With the same arguments as in Proposition 3.21 where we replace
µt + αt by (µt + αt)1[0,T ](t), and µˆt + αˆt by (µˆt + αˆt)1[0,T ](t),
we can show that I is a Brownian motion w.r.t. FM. Since
Y ct = σIt +
∫ t∧T
0
µˆs + αˆs ds, t ≥ 0,
we get the equivalence of (1) and (2) with a similar argumentation as in Proposition 3.21. For
the equivalence of (2) and (3) observe that admissibility of θ ensures that the last two integrals
in (4.48) are martingales. On the other hand, (Ht∧T )t≥0 itself is a martingale (recall that H is
a rational pricing function). Again, with an analogous argumentation as in Proposition 3.21 we
get the equivalence of (2) and (3).
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To realise the equivalence of (3) and (4), observe that (similar to (4.37))∫
R3
H(t, y + ϕ(t, u¯, φX(t, ζ2)), u¯+ φ
U¯ (t, u¯, ζ))
λ+ φλ(t, u¯, φX(t, ζ2), φS(t, S, ζ2, ζ3))
− H(t, y, u¯)
λ
ν(dζ)
= λ−1
∫
R3
H(t, y + ϕ(t, u¯, φX(t, ζ2)), u¯+ φ
U¯ (t, u¯, ζ))−H(t, y, u¯) ν(dζ)
+
∫
R3
H(t, y + ϕ(t, u¯, φX(t, ζ2)), u¯+ φ
U¯ (t, u¯, ζ))φλ
−1
(t, u¯, ζ2, ζ3) ν(dζ).
Then the equivalence easily follows by multiplication of PIDE (4.46) with λ−1 and insertion of
(4.47).
4.7 Equilibrium
The following proposition gives sufficient conditions for a pair of an admissible pricing rule
(H,λ, ϕ) and an admissible trading strategy θ to form an equilibrium. This is the jump part
analogue to Proposition 3.22.
Proposition 4.13. Let Assumptions 4.1, 4.3, and 4.8 be satisfied, (H,λ, ϕ) ∈ P and θ ∈
S(H,λ, ϕ). Then (H,λ, ϕ, θ) is an equilibrium (in P×S(H,λ, ϕ)) if the following conditions are
fulfilled:
(i) H, λ and F satisfy (4.31), (4.33), and (4.35),
(ii) θ is of finite variation,
(iii) σ−1
(
Y c − ∫ ·∧T0 (λs∂yH(s, Y˜s, U¯s))−1f(s, Y˜s, U¯s) ds) is an FM-Brownian motion on [0, T ]
where f is defined as in (4.47),
(iv) H(T, Y˜T , U¯T ) = h(ZT ) P-a.s.
Proof. We conclude the optimality of θ from conditions (i), (ii), and (iv) with the help of
Proposition 4.10.
For rationality of (H,λ, ϕ) first observe that (Ht∧T )t≥0 is an FM-martingale. To see this,
again use Itô’s formula.
Ht∧T = H0 +
∫ t∧T
0
∂tHs +
σ2λ2s
2
∂yyHs + ls∂λHs − λ2sσ2∂ΛHs − ∂SHs ds
+
∫ t∧T
0
∫
R3
H(s, Y˜s− + ϕs(ζ), U¯s− + φU¯s (ζ))−H(s, Y˜s−, U¯s−) ν(dζ) ds
+
∫ t∧T
0
∫
R3
H(s, Y˜s− + ϕs(ζ), U¯s− + φU¯s (ζ))−H(s, Y˜s−, U¯s−) N¯(ds, dζ)
+
∫ t∧T
0
λs−∂yHs− dY cs .
(4.50)
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Using PIDE (4.46), which follows from Proposition 4.12 and condition (iii), this simplifies to
Ht∧T = H0 +
∫ t∧T
0
λs−∂yHs− dY cs −
∫ t∧T
0
fs ds
+
∫ t∧T
0
∫
R3
H(s, Y˜s− + ϕs(ζ), U¯s− + φU¯s (ζ))−H(s, Y˜s−, U¯s−) N¯(ds, dζ).
Due to condition (iii) and the admissibility of (H,λ, ϕ) and θ, we conclude that (Ht∧T )t≥0 is an
F
M-martingale. Finally, condition (iv) yields
H(t ∧ T, Y˜t∧T , U¯t∧T ) = E
(
H(T, Y˜T , U¯T )
∣∣∣FMt ) = E (h(ZT )∣∣FMt ) .
In the case when f ≡ 0 we are now able to state the form of an equilibrium in the following
theorem. For a discussion of the non-inconspicuous case we refer to Section 4.9.
Up to now, we did not characterise the price pressure for the jumps, i.e. ϕ. For reasons that
are due to the filter problem of the market makers, ϕ has to be chosen such that a jump of Y˜
equals the estimated (w.r.t. the market makers information) corresponding jump of Z.
Theorem 4.14. Suppose Assumptions 4.1, 4.3 and 4.8 are satisfied. Let
ϕ(t, u¯, φX(t, ζ2)) := κ(t, φ
X(t, ζ2))
and λ be as in (4.33) such that
• λ is pathwise bounded away from 0 and bounded from above on [0, T ]
• (4.35) holds
• Λt > 0, for all t ∈ [0, T ), and ΛT = 0 P-a.s.
Furthermore, let
H(t, y, u¯) := E
(
h(ξT )
∣∣ξt = y, U¯t = u) , (4.51)
and
θt :=
∫ t∧T
0
−µs + as(Zs − Y˜s) ds, with at := λtσ2Λ−1t . (4.52)
If (H,λ, ϕ) ∈ P, θ ∈ S(H,λ, ϕ) and f ≡ 0 where f is defined as in (4.47), then (H,λ, ϕ, θ)
defines an equilibrium.
Proof. The proof makes use of Proposition 4.13. Hence, we have to ensure that all conditions
are satisfied. This is obviously the case for condition (ii). Condition (iii) is proved by Lemma
4.16. Due to the special structure of H, for condition (iv) it is sufficient to show the P-a.s.
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equality of Y˜T and ZT . This is done by Lemma 4.15. Last but not least, for condition (i), PIDEs
(4.33) and (4.35) hold by assumption. Furthermore, since f = 0, it remains to show, according
to Proposition 4.12, that H satisfies
0 = ∂tH(t, y, u¯) +
λ2σ2
2
∂yyH(t, y, u¯)− λ2σ2∂ΛH(t, y, u¯) + l(t, u¯)∂λH(t, y, u¯)− ∂SH(t, y, u¯)
+
∫
R3
H(t, y + ϕ(t, u¯, φX(t, ζ2)), u¯+ φ
U¯ (t, u¯, ζ))−H(t, y, u¯) ν(dζ)
for all (t, u) ∈ D. This again follows from Feynman-Kac’s formula as in Section 4.3 where we
use the admissibility of (H,λ, ϕ).
4.8 Auxiliaries for the proof of Theorem 4.14
Lemma 4.15. Let the assumptions of Theorem 4.14 be satisfied. Then Y˜T = ZT holds P-a.s.
Proof. For  > 0 define
τ  := inf {t ≥ 0 : St ≤ } .
Observe that for any t ≥ 0 we have T − (t ∧ τ ) ≥ . Since λ is (pathwise) bounded away from
0 and bounded from above on [0, T ], there exist random variables 0 < λ¯1 ≤ λ¯2 < ∞ such that
λ¯1 ≤ λt∧T ≤ λ¯2 P-a.s. Furthermore, we have
Λt∧τ ≥
∫ τ+
t∧τ
σ2λ2s ds ≥ σ2λ¯1 > 0, for all t ≥ 0.
It follows that λ2t∧τσ2Λ
−1
t∧τ is pathwise uniformly (for t ∈ [0,∞)) bounded away from zero and
bounded from above.
Now, define
ρt := exp
(
−
∫ t∧τ
0
asλs ds
)
= exp
(
−
∫ t∧τ
0
λ2sσ
2
Λs
ds
)
.
For any  > 0, ρ as well as (ρ)−1 are well-defined, locally bounded, predictable processes of
finite variation and
d
1
ρt
=
atλt
ρt
1[0,τ](t)dt, t ≥ 0, ρ0 = 1.
By assumption we have
d(Zt − Y˜t) = −λtat
(
Zt − Y˜t
)
dt− λtσdBt + d
∑
s≤t
∆(Zs − Y˜s).
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Integration by parts yields (remember that Y˜0 = 0 and ρ0 = 1)
Zτ − Y˜τ
ρτ
= Z0 +
∫ τ
0
(Zt − Y˜t) d 1
ρt
+
∫ τ
0
1
ρt
d(Zt − Y˜t)
= Z0 +
∫ τ
0
λtat
ρt
(Zt − Y˜t) dt−
∫ τ
0
λtat
ρt
(Zt − Y˜t) dt−
∫ τ
0
λtσ
ρt
dBt
+
∑
t≤τ
∆(Zt − Y˜t)
ρt
= Z0 −
∫ τ
0
λtσ
ρt
dBt +
∑
t≤τ
∆(Zt − Y˜t)
ρt
.
Multiplying ρτ on both sides,
Zτ − Y˜τ = ρτ
Z0 − ∫ τ
0
λtσ
ρt
dBt +
∑
t≤τ
∆(Zt − Y˜t)
ρt
 . (4.53)
By assumption we have that T <∞ P-a.s., and that N is a Poisson process. Let Ω0 be the set
of all ω ∈ Ω with NT <∞. Then P(Ω0) = 1. For ω ∈ Ω0 let nω := NT (ω). It follows that
δω := inf
0≤t≤Tnω
{St(ω)} = min
i=1,...,nω
{STi(ω)} > 0,
where Ti, i = 1, 2, . . . are the jump times of the related Poisson process. For all ω ∈ Ω0 we get
T (ω)− τ (ω) =  for all  ∈ (0, δω).
Hence, τ  ↗ T P-a.s. for ↘ 0. As Y and Z are càdlàg processes, we have P-a.s. convergence
of
Y˜τ
→0−−→ Y˜T−, Zτ →0−−→ ZT−.
Moreover, P(∆YT = 0,∆ZT = 0) = 1. Altogether, it results
Y˜T = ZT P-a.s.
if we show that the term on the right hand side of (4.53) vanishes while  approaches zero. We
prove this in three steps:
(1) ρτZ0 −→ 0
(2) ρτ
∑
t≤τ (ρ

t)
−1∆(Zt − Y˜t) −→ 0
(3) ρτ
∫ τ
0 λtσ(ρ

t)
−1 dBt −→ 0
in probability, for ↘ 0.
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(1) Let Ω0 and δω be as before, then for all ω ∈ Ω0 we get for all  ∈ (0, δω) that Tnω(ω) ≤
τ (ω). The integral in the definition of ρ is defined pathwise. Using the special form of a, we get
on the interval [Tnω(ω), τ (ω)] that
λt(ω)at(ω) =
λ2t (ω)σ
2
Λt(ω)
=
λ2t (ω)σ
2∑nω
i=1 χi(ω)−
∫ t
0 λ
2
s(ω)σ
2 ds
.
Hence,(∫ τ
0
λtat dt
)
(ω) ≥
∫ τ(ω)
Tnω (ω)
λ2t (ω)σ
2∑nω
i=1 χi(ω)−
∫ t
0 λ
2
s(ω)σ
2 ds
dt
= log
(
nω∑
i=1
χi(ω)−
∫ Tnω (ω)
0
λ2t (ω)σ
2 dt
)
− log
(
nω∑
i=1
χi(ω)−
∫ τ
0
λ2t (ω)σ
2 dt
)
= log
(
ΛTnω
)
(ω)− log (Λτ) (ω).
(4.54)
The first term in the last line of (4.54) is constant w.r.t. . By assumption we have that Λt → 0 for
t→ T . Hence, log(Λτ)↘ −∞, for → 0. Since Z0 <∞ a.s., we obtain altogether Z0ρτ ↘ 0.
(2) For 0 ≤ s ≤ t define
ρs,t := ρ

t(ρ

s)
−1 = exp
(
−
∫ t∧τ
s∧τ
λuau du
)
.
Since λtat > 0, it follows ρs1,t ≤ ρs2,t for s1 ≤ s2. A calculation as in (4.54) yields
ρTnω ,τ(ω) = exp
(
−
∫ τ
Tnω
λ2tσ
2
Λt
dt
)
(ω) = exp
(
log(Λτ)− log(ΛTnω )
)
(ω) =
Λτ
ΛTnω
(ω). (4.55)
In particular,
ρTnω ,τ(ω)
→0−−→ 0. (4.56)
With (4.56) and ∣∣∣∣∣
nω∑
i=1
∆(ZTi − Y˜Ti)(ω)
∣∣∣∣∣ <∞ for almost all ω ∈ Ω
we finally get∣∣∣∣∣∣ρτ
∑
t≤τ
(ρt)
−1∆(Zt − Y˜t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (ω) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
t≤τ(ω)
ρt,τ(ω)∆(Zt − Y˜t)(ω)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ρTnω ,τ(ω)
∣∣∣∣∣
nω∑
i=1
∆(ZTi − Y˜Ti)(ω)
∣∣∣∣∣ ↘0−−→ 0.
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(3) Due to the independence of B and (λ,Λ, S), (ρ)−1 given (λ,Λ, S)t∈[0,τ] is a bounded,
deterministic process and ∫ τ
0
(ρt)
−1 dBt ∼ N
(
0,
∫ τ
0
(ρt)
−2 dt
)
.
It follows that
ρτ
∫ τ
0
(ρt)
−1 dBt ∼ N
(
0, (ρτ)
2
∫ τ
0
(ρt)
−2 dt
)
.
Therefore, in order to prove (3), it suffices to show that P-a.s.
(ρτ)
2
∫ τ
0
(ρt)
−2 dt ↘0−−→ 0.
For all ω ∈ Ω0 and  ∈ (0, δω)
(ρτ)
2(ω)
∫ τ(ω)
0
(ρt)
−2(ω) dt = (ρτ)
2(ω)
(∫ Tnω (ω)
0
(ρt)
−2(ω) dt+
∫ τ(ω)
Tnω (ω)
(ρt)
−2(ω) dt
)
.
Since (ρt)−1 is increasing, we get
(ρτ)
2(ω)
∫ τ(ω)
0
(ρt)
−2(ω) dt ≤ (ρTnω ,τ)2(ω)Tnω(ω) + (ρτ)2(ω)
∫ τ(ω)
Tnω (ω)
(ρt)
−2(ω) dt. (4.57)
Due to (4.56), the first term on the right hand side of (4.57) vanishes for → 0. For all  ∈ (0, δω)
a calculation similar to that in (4.54) shows
(ρτ)
2(ω)
∫ τ(ω)
Tnω (ω)
(ρt)
−2(ω) dt = Λ2τ(ω)
∫ τ(ω)
Tnω (ω)
Λ−2t (ω) dt.
For t ∈ (Tnω(ω), T (ω)) now consider
Λ2t (ω)
∫ t
Tnω (ω)
Λ−2s (ω) ds.
Both factors are differentiable functions in t on (Tnω(ω), T (ω)). By l’Hospital’s rule we get
lim
t→T (ω)
Λ2t (ω)
∫ t
Tnω (ω)
Λ−2s (ω) ds = lim
t→T (ω)
Λ−2t (ω)
2σ2λ2t (ω)Λ
−3
t (ω)
= lim
t→T (ω)
Λt(ω)
2σ2λ2t (ω)
= 0.
This finally completes the proof of this lemma.
Lemma 4.16. Let the assumptions of Theorem 4.14 be satisfied. Then σ−1Y c is a Brownian
motion w.r.t. FM on the stochastic interval [0, T ].
Proof. Analogous to Chapter 3, we want to apply Proposition 2.5 to obtain a certain repre-
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sentation of the dynamics of σ−1Y c. This representation allows us to conclude that σ−1Y c is a
Brownian motion w.r.t. the market makers filtration.
As seen before, the drift part of Y , i.e. at(Zt− Y˜t), does not match the assumptions of Proposi-
tion 2.5 since at
t→T−−−→∞. For this reason, we prove the assertion on a stochastic interval [0, τn],
for n ∈ N, where (τn)n∈N is a localising sequence such that λtat1[0,τn](t) is bounded for any
n ∈ N and τn n→∞−−−→ T P-a.s.
Let us now define this sequence by
τn := inf
{
t ≥ 0 : Λt ≤ n−1, λt ≥ n
} ∧ n, n ∈ N. (4.58)
Obviously,
∣∣at1[0,τn](t)∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣λtσ2Λt 1[0,τn](t)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ σ2n2
and τn → T P-a.s., for n → ∞, since λ is bounded pathwise and Λt > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ) and
left-continuous in T .
Then consider the slightly modified filter problem on the interval [0, n] induced by Z as signal
process and (Y n, S) as observation process where
Y nt := θ
n
t +Xt, θ
n
t :=
∫ t
0
−µs1[0,T ](s) + as(Zs − Y˜s)1[0,τn](s) ds.
Furthermore, define
Y˜ nt :=
∫ t
0
λs− d(Y ns )
c +
∫ t
0
∫
R3
κ(s, φX(t, ζ2)N(ds, dζ), t ≥ 0. (4.59)
In particular, Y n and Y˜ n coincide with Y and Y˜ , respectively, on [0, τn]. We are now able to
apply the results of Section 2.2. Due to Corollary 2.6,
γt =
(∫ t∧τn
0
a2sσ
−2 ds+
Nt∑
i=0
χ˜i
)−1
, (4.60)
with
χ˜0 = χ
−1
0 , χ˜i =
−χi
(γTi− + χi)γTi−
, for i ∈ N. (4.61)
Since (4.60) is defined pathwise, we can apply Lemma A.3 (pathwise) on
γtat
σ2
=
atσ
−2∫ t
0 a
2
sσ
−2 ds+
∑Nt
i=0 χ˜i
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and obtain
γtat
σ2
= λt (4.62)
if we show that
χ˜i = − χi(λTi−σ2
aTi−
+ χi
)
λTi−σ
2
aTi−
for all i ∈ N. (4.63)
Obviously, if γTi−aTi− = λTi−σ2 holds, we get (4.63) by (4.61). Hence, (4.62) follows by induction
since γ0a0 = λ0σ2 can easily be verified by the definition of γ and a.
Moreover, according to Proposition 2.5 we get for ηt = E(Zt|FY
n,S
t ) that
dηt =
γt−at−
σ2
1[0,τn](t)
(
dY n,ct − at1[0,τn](t)
(
ηt − Y˜ nt
)
dt
)
+
∫
R3
κ(t, φX(t, ζ2)N(dt,dζ)
=
γt−at−
σ2
1[0,τn](t)σ dI
n
t +
∫
R3
κ(t, φX(t, ζ2))N(dt,dζ)
where
dInt = dBt + atσ
−11[0,τn](t)(Zt − ηt) dt, In0 = 0,
is the information process of the associated filter problem and a Brownian motion w.r.t. the
observation filtration. Together with (4.62) this yields
dηt = σλt−1[0,τn](t) dInt +
∫
R3
κ(t, φX(t, ζ2))N(dt,dζ). (4.64)
Now, on the one hand, for Y n,c (continuous part of Y n) we get
dY n,ct = at
(
Zt − Y˜ nt
)
1[0,τn](t) dt+ σdBt = at
(
ηt − Y˜ nt
)
1[0,τn](t) dt+ σdI
n
t . (4.65)
On the other hand, due to (4.59) and (4.64), we have
ηt − Y˜ nt =
∫ t
0
σλs−1[0,τn](s) dIns −
∫ t
0
λs− dY n,cs .
Together this yields
dY n,ct = at1[0,τn](t)
(∫ t
0
σλs−1[0,τn](s) dIns −
∫ t
0
λs− dY n,cs
)
dt+ σdInt .
The unique strong solution to the above SDE with initial condition Y n,c0 = 0 is given by
Y n,ct = σI
n
t , t ∈ [0, n].
102
4.9. Remarks and examples
We conclude that σ−1Y n,c is a Brownian motion w.r.t. the observation filtration FY n,S . Fur-
thermore, for any n ∈ N we have almost sure that
Y n,c· 1[0,τn](·) = σIn· 1[0,τn](·) = σI·1[0,τn](·)
where I is a Brownian motion w.r.t. FM. Since τn → T P-a.s., this proves the assertion.
4.9 Remarks and examples
Non-inconspicuous equilibria
In the situation of Theorem 4.14, assume that f 6= 0. Defining
H(t, y, u¯) := λE
(
e
∫ T
t −m(s,U¯s)λs dsh(ξT )λ−1T
∣∣∣ξt = y, U¯t = u) (4.66)
ensures that (4.31) is still satisfied even if f 6= 0. To realise this, first apply integration by parts
to λ−1t and H(t, ξt, U¯t). This yields (where we now write Ht for H(t, ξt, U¯t))
dHtλ
−1
t = Ht−dλ
−1
t + λ
−1
t−dHt + d
[
H,λ−1
]
t
. (4.67)
Using the particular dynamics of H and λ−1, calculated by Itô’s formula, yields
λ−1t
(
∂tHt +
σ2λ2t
2
∂yyHt + lt∂λHt − σ2λ2t∂ΛHt − ∂SHt
)
+Htmt −Htl(2)t λ−2t
+
∫
R3
H(t, ξt + ϕt(ζ), U¯t + φ
U¯t
t (ζ))(λ
−1
t + φ
λ−1
t (ζ))−H(t, ξt, U¯t)λ−1t ν(dζ)
as dt term in the representation of dHtλ−1t in (4.67). Admissibility of H ensures that all
other terms are martingale terms. Again applying integration by parts for λ−1t Ht and kt :=
exp
(∫ t
0 −msλs ds
)
yields
kt
(
λ−1t
(
∂tHt +
σ2λ2t
2
∂yyHt + lt∂λHt − σ2λ2t∂ΛHt − ∂SHt
)
+Htmt −Htl(2)t λ−2t
+
∫
R3
H(t, ξt + ϕt(ζ), U¯t + φ
U¯t
t (ζ))(λ
−1
t + φ
λ−1
t (ζ))−H(t, ξt, U¯t)λ−1t ν(dζ)
)
−Htλ−1t mtλtkt
(4.68)
dt term. The rest of the terms are again martingale terms since −mtλt < 0, i.e. kt ≤ 1.
Furthermore,
e
∫ t∧T
0 −m(s,U¯s)λs dsHt∧Tλ−1t∧T , t ≥ 0,
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itself is a martingale by definition. We conclude that (4.68) has to equal 0 dt⊗dP-a.s. on [0, T ].
Dividing by k proves PIDE (4.31).
Nevertheless, an approach as used for Theorem 4.14 does not lead to an equilibrium. According
to Proposition 4.13 we would have to ensure that
σ−1
(
Y c −
∫ ·
0
(λs∂yH(s, Y˜s, U¯s))
−1f(s, Y˜s, U¯s) ds
)
=: σ−1Y f,c
is a Brownian motion. Defining θ as
θt :=
∫ t∧T
0
−µs + βs + as(Zs − Y˜s) ds, with at := λtσ2Λ−1t , t ≥ 0,
for a suitable FM-adapted process β and proceeding as in Lemma 4.16 leads to (cf. (4.65))
dY f,ct = (at(ηt − Y˜t) + βt)dt+ σdIt − ft(λt∂yHt)−1dt
and
ηt − Y˜t =
∫ t
0
σλs− dIs −
∫ t
0
λs− dY f,cs −
∫ t
0
fs(∂yHs)
−1 ds.
Together we have
dY f,ct =
(
at
(∫ t
0
σλs− dIs −
∫ t
0
λs− dY f,cs −
∫ t
0
fs(∂yHs)
−1 ds
)
+ βt − ft
λt∂yHt
)
dt+ σdIt.
Since σ−1Y f,c is required to be a Brownian motion and, in particular, a martingale (i.e. the dt
term has to vanish), we necessarily have to chose
βt = at
∫ t
0
fs(∂yHs)
−1 ds+ ft(λt∂yHt)−1.
Now, a similar calculation as in the proof of Lemma 4.15 shows that
Zτ − Y˜τ +
∫ τ
0
ft
∂yHt
dt = ρτ
Z0 − ∫ τ
0
λtσ
ρt
dBt +
∑
s≤τ
∆(Zs − Y˜s)
ρs
 .
This leads to
ZT = Y˜T −
∫ T
0
ft
∂yHt
dt.
However, according to Proposition 4.10, θ is not optimal.
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Example: constant price pressure
Suppose that the conditional variance of the jumps of Z as well as the jumps of S are constant,
i.e. χi = χ ∈ R+, for all i ∈ N0 and ∆STi = S0 = s ∈ R+. We get
Λt = (Nt + 1)χ−
∫ t
0
λ2uσ
2 du.
In particular, λ has to be chosen such that for all n ∈ N
nχ− σ2
∫ sn
0
λ2u du = 0.
This holds true for λ =
√
χ(σ2s)−1. According to Remark 4.6, (4.35) holds. Furthermore, if
µ = 0, λ satisfies the conditions of Theorem 4.14. Since λt,Λt, St only depend on Nt, H admits
the representation
H(t, Y˜t, U¯t) = H¯(t, Y˜t, Nt)
for a suitable function H¯. If furthermore κi =
√
χ(σ2s)−1∆XTi , for all i ∈ N, we have a uniform
price pressure for continuous and discontinuous changes of the total order process. According
to Remark 4.11, an optimal strategy in θ ∈ S(H,λ, ϕ) would also be optimal in the larger class
where discontinuous strategies are allowed.
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Appendix A
Auxiliary results
A.1 Proofs of Corollary 2.3 and Corollary 2.4
Proof of Corollary 2.3. We start with verifying conditions (1) - (11) of Theorems 2.1 and
2.2: (1) is obviously verified, since Z is constant and the volatility of Y (i) is constant, for
i = 1, . . . , 2n− 1. (2) follows directly from (iv) and (v). (3): obviously, the (2n− 1)× (2n− 1)
diagonal matrix 
σ2 0 · · · 0
0 σ2 0
...
. . .
0 0 σ2

is uniformly non-singular. (4) holds due to the constant volatility of Y (i). (5), (6) and (7) follow
from (vi) and (iv) because
E
(∫ T
0
(A1(t, Y )η
(j)
t )
2 dt
)
≤ L2
∫ T
0
E(η
(j)
t )
2 dt ≤ L2
∫ T
0
EZ2j dt <∞.
(8) follows from (ii). (9), (10), and (11) are obviously satisfied, too. According to Theorem 2.1,
Z given FYt is N (ηt, γt)-distributed. Furthermore, by inserting in (2.5) (Theorem 2.2) we get
d
dt
γt =−A1(t, Y )2

γ
(11)
t · · · γ(1n)t
...
. . .
...
γ
(n1)
t · · · γ(nn)t


1[T1,∞)(t) 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
1[Tn,∞)(t) 0 · · · 0


1
σ2
0 · · · 0
0 1
σ2
0
...
. . .
0 0 1
σ2

×

1[T1,∞)(t) · · · 1[Tn,∞)(t)
0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0


γ
(11)
t · · · γ(1n)t
...
. . .
...
γ
(n1)
t · · · γ(nn)t

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=− A1(t, Y )
2
σ2

γ
(11)
t · · · γ(1n)t
...
. . .
...
γ
(n1)
t · · · γ(nn)t


1[T1∨T1,∞)(t) · · · 1[T1∨Tn,∞)(t)
...
. . .
...
1[Tn∨T1,∞)(t) · · · 1[Tn∨Tn,∞)(t)

×

γ
(11)
t · · · γ(1n)t
...
. . .
...
γ
(n1)
t · · · γ(nn)t
 .
Since (
γ
(i1)
t , . . . , γ
(in)
t
)(
1[Tj∨T1,∞)(t), . . . ,1[Tj∨Tn,∞)(t)
)>
=
n∑
k=1
γ(ik)1[Tj∨Tk,∞)(t)
and(
n∑
k=1
γ(ik)1[T1∨Tk,∞)(t), . . . ,
n∑
k=1
γ(ik)1[Tn∨Tk,∞)(t)
)(
γ
(1j)
t , . . . , γ
(nj)
t
)>
=
n∑
l=1
n∑
k=1
γ
(ik)
t 1[Tl∨Tk,∞)(t)γ
(lj)
t = c
(ij)
t ,
we get
d
dt
γt =− A1(t, Y )
2
σ2

c
(11)
t · · · c(1n)t
...
. . .
...
c
(n1)
t · · · c(nn)t
 .
Furthermore, for t ∈ [0, T ], define
Y˜
(1)
t := Y
(1)
t −
∫ t
0
A0(s, Y ) + A¯1(s, Y )ηs ds
= Y
(1)
t −
∫ t
0
A0(s, Y ) +A1(s, Y )
n∑
i=1
η(i)s 1[Ti,∞)(s) ds.
Then we get by inserting in (2.4)
d

η
(1)
t
...
η
(n)
t
 =A1(t, Y )σ2

γ
(11)
t · · · γ(1n)t
...
. . .
...
γ
(n1)
t · · · γ(nn)t


1[T1,∞)(t) 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
1[Tn,∞)(t) 0 · · · 0


dY˜
(1)
t
dY
(2)
t
...

=
A1(t, Y )
σ2

∑n
j=1 γ
(1j)
t 1[Tj ,∞)(t) 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...∑n
j=1 γ
(nj)
t 1[Tj ,∞)(t) 0 · · · 0


dY˜
(1)
t
dY
(2)
t
...

108
A.1. Proofs of Corollary 2.3 and Corollary 2.4
=
A1(t, Y )
σ2

∑n
j=1 γ
(1j)
t 1[Tj ,∞)(t) dY˜
(1)
t
...∑n
j=1 γ
(nj)
t 1[Tj ,∞)(t) dY˜
(1)
t
 .
Proof of Corollary 2.4. First observe that η˜ and γ˜ can be expressed in terms of η and γ of
Corollary 2.3. For η˜ we obviously have
η˜t =
n∑
i=1
η
(i)
t 1[Ti,∞)(t).
Using the linearity of the conditional mean and the fact that all Ti, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, are FY0 -
measurable, we get
γ˜t = E
( n∑
i=1
Zi1[Ti,∞)(t)−E
(
n∑
i=1
Zi1[Ti,∞)(t)
∣∣∣∣∣FYt
))2∣∣∣∣∣∣FYt

= E
( n∑
i=1
(
Zi −E(Zi|FYt )
)
1[Ti,∞)(t)
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣FYt

=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γ
(ij)
t 1[Ti∨Tj ,∞)(t).
Now, the initial conditions are easily verified since η˜t = η
(1)
t and γ˜t = γ
(11)
t for t ∈ [0, T2)
(remember that T1 = 0). For p ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and t ∈ (Tp, Tp+1) we have
n∑
j=1
γ
(ij)
t 1[Tj ,∞) =
p∑
j=1
γ
(ij)
t 1[Tj ,∞).
Due to the dynamics of η(i)t , i ∈ {1, ..., p}, it follows that on (Tp, Tp+1)
dη˜t =d
p∑
i=1
η
(i)
t =
 p∑
i=1
A1(t, Y )
σ2
n∑
j=1
γ
(ij)
t 1[Tj ,∞)
(dY (1)t − (A0(t, Y ) +A1(t, Y )η˜t) dt)
=
A1(t, Y )
σ2
p∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
γ
(ij)
t
(
dY
(1)
t − (A0(t, Y ) +A1(t, Y )η˜t) dt
)
=
A1(t, Y )
σ2
γ˜t
(
dY
(1)
t − (A0(t, Y ) +A1(t, Y )η˜t) dt
)
.
Furthermore, for t ∈ (Tp, Tp+1),
d
dt
γ˜t =
p∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
d
dt
γ
(ij)
t = −
A1(t, Y )
2
σ2
p∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
n∑
l=1
n∑
k=1
γ
(ik)
t 1[Tk,∞)(t)γ
(lj)
t 1[Tl,∞)(t)
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=− A1(t, Y )
2
σ2
p∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
p∑
l=1
p∑
k=1
γ
(ik)
t γ
(lj)
t = −
A1(t, Y )
2
σ2
p∑
j=1
p∑
l=1
γ
(lj)
t
p∑
i=1
p∑
k=1
γ
(ik)
t
=− A1(t, Y )
2
σ2
 p∑
j=1
p∑
l=1
γ
(lj)
t
2
=− A1(t, Y )
2
σ2
(γ˜t)
2 .
Since p was arbitrarily chosen, this proves the dynamics of the continuous part of η˜ and γ˜. It
remains to show that ∆η˜Ti = κi and ∆γ˜Ti = χi.
As a first step, we show that for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, for all t ∈ [0, Ti ∨ Tj ]
γ
(ij)
t =
0, if i 6= jχi, if i = j .
To see this, consider (γ(1m)t , . . . , γ
(m−1m)
t ) for 1 ≤ m ≤ n, t ∈ [0, Tm). According to Equation
(2.7) this vector is a solution to the following (m− 1)-dimensional system of ODEs
d
dt
γ
(1m)
t =
m−1∑
l=1
γ
(lm)
t 1[Tl,∞)(t)
m−1∑
l=1
γ
(1k)
t 1[Tk,∞)(t), γ
(1m)
0 = 0,
...
...
d
dt
γ
(m−1m)
t =
m−1∑
l=1
γ
(lm)
t 1[Tl,∞)(t)
m−1∑
l=1
γ
(m−1 k)
t 1[Tk,∞)(t), γ
(m−1m)
0 = 0.
Hence,
γ
(im)
t = 0, ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} , ∀ t ∈ [0, Tm).
Continuity of γ(im), i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (cf. Theorem 2.2) yields the assertion on the whole interval
[0, Tm]. Finally,
d
dt
γ
(mm)
t =
m−1∑
l=1
γ
(lm)
t 1[Tl,∞)(t)
m−1∑
k=1
γ
(mk)
t 1[Tk,∞)(t) = 0.
Due to the initial condition γ(mm)0 = χm, we have γ
(mm)
t = χm for all t ∈ [0, Tm].
Now, for t ∈ [0, Ti), it follows
dη
(i)
t =
n∑
j=1
γ
(ij)
t 1[Tj ,∞)(t)
A1(t, Y )
σ2
dY˜
(1)
t =
i−1∑
j=1
γ
(ij)
t 1[Tj ,∞)(t)
A1(t, Y )
σ2
dY˜
(1)
t = 0
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where dY˜ (1)t = dY
(1)
t − (A0(t, Y ) +A1(t, Y )η˜t) dt. Hence, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, η(i)Ti = κi and
∆η˜Ti = ∆
 n∑
j=1
η
(j)
Ti
1[Tj ,∞)(Ti)
 = η(i)Ti = κi.
This completes the proof of the dynamics of η˜. For γ˜ consider
i+1∑
k=1
i+1∑
l=1
γ
(kl)
t =
i∑
k=1
(
i∑
l=1
γ
(kl)
t + γ
(k i+1)
t
)
+
i+1∑
l=1
γ(i+1 l)
=
i∑
k=1
i∑
l=1
γ
(kl)
t + 2
i∑
k=1
γ
(k i+1)
t + γ
(i+1 i+1).
Hence,
∆γ˜Ti = 2
i−1∑
k=1
γ
(ki)
Ti
+ γ
(ii)
Ti
= χi.
A.2 Auxiliaries for Chapter 3
Lemma A.1. Let λ and σ be positive differentiable functions on [0, T ) and C such that
C−1 ≥
∫ T
0
λ(s)2σ(s)2 ds.
Define the function a : [0, T ) 7→ R by
a(t) :=
λ(t)σ(t)2
C−1 − ∫ t0 λ(s)2σ(s)2 ds. (A.1)
Then a verifies the following integral equation for all t ∈ [0, T )
a(t)σ(t)−1∫ t
0 a(s)
2σ(s)−2 ds+ C
= λ(t)σ(t). (A.2)
Proof. Due to the choice of C, a is well-defined with a(t) ∈ (0,∞), for all t ∈ [0, T ). Together
with λ(t) > 0, σ(t) > 0, for all t ∈ [0, T ), we get
(A.2) ⇔
∫ t
0
a(s)2σ(s)−2 ds+ C = a(t)σ(t)−2λ(t)−1.
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Now, let
b(t) := a(t)σ(t)−2λ(t)−1, t ∈ [0, T ).
Since a and λ are differentiable functions this also holds true for b. Hence,
(A.2) ⇔ b(t) =
∫ t
0
λ(s)2σ(s)2b(s)2 ds+ C
⇔ b′(t) = λ(t)2σ(t)2b(t)2, b(0) = C.
This special Bernoulli type ODE has the solution
b(t) =
(
C−1 −
∫ t
0
λ(s)2σ(s)2 ds
)−1
which is equivalent to
a(t) =
λ(t)σ(t)2
C−1 − ∫ t0 λ(s)2σ(s)2 ds.
Lemma A.2. Given the assumptions of Theorem 3.24. For t ∈ [0, T ) let
k(t) := λ(t)(a(t)−m(t)). (A.3)
Then limt→T
∫ t
0 k(s) ds =∞.
Proof. Since λ and a are continuous and positive and m is bounded on [0, T ′], for all T ′ ∈ [0, T ),
k(t) = λ(t)a(t)
(
1− m(t)
a(t)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ),
is bounded on [0, T ′], for all T ′ ∈ [0, T ). Hence, it suffices to show that there exists a T ′ ∈ (0, T )
such that
(1) lim
t→T
∫ t
T ′
λ(s)a(s) ds =∞,
(2)
m(t)
a(t)
< 1− ,  > 0, for all t ∈ (T ′, T ).
1. By definition of a,
λ(t)a(t) =
λ(t)2σ(t)2
1− ∫ t0 λ(s)2σ(s)2 ds
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with λ such that for all t ∈ [0, T )
1−
∫ t
0
λ(s)2σ(s)2 ds > 0 and 1−
∫ T
0
λ(s)2σ(s)2 ds = 0.
Now, for an arbitrary but fixed T ′ ∈ (0, T ) we have for all t ∈ (T ′, T )
∫ t
T ′
λ(s)2σ(s)2
1− ∫ s0 λ(u)2σ(u)2 du ds = − log
(
1−
∫ t
0
λ(s)2σ(s)2 ds
)
+ log
(
1−
∫ T ′
0
λ(s)2σ(s)2 ds
)
.
In particular, ∫ t
T ′
λ(s)a(s) ds
t→T−−−→∞.
2. If m is bounded, it follows that λ(T ) > 0. In particular, limt→T a(t) = ∞. Hence,
limt→T m(t)/a(t) = 0. If m is unbounded, (2) follows from the assumptions of Theorem 3.24.
A.3 Auxiliaries for Chapter 4
Lemma A.3. Let σ ∈ R, λ be a positive piecewise differentiable càdlàg function on [0, T ), with
jumps in ti, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, n ∈ N, with 0 = t0 < t1 < t2 < ... < tn < T <∞. Furthermore, let
χi > 0, i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, such that for all t ∈ [0, T )
n∑
i=0
χi1[ti,T )(t)−
∫ t
0
λ(s)2σ2 ds > 0.
Then the function a : [0, T ) 7→ R, defined by
a(t) :=
λ(t)σ2∑n
i=0 χi1[ti,T )(t)−
∫ t
0 λ(s)
2σ2 ds
, (A.4)
verifies the following integral equation
a(t)σ−2∫ t
0 a(s)
2σ−2 ds+
∑n
i=0 χ˜i1[ti,T )(t)
= λ(t), t ∈ [0, T ), (A.5)
where
χ˜0 = χ
−1
0 and χ˜i = −
χi(
λ(ti−)σ2
a(ti−) + χi
)
λ(ti−)σ2
a(ti−)
. (A.6)
Proof. The assertion follows from induction and Lemma A.1. More detailed, for t = 0 we have
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by definition, i.e. Equation (A.4),
a(0) =
λ(0)σ2
χ0
and by Equation (A.5)
a(0)σ−2
χ˜0
= λ(0).
The above two equations are equivalent if χ˜0 = χ−10 . Now, for t ∈ (0, t1) we get (A.5) by Lemma
A.1. Assume now that (A.5) holds for all t ∈ [0, ti), i ≥ 1. In particular, we have
a(ti−)σ−2∫ ti
0 a(s)
2σ−2 ds+
∑i−1
j=0 χ˜j
= λ(ti−) ⇔ a(ti−)
λ(ti−)σ2 =
∫ ti
0
a(s)2σ−2 ds+
i−1∑
j=0
χ˜j .
In order to satisfy (A.5) for ti, χ˜i has to be chosen such that
χ˜i =
a(ti)
λ(ti)σ2
− a(ti−)
λ(ti−)σ2 .
Observe that due to (A.4)
χi =
λ(ti)σ
2
a(ti)
− λ(ti−)σ
2
a(ti−) .
Then simple calculations and (A.6) show
a(ti)
λ(ti)σ2
− a(ti−)
λ(ti−)σ2 =
λ(ti−)σ2
a(ti−) −
λ(ti)σ
2
a(ti)
λ(ti)σ2
a(ti)
λ(ti−)σ2
a(ti−)
= − χi(
λ(ti−)σ2
a(ti−) + χi
)
λ(ti−)σ2
a(ti−)
= χ˜i.
Hence, (A.5) holds for all t ∈ [0, ti]. Again with the help of Lemma A.1, (A.5) holds for all
t ∈ [0, ti+1). This proves the assertion by induction.
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List of abbreviations
a.s. almost surely
càdlàg right continuous with left limits (continu à droite, limites à gauche)
w.r.t. with respect to
HJB Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
ODE ordinary differential equation
PDE partial differential equation
PIDE partial integro-differential equation
SDE stochastic differential equation
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List of symbols
List of symbols: general model
α instantaneous insider trading rate (absolutely continuous θ), 12
θ insider strategy, 10
P market price process of the risky asset, 9
T trading horizon, 9
V fundamental value process of the risky asset, 9
W θT terminal wealth of the insider, according to the strategy θ, 10
X demand process of the noise traders, 10
Y total order process, 9
P admissible pricing rules, 12
S admissible insider strategies, 11
U utility function (of the insider), 11
FIt σ-algebra, insider’s information at time t, 10
FMt σ-algebra, market makers’ information at time t, 10
F
I filtration of the insider, := (FIt )t≥0, 10
F
M filtration of the market makers, := (FMt )t≥0, 10
List of symbols: additional symbols in Chapter 3
−β degree of risk aversion, 26
ηt conditional mean of Z with respect to FMt , 64
γt conditional variance of Z with respect to FMt , 64
λ(t) price pressure, 26
µ(t, Y˜t, V ) noise drift, informed part of X, 27
σ(t) noise volatility, 25
ξ weighted (according to λ) total uninformed order process, 26
B Brownian motion, noise part of X, 25
H(t, Y˜t) market price according to the pricing function H depending on the weighted
total order, 26
h value function of the risky asset, 25
I information process (stochastic filtering), FM-Brownian motion, 60
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List of symbols: additional symbols in Chapter 4
J value function of the insider’s optimisation problem for a general utility func-
tion, 28
J0 value function of the insider’s optimisation problem, risk neutral case, 28
Jβ value function of the insider’s optimisation problem, exponential utility with
parameter β, 32
J0,t risk neutral value function of an auxiliary optimisation problem with trading
horizon t, 49
m(t) noise drift intensity, 36
y∗(t, V ) implicit order volume of the fundamental value, i.e. H(t, y∗(t, V )) := V , 26
Y¯ volatility adjusted total order process, 59
Y˜ weighted total order process, according to λ, 26
Z transformed fundamental value, := h−1(V ), 25
S(H,λ) set of (H,λ) admissible insider strategies, 27
V image of the value function h, := h(R), 26
E
v expectation with respect to Pv, 28
P
v probability measure under which V = v, 28
P
β
P equivalent probability measure induced by risk aversion (with degree −β),
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List of symbols: additional symbols in Chapter 4
χi conditional variance of ∆ZTi given ∆XTi , 79
ηt conditional mean of Zt with respect to FMt , 102
γt conditional variance of Zt with respect to FMt , 101
κi conditional mean of ∆ZTi given ∆XTi , 79
Λ important process used for determination of equilibrium, 80
λ price pressure process for continuous changes in the order process, 80
µ(t, Ut) noise drift, informed part of X, 82
ν(dζ) Lévy measure of N(dt,dζ), 78
ϕ price pressure process for jumps in the order process, 80
σ volatility of continuous noise, 75
ξ weighted (according to λ and ϕ) total uninformed order, 81
B Brownian motion, continuous noise part of X, 75
H(t, Y˜t, U¯t) market price according to the pricing function H, 81
I continuous information process (stochastic filtering), FM-Brownian motion,
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J value function of the insider’s optimisation problem, 83
m(t, U¯t) noise drift intensity, 85
N(dt,dζ) poisson random measure on R3, drives the underlying jump process, 78
N¯(dt,dζ) compensated poisson random measure, :=N(dt,dζ)− ν(dζ)dt, 79
118
List of symbols: additional symbols in Chapter 4
Nt := N(t,R
3 \ {0}), poisson process, 79
S model horizon determining process (market cooling), 76
Ti, i ∈ N0 jump times of N , 79
Ut := (Λt, λt, St, Zt, Y˜t), 81
U¯t := (Λt, λt, St), 81
U ξt := (Λt, λt, St, Zt, ξt), 81
Xd discontinuous part of X, shot noise, 75
y∗(t, Ut) implicit order volume of the fundamental value, i.e. H(t, y∗(t, Ut), U¯t) := Vt,
81
Y˜ weighted total order process, according to λ and ϕ, 80
Z transformed fundamental value process of the risky asset, 75
D¯ state space of (t ∧ T, U¯t∧T )t≥0, 81
D∗ state space of (t ∧ T,U ξt∧T )t≥0, 81
D := D∗ ∩ (R3 × (0,∞)×R2), 83
S(H,λ, ϕ) set of (H,λ, ϕ) admissible insider strategies, 90
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